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CONTENTS

SAINT SUNDARAR'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND BHAKTI

By M. A. Dorai Rangaswamy .. 1

HINDU CULTURAL PATTERN

By M. S. Gopalakrishnan .. 5

SANSKRIT DRAMA AND PERFORMANCE

By V. Raghavan .. 11

DIALECTICS OF DIFFERENCE

By P. K. Sundaram and S. Subrahmanya Sastri .. 31

BOOK REVIEWS .. 63

Supplement

THE DESTINY OF MAN AND INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

By P. Chenchiah .. 1

Saint Sundarar's Philosophy of Art and Bhakti

by

M. A. Dorai Rangaswamy

Department of Tamil

In the hymn on Ōṇakāntaṉ taḷi, we find that our Saint Sundarar is giving his philosophy of Art or 'Kalai': "Kalai amaitta kāmac ceṟṟak kurōta lōpa mata varuṭai": (H.7: 5: 8). Here he is referring to the six passions of man: Kāma, Krōdha, Lōbha, Mada, Moha and Matsara. They are referred to as having been established in the scheme of the Universe for 'Kalai' or Art. These are the most powerful emotions and when they are sublimated they become poetic sentiments, 'rasas' or 'cuvai' or 'meyppāṭu' which are said to form the very life of poetry or art. Art, according to Aristotle's theory of Catharsis or purging, evokes these emotions but in such a way that artist and critic become masters of these emotions rather than their slaves, with the result that their minds remain purified, being purged of all the riotous effects of these emotions. At the end there is a calmness or peace which is after all the real bliss. It is this sublimation of the passions which our poet speaks of as 'Ulaiyamaittal', i.e., preparing for their enjoyment even as the cook prepares for the feast of rice by starting the oven, in the same verse. The fire of the oven here reminds us of the tapas involved in the creation of art — the tapas which transforms these diabolical emotions into divine art. Art was looked upon by a few schools of Jains as something worldly. Music, for instance, was identified with erotic love; a great artist like Tiruttakka Tēvar describes Kāmam as 'Vīṇaiccelvam' (Cintāmaṇi, V. 411), as the wealth of music or lyre. But Sambandar and Sundarar have experienced God Himself as a form of Art and they identify God with Art. Music, thus spiritualized according to Sambandar removes the emotions like anger or Krōdha (3: 78: 10)—"Ēḻu icaikkiḷaviyāl veñciṉam oḷittavar". Like Tyāgarāja and Purandara Dās, Sundarar also has realized the spiritual heights to which Art takes us.

The spiritualized music leads to God. What Prof. Srinivasachariar says about Tyāgarāja applies to Sundarar as well but

unfortunately we know nothing about the music of his compositions or of his age. Sundarar's age was an age of renaissance in music as is proved by Kuṭimiyāmalai musical inscription of Mahēndravarman and Tēvāram is probably the product of this renaissance. Prof. Srinivasachariar writes:

"Music aids *mukti* as Brahman is *rasa* or songs vibrating through the universe and it has its fruition in *yōga* and *bhōga*. The mind is spontaneously centred in Divine Love and joy wells up from within. The beauty of Tyagarāja's music lies in the concretising of the rare *rāgas* into *kīrtanas* and lyric music and in the marvellous development of the *sangatis* or musical notes of scales with shades of sweetness swelling from within. The rhythm of *rāgas* is different from that of words, as the inner music vanishes the moment it is dissected by grammar and logic. Every *rāga* has its specific mood and the *rāgas* sung by him exhaust almost the whole gamut of emotions. In his songs he saw Rāma face to face, spoke to Him heart to heart and passed through all *bhāvas* and he felt it his mission to spread the spell of Rāmanāma. The mystic would sometimes enter into the bridal mood like that of Sīta and express his moods of separation, remorse and assault. When the mystic mood ripened, he entered into *sannyāsa* and soon after into the security of *tanmaya* and *sāyujya*. He became a mellowed philosopher as age advanced and his *bhakti* for *Rāma* transcended prayer and praise. In sweetness of diction, beauty of *bhāva,* free flow of imagination, in the blending of music and musing and finally in the rich variety of mystic experience musically inspired, he stands in South India unmatched in the realm of (modern) musical mysticism" (Mystics and Mysticism, pp. 280-281). (We may read this same for Sundarar, just supplying the words Siva for Rama, Sundarar for Tyagarāja, and Sivanāma for Ramanāma and for Sita, the lady love.)

It is in this view, that we can understand our poet speaking of dance, music and poetry as modes of worship and as forms of the Lord. In this connection, we may remember Gñānasambandar speaking of 'Pāṭal neṟi' and 'Āṭal neṟi' (2:44:5), 'the Path of Poetry or music' and 'the Path of Dance' in the same way in which others speak of Karma mārga, Jñāna mārga and Bhakti mārga. Even the forms of the temples and the images as works of art are the various forms of beauty in which the Lord incarnates as it were, Beauty being the Absolute. Thus Art itself

becomes purified and deified in our poet's aesthetics. Temple cult thus receives a new interpretation in this theory of Art. It looks as though we can group all kinds of worship around this theory of Art divine.

In another place, Nampi Ārūrar speaks of Śiva as the significance of all arts: "Palkalaipporuḷē" (7:69:10); "Nirampu Palkalaiyiṉ poruḷālē poṟṟit taṉkaḻal toḻumavaṉ" (7:62:6)—'The Bhakta takes refuge in his feet realizing the truth of the various arts so full of His Grace praising Him with the words of these arts. Education is thus deified and he speaks of the Lord as one who is worshipped by the educated—"Kaṟṟavar paravappaṭuvāṉ" (7:61:11). The darkness of this Universe is cleared by that light which is no other than God. It is a pure light, the light of Grace, piercing through the darkness enshrouding the Universe of sound and the Universe of matter: "Coṟpatapporuḷ iruḷaruttaruḷum tūya cōti" (7:68:6). 'Those who realize God as the greatest Good, speak that the Lord resides in all their words'—"Naṟpatam eṉṟuṇarvār coṟpatamār Śivaṉ" (7:84:3). 'They read and realize the truth. They think of your greatness; their hearts melt. They give expression to the music of their hearts in poetry. There I realize you'—"Ōtal uṇarntaṭiyār uṉ perumaikku niṉaintu uḷḷurukā viracum ōcaiyaip paṭalum nī āṭal uṇarntu......aṭiyēṉ" (7:84:2).

God is therefore knowledge, the resultant experience of all education and art. He is, therefore, addressed as 'Aṟivē' (7:6:4; &: 24: 9 etc.). Usually this knowledge or Jñānam is considered under two heads: (1) the Parajñāna, the supreme direct knowledge or divine experience; (2) the Aparajñāna, the lower knowledge or the indirect knowledge about the Lord and the direct knowledge of other things. Cēkkiḻār speaks of them as "Civañānam" and "Kalaiñānam" (Campantar Purāṇam, v. 70). Sundarar shows the way to sublimate even the lower knowledge into the supreme knowledge. As the Upanisads often say, "When the mud, the root cause is known, all the mud vessels are known; when God is known, everything also is known". Knowledge at that stage ceases to be mere knowledge but experience 'Aṟivu'; there is blissful 'Aṉpu'. The great Advaitist Madhusūdana Sarasvati identifies both Bhakti and Brahmavidya in his Bhaktirasāyana. That is Parabhakti or Sādhya Bhakti, Bhakti as the

end and goal and not Bhakti as the means to that goal. It is from this point of view that Tirumantiram identifies 'Anpu' with 'Sivam' (V. 270). Kaṇṇappar, the hunter saint, who never went to any school for education, is praised by Sundarar as "Kalai malinta cīr Nampi Kaṇṇappaṛ" (7:39:2)—'the prince of that greatness full of arts'. Now this greatness can only be the greatness of this Bhakti or Love which according to Sundarar is equivalent to the resultant of all Arts.

Hindu Cultural Pattern*

by

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I

India has been an abode of various cultures and cultural groups through the centuries. Some of these were brought into this land by conquerors and some were indigenous,—though a few remained uninfluenced by those of the immigrants. In recent times this influence was further intensified.

India contains countless castes and tribes; and each one of these has a character of its own. With the arrival of the Aryans, Kushans, Arabs, Afghans, Moghuls, Portuguese, the Dutch, French and especially the British, the impact of foreign cultures on an ancient people came to wield an ever growing impact on their beliefs and modes of living.

Hindu culture is a very complex system and this has part of its roots in the sacred and spiritual writings of India's saints and teachers, and parts in the traditions of preliterate societies. The theme of Hindu culture found literary formulation in most of the Indian languages.

The village in India is the focus of the socio-cultural, economic and religious institutions and activities of the Hindus. A village in itself is a traditional unit, but it might contain many different castes and other groups belonging to different creeds.

A Hindu in a village is attracted to the village temple and what village life there is, it centres round the village temple. The great annual religious festivals in these village temples bring

* In the preparation of this paper, I am indebted to Dr. U. R. Baron Ehrenfels, Ph.D. (Vienna) for all his valuable corrections and suggestions.

together all the people living in the village and its neighbourhood.

It was considered a sacred act, if one were to meet the expenses of a day's festival or if one were to give in charity food or money to the priests or to the poor on festive times.

The incentive for such gifts was the desire to accumulate *punyam;* the rich donate large sums for the temples; they build these largely in honour of Vishnu, Siva or Subrahmanya and make gifts to the *maths* of religious heads. And the heads of various maths following the traditions of Hinduism are thought of to preserve and propagate ethical and religious principles. Food is given to Sadhus, daily in some Hindu families, and in some others rice is given in charity to the poor on every Saturday in the week. Most of the Hindus dread the influences of Saturn. Hindu women generally visit village-goddess shrine on Fridays and prepare rice offerings to the Goddess in the temple itself.

The belief in re-birth is a wide spread and fundamental concept of Hindu weltenschaung. He thinks that this birth again into a world of misery should be avoided. To avoid this, one should perform meritorious deeds. Hindus also believe in the potency of evil powers or spirits which could bring on great pains to an individual. Those who dread these evil spirits wear amulets or talismans. Most break coconuts to the elephant-headed god—Vigneswara, to overcome obstacles and failure. Even some non-brahmin women go and wait in front of mosques with their sickly children to see some religious and spiritually evolved moslim who could cure the latter and cast off the evil influences from which they suffer. Prosperity or sufferings according to Hindu view comes from *punyam* or *pāpam.* Also the belief in omens is basic and a Hindu's mind is not entirely free from superstitions which are difficult to explain. He has his numberless deities and their attendants; there are priests in all communities of Hindus; and also there are very commonly consulted practitioners of astrology, as also "magic" and sorcery.

Life in the village revolves round a religious and another secular centre, i.e. the village temple and the home of the richest man in the village. Even from very early age a child comes into contact with persons belonging to communities different from his/her own.

In an Hindu society the individual achieves a status and prestige by his or her inherited social and economic position and in the second place by personal worth and actions. Men of high birth and social importance occupy the foremost rank in social gatherings and within the family the elders receive respect from younger members. An individual has to obey his or her parents, guardians, and elder brothers,—show regard to elders or follow the ways of the community to which he or she belongs by birth. The man of status is offered a special seat; and in the past the village community looked for elder men only to guide its affairs.

Lack of initiative, original thinking and certain meekness of the Hindu character have often been linked causally with this situation. Yet, a certain sense of personal freedom,—freedom in judgment is there. Personal freedom does not mean among traditional Hindus that one should be completely independent in all important decisions of life which one has to take. The Hindu believes in the virtue of understanding interdependent alliances of various kinds. He speaks much of the philosophy of non-attachment, but at the same time he is attached to many things of this world. He tends to think too high of his own caste and too low of others in the same fold. In some of the villages also today the majority follows the caste profession.

The Hindus love to have children. The children are bathed and anointed by women, but generally named by men. The arrival of a child into a family invites the neighbours. The Hindus pray for the birth of male children, as there is a strong patriarchal accent in Hindu society, except its matrilineal branches. The moment a child is born, the time of birth is noted for information of the local astrologer.

The child receives a good deal of attention from its parents, and their relatives,—before and after birth, until the age of five, it remains mostly with its mother. She looks to all its needs till it learns from her fully as to take care of itself. Women in Hindu India have always had a place of ideological distinction, though little influence on the management of society. In all religious and social rites of the Hindus they have a share. Though the religious role of goddesses (Devi-worship", "Village mother-goddess worship", etc.) is very prominent, the actual role played by all Hindu women,—except those of the matrilineal groups in the

south,—is characterized by a number of restrictions. Until quite recent legislation changed the position, a Hindu woman had no right to inherit paternal property, to re-marry as widow or divorce, or to marry on her own decision. Especially the laws of early and hypergamous marriage, but also the custom to eat only after men finished their meals, to serve them and get up when talking even to related men of the same generation and age are all characteristic expressions of the patriarchal accent in Hindu society. Yet, husbands would generally consult their wives in what all they have to do for the welfare of the family. And in a Hindu family the father has all authority and is generally obeyed by all. Parents in old age depend on their children.

II

The educated Hindu says that one should work without expecting any rewards for his labour. But,—nowadays at any rate—most Hindus work only for rewards. 'Nishkāmyakarma" is a fine ethical tenet in Hindu sacred texts,—scarcely to be practised in actual life. Generally a Hindu believes in fate and resigns everything to Time. He thinks that it is Time that works out everything.

In the many castes of Hindus we find significant differences not only in their status, position and functions, but also in their general education and outlook. Hindu culture is no doubt to some extent patterned on the structure of the Hindu caste system.

Hindu culture of today is a chaotic mass of traditional culture-elements combined with various and in part perhaps unwanted elements of alien civilizations. This culture has been passing through diverse types of changes according to the nature of the impact of alien cultures, say Greek, Islamic or European on its workings. Whatever might have been the effects of such impacts of such extra-Indian cultures, Hindu culture has essentially remained an unifying force of different ideas which have been incorporated into the Hinduistic area from the Himalayas to the Cape. It is a mistake to think as some do that Hindu culture is primarily brahminic; brahminic culture is only one element of the many colourful elements in Hindu culture.

A Hindu is always in search for the unity of ideals. And such an unity he sees in cultures and faiths even other than his own.

His culture has enabled him to understand other cultures. Still, as he feels the impact of change in every sphere, he becomes sometimes a problem unto himself tortured by his sense of traditions, and by his situation in life. As he gets himself lost in the day's routine, he seeks meditation in busy market places, and learns the mysteries of life through cinemas, pictures, dailies and gramaphone records. No doubt that there has been a revival of Hindu culture after the withdrawal of the British from India. But the fact cannot be denied that a sense of equality between individuals is developing now which is not based on the cultural traditions of *Varnāshrama Dharma,* but on a sense of self-esteem and acquired values. In his willingness to adjust himself to the changing conditions of industrialization and mechanization, he unconsciously imitates those who have created these conditions and often have nothing in common with him. Then he cuts himself away from his own traditional past and what he is by nature to become what he should be by necessity. He has come to value situations much more than cultural needs.

The pattern of the many existing variations in Hindu culture today is not what it was a few decades ago, and then it was different from hundred, or thousand or two thousand years before. It has changed as the patterns of other cultures all over the world have also changed. The present change is mostly seen as the result of many scientific innovations, of mechanization, industrialization and urbanization in this century. Hindu culture has to an extent assimilated these elements of world culture. Modern man in no part of the earth feels himself isolated from another of his own species; every individual has come to think that he or she is only a member of the world community. Whatever culture trait which is not Hinduistic if seen in the pattern of Hindu culture as one assimilated from a pattern of world culture as one sees now, we have to see whether this assimilation has not or has marred the traditions of the ancient Hindu culture.

By tradition is here meant not the mere forms of customs, rites and practices, but also the spirit, the life force that animates the Hindu way of life through the ages. This force was kept alive amidst all onslaughts of different kinds by the great sacrifices of master minds. What one sees now is that this life force of Hindu culture does not shine forth brightly. This does not mean to say here that it has become weak. The culture is alive, but the roots

of this culture are decaying. The communities which preserve this culture are alive, but they come to conflicts.

To end with the words of G. P. Murdock:—"The net effect of the various processes of cultural change is to adapt the collective habits of human societies progressing over time to the changing conditions of existence. Change is always uncomfortable and often painful, and people frequently become discouraged with its slowness or even despair of achieving any genuine improvement. ....".

Sanskrit Drama and Performance*

by

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The word Nāṭya means and comprises both dance and drama. The dual meaning signifies also the fact that drama, as conceived by Bharata, is an integrated art of music, dance, action and poetry. Bharata Nāṭya is as glorious an achievement of the ancient Indian genius as Sanchi Śilpa or Ajanta Citra, nay, as the Viṣṇu-dharmottara says, the very basis of the latter arts. The highest literary creations of ancient India, the works of Kālidāsa and Śūdraka, lie in it; an understanding of its technique is necessary to appreciate the several regional and popular dance-drama traditions surviving in the country. What a wonderful medium it was cannot be better demonstrated than by the sway its technique and theme gained in the entire East and South-East Asia which it helped to consolidate into a cultural homogenity still happily undestroyed.

The antiquity and indigenous growth of this art are clear from early literary evidences. The Ṛgveda has many references to it, the most noteworthy one being in the beautiful description of dawn as a bright-attaired danseuse.[1] By about 500 B.C. the art of actors had become sufficiently developed, for the great grammarian Pāṇini[2] informs us that two authors, Śīlālin and Kṛśāśva, had by that time codified the art into aphoristic texts, the Naṭa Sūtras.

The epics, which Kauṭilya in the fourth century B.C. knew, and Buddhistic literature bear out the popularity of this art. We have also fragments of a peculiar kind of play called Vāsavadattā-nāṭya-dhārā, surviving in quotations, which Subandhu a poet and minister of the Mauryan court about this time wrote and in which

*Paper presented at the Drama Seminar organised by the Central Sangita Nataka Akademi, Delhi, March 1956; published here with their permission.

1. I.92.4.
2. IV.3.110, 111.

he developed in a series of play within play his theme which portrayed court intrigue and used the story of King Udayana and Vāsavadattā.[3] In the middle of the second century B.C. Patañjali, the grammarian, speaks of many things pertaining to the art, the Raṅga or stage, the music, the verses, the actors, the themes of binding Bali and killing Kamsa and even the concept of Rasa or Sentiment and emotional response. A rectangular terracota tablet dug up at the Bhir Mound site at Taxila, considered pre-Mauryan, already depicts one of the poses described by Bharata among the hundred and eight Karaṇas of his Nāṭya Śāstra. If we follow Johnston who has re-edited the poems of Aśvaghoṣa, this Buddhistic poet flourished in the first cent. B.C.; the fragments of his plays which have been discovered in the Central Asian excavations show that the degree of development and perfection seen in them warrants a long period of growth for Sanskrit drama extending to some centuries in the pre-Christian era.

After the Naṭa Sūtras mentioned by Pāṇini, there arose more detailed texts dealing with the art of the actors. This we know from the earliest available work dealing with the Indian theatre arts, the Nāṭya Śāstra of sage Bharata. This text, usually placed between 200 B.C. and 200 A.D., incorporates within itself portions of earlier texts, aphoristic and longer prose passages, and memorised verses handed down in the line of the actors. Also the state of ramification of the art seen in this text is such that many centuries of growth have to be pre-supposed.

Stages and strands in the formation of this art can be traced. In the Nāṭya Śāstra, Bharata tells us that Nāṭya was extracted out of the Vedas, — the spoken or recited word from the Ṛg Veda, the song from the Sāma Veda, the action from the Yajur Veda and the sentiments from the Atharva Veda. Modern historians like Keith would also see for Indian drama a religious origin in the Vedic sacrificial ritual where the performer who has to put on a specific dress, recite a specified hymn, and go through a specified course of action or enact an incident does all that is meant by an actor and dramatic action. When an original myth is gone through again and again as a rite, it becomes an *anukāra* or imitation of an action, drama. One of the earliest themes to be thus reproduced, according to Bharata, is the imitation of the victory of the gods over the demons, the story of the churning of

3. See my notes on this play in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, XIX, pp. 69-71, and XX, p. 85, p. 366.

the ocean. Side by side with this heroic action, there was also a popular phase which too Bharata does not fail to mention. There was a burlesque or comic display, parodying and imitating the higher folk in which pastime the lower strata of society were indulging.[4] Drama grew from this popular source also. Both these aspects, the religious and the heroic from the one end and the popular and the comic from the other, converged towards a common venue when great national festivals were celebrated. The greatest of such festivals of ancient India was that of Indra's Flagstaff, the Indradhvaja-maha or Śakra-maha. Bharata's text opens with this festival as the occasion of the first drama; later when drama became the main event, the festival shrank but stuck to the drama as a preliminary ritual consisting of the worship of a bamboo pole, *jarjara,* representing Indra's flagstaff and attendent music and dance referred to as Pūrva-raṅga. In Tamil dance-tradition this staff survives as the *Talaikkol,* the symbol of the danseuse and her high attainments; and to this day, in Indonesia, the tree or twig planted before any play is begun, represents Indra's Flagstaff. The preliminary music and dance called Pūrva-raṅga has a counterpart in the popular stage and Kathakali, and in dance also, but its fuller form can be seen in the Indonesian theatre.

It is interesting also to trace the stages by which the various components of the art came together and how, from less perfect forms, the fuller ones evolved. The word *Nṛt* means also exercise, *Vyāyāma,* and in Vedic literature, we have evidence disclosing funerary associations in dance and drama. After the obsequial ceremonies were over, the ancients went for disporting themselves with dance or physical exercises and merriment, *Nṛti,* and *Hasa.*[5] In Bali we know that the plays are staged during the season when the spirits of ancestors are supposed to come down to their former homes, the *Galoengen,* something like our *Mahālayapakṣa.* The merriment on such occasions consists of displays of physical exercises, Vyāyāma, and duels, swordplay etc. Students of Bharata's text know that among the numerous poses and movements and modes of action described by Bharata, there are what are called the 108 Karaṇas, many of which are difficult of execution, and are of acrobatic nature, and also those that are called Vṛttis, Nyāyas or Pravicāras and refer to movements and poses in

4. See the last chapter of Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra.
5. RV. X. 18.3.

handling and hurling weapons and Sthānas or poses in shooting. The word Raṅga is common to both the arena for tournaments and the stage for drama. Among the dances of Bali, we have still those connected with the handling of weapons and duels. Bharata expressly mentions acrobatic use among the purposes of the Karaṇas. Again, the same authority says that originally the preliminaries of a play were simple, but later the Tāṇḍava with all its Karaṇas were added at the instance of Śiva to make the show richer and more attractive. The first themes to be played were purely masculine heroic myths like the fight of the gods and demons; on the success of this play Bharata says, the women-actresses, the Apsarasas, were added to impart additional grace and charm, and the theme of love and the arts of music and dance.

Of the modes or styles of dramatic expression described by Bharata,—the Vṛttis[6] already referred to,—one is called Bhāratī; the Bhāratī is the name of the verbal mode of expression; all places in a drama where speech predominates and all specimens of drama which carry on solely through the verbal medium form the provenance of this Bhāratī Vṛtti. Among the ten forms of drama described by Bharata, three pertain to this verbal group,—the monologue called Bhāṇa, the farce called Prahasana and the Vīthī which is a series of verbal exchanges between two persons. Patañjali speaks in his Mahābhāṣya of two kinds of shows, that of the Grānthikas which was based on a text and that of the Śobhanikas which was based on action;[7] the former was a verbal recital as in the case of the early epic recitals or the expositions of later Kathakas; the latter, presentation of a story by action unaided by words. With reference to the music, Bharata has the story of how the co-operation of the Asuras was sought and how they contributed the embellishment of instrumental music to the drama. It is on the coalescence of these different forms or elements that the full-fledged drama with men and women artistes, with speech, action, music and dance gradually took shape.

As mentioned above, ten kinds of drama or Rūpaka are described by Bharata. These ten kinds called 'Daśa-rūpaka' can be distinguished into two classes, the major varieties and the minor ones or the perfect specimens and the imperfect ones. From

6. See my article on these in the *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, Vols. VI, pp. 346-379, VII. pp. 32-52, pp. 73-112.

7. *Ibid.*, Vol. VI. p. 364.

another point of view, these ten kinds fall into the two classes, the Heroic and the Social. Now, two of the ten varieties are major specimens, the Nāṭaka in which the heroic trend reaches its perfection and the Prakaraṇa in which the social trend attains its full scope of development. Among the lesser varieties under the heroic are the Samavakāra, Ḍima, Vyāyoga, Aṅka and Īhāmṛga; and among smaller ones under the social type are the Prahasana, the Bhāṇa and the Vīthī. The heroic category portrays actions of gods or epic heroes, their fights and the consequence thereof, types which probably still survive in Java and Bali in the dramatic *Baris.*[8] The social type depicts the life and love affairs of common men.[9] The former presents before us the examples of supermen, while the latter holds the mirror up to the world.

This analysis of the varieties of Sanskrit drama to the two ultimate characteristics of the heroic and the social, would bring it into some similarity to the Greek theatre with its two types, the tragedy and the comedy. Orientalists of the West have striven to show that Sanskrit drama developed under Greek influence. The height of Greek influence was in the first century B.C. but as we have seen above, Sanskrit drama had developed much earlier. The Indian theatre had already a rich variety of dramatic forms not met with in the Greek. The tragedy was the highest form of Greek drama and the Sanskrit theatre never developed anything like the Greek tragedy; in fact, its philosophy prohibited any death on the stage or any conclusion of the drama with death. The Sanskrit stage had no chorus like the Greek and of the three unities insisted upon by the Greek theory, those of time and place were thrown to the winds completely by the Indian theory and practice. The Indian drama was also very much bigger than its Greek counterpart. There is also no resemblance between the theatre of Greece and the three varities of it, the rectangular, the square and the triangular, described at some length by Bharata.[10] The Greek theory of Terror, Pity and Katharsis is scrappy by the side of the full Rasa-theory of Bharata, whose treatise is more

8. See Dance & Drama in Bali by Beryl de Zoete & Walter Spies, Faber & Faber, London.

9. See my 'The Social Play in Sanskrit', Indian Institute of Culture, Bangalore, 1952.

10. See my articles on Theatre-Architecture in Ancient India in the *Triveni,* Madras, Vol. IV. No. 6, pp. 69-77, Vol. V. No. IV, pp. 357-366 and also pp. 991-4, *Indian Historical Quarterly,* Vol. IX. See also my chapter on this subject in the *Theatre of the Hindus,* Calcutta.

complete than Aristotle's Poetics and Rhetoric put together. Some evidence is drawn from the name Yavanikā applied to the curtain and the presence among royal attendents on the stage, of Yavana women; the latter is of no value and the former would have some force if we did not have such indigenous and appropriate names for the curtain as Apaṭī, Paṭī, Tiraskariṇī, Pratisīrā and even the form Yamanikā. More important than all these are those characteristic features of the Indian drama which are absent from the Greek, like the multilingual medium, of Sanskrit and different kinds of Prākṛts which Sanskrit drama employs. Sylvain Levi propounded the theory that Sanskrit drama evolved under Śaka influence in Western India; his grounds were far less substantial. As Keith says, Sanskrit drama had an indigenous origin and growth. Of course, in technique and ideology, the Indian drama is something totally different from the Hellenic.

The Sanskrit drama opens with a Prologue in which the Manager and a companion converse and introduce the poet and the play. The theme is organised in Acts called Aṅkas, ranging from four to ten. There may be a change of scene within an Act, but no scenic divisions within an Act are indicated. The Acts contain a continuous action not exceeding the duration of a day. The Acts may have an introductory scene with higher or lower characters, the purpose of this being to give the link or continuity in the story and to enlighten the audience by narration, report or dialogue about events which could not be shown on the stage in the course of the main Acts. No character can enter without having been indicated already. The text of the play is in a mixed prose and verse style, the verse appearing wherever there is need for a striking expression or heightened effect. Like the mixture of prose and verse, there is also a mixture of the learned and the popular tongues, the higher strata and the educated male characters speaking Sanskrit and the lower classes and the ladies barring courtezans, speaking Prākṛts, sometimes of different kinds according to the number and nature of the lower characters. The action may be of short duration or one spread over years, and similarly, played in a specific place or spread over different places. The theme may be taken from well-known epics or invented or mixed; even when the story is well-known, the dramatist could make innovations to suit his dramatic idea and purpose, for what the Sanskrit drama endeavours to present is a harmonious character and harmonious emotional impression in the spectators' hearts. The drama should have a happy ending.

With these ends in view, the dramatist handled the factors of his theme, the story, the character and the sentiment according to the idea he had taken on hand. Those incidents in the story which were not necessary for his plot or those which were in conflict with his main idea, he eschewed or re-modelled. Similarly with the traits in the characters handled by him, he created his own character out of the personality handed to him. Story and character which are all in all in western drama were subordinated in Indian dramaturgy to the Sentiment or Rasa of which they were vehicles. This does not mean that the plot and the character were neglected. Bharata's systematic analysis of the technique of plot-construction would refute such a criticism. Any action has three main stages, the beginning, the middle and the end; a thing is aimed at and for that a start is made, effort taken and continued, and accessory help sought to overcome obstacles, and finally the end is realised. In this course, Bharata analyses action in two ways, the elements of the action and the stages of the action, each of which are five. The five elements of the action or the Artha-prakṛtis are the Seed, the Continuity, the Major episode, e.g., in the Rāmāyaṇa story, the acquisition by Rāma of Sugrīva's friendship, the Minor episode, e.g., the friendship of Vibhīṣaṇa, and the Purpose; the five states are Beginning, Effort, Hope, Surety and Fruition. When these conjointly operate they produce, as it were, five junctures through which the plot passes, the Opening, the Progression, the Development, the Pause and the Conclusion. Similarly, character-types are analysed; to take for example only the hero, four main types are set forth, the Sublime, the Impetuous, the Gay and the Subdued; the epic-heroes like Rāma come under the first, the Sublime; the demons and fierce characters come under the Impetuous; lovers like Udayana come under the Gay; and others, Brahmans, ministers, merchants and the like, e.g., Cārudatta in the Mṛcchakaṭika, under the last, the Subdued. Besides, by age and emotional situation and temperament, men and women[11] were studied and classified in great detail. The intention of Bharata in all these analyses was that the actors who were to play the different roles should have a complete understanding of the nature of the characters to be represented by them. In conformity with Indian mythology, literature, sculpture and painting, Indian drama too personified ideas and aspects of Nature, and made them part of darmatis personae.

11. See the Introduction in my edition of the Śṛṅgāramañjarī, Hyderabad Archaeological Departmental Publication, 1951.

As already said, while the story and the character had their own places, the soul of the play is the Rasa, the portrayal of emotion and the evocation of the same in the spectator's heart so that he might identify himself completely in one communion and become immersed in a certain serenity of heart or mental repose called *Hṛdaya-viśrānti*. Rasa has two phases, one the sentiments called heroism, love, laughter, wonder, etc., forming part of the theme of the play, and another that final transcendent blissful experience of the aesthetically responsive spectator's heart which results from witnessing these emotions in the play, contemplating on them and allowing them to touch the corresponding chords in one's own being and thereby getting one's being absorbed in the blissful state that has been awakened. Of the Rasas of the theme, eight, nine or even a few more are recognised, Love, Heroism, Pathos, Laughter, Terror, Fear, Wonder, Loathsomeness, Quietude and so on. It is to bring out a harmonious impression on the spectator that incongruous elements in story and conflicts in a character are resolved by the dramatist. The purpose of drama is to compose the conflicts, not to aggravate them or leave the spectator more disturbed at the end than he was when he entered the theatre. Tragedy or cruelty and suffering are not completely eschewed by the Sanskrit dramatist, for these he takes in under his Karuṇa Rasa and the villain or Pratināyaka; but only, according to the view of life under which his genius has flourished, he believes that suffering is not the end of the scheme; as in that story-complex of Kādambarī, he would even take his couples through many deaths and births to unite them completely. Incidentally, it might also be added that the Sanskrit Rasa theory has its own noteworthy solution to the vexed question of how one happens to enjoy tragedy on the stage. According to the Sanskrit aesthete, the thing is not so much enjoyment as absorption, *āveśa*, which is achieved by the preponderance of the mental quality or guṇa called Sattva; the artistic presentation brings on the full play Sattva-guṇa which overpowers Rajo-guṇa the cause of the mental disturbance called misery. It is in so far as art is a help to bring forth in an increasing measure the play of the Sattva-guṇa whereby repose and serenity are attained, and a glimpse, however temporary, is gained of the ineffable Spirit, that art is valued by us as an important spiritual sādhana.

In the presentation of the plot as well as in the production of the play, Bharata's stage shows features of artistic value and refinement to which it is worthwhile to draw attention today

when our notions have undergone a change on the impact of the modern western theatre and the film. From out of the many phases and incidents of the story, the Sanskrit drama makes a selection and presents in the actual main Act only such parts or actions which are elegant and sublime and full of emotional possibilities; parts of the story which are long, tedious and devoid of interest or action-possibilities are summarised and communicated or indicated in the interludes. On the stage, such actions as eating or taking to the bed, dressing, kissing — all such trivial or indecorous activities are prohibited. As it is more germane to art to depict on a character the effect of an incident or happening, Bharata eschews the actual depiction of a spectacle, of war, fire, etc., which may please the less evolved minds in the audience but not the savants who look to points of real artistic appeal. In Bhāsa's Svapnavāsavadatta, for example, a modern stage-craftsman would raise a tent-city of Lāvāṇaka and burn it before the eyes of the audience, but what Bhāsa really does is to report graphically the conflagration of Vāsavadattā and portray to us the emotional effect of it on the Queen. As Tolstoy explains, when as a result of a calamity, a character is made to weep or express pity, the feeling is transmitted from heart to heart, from the actor to the spectator, but there is no aesthetic effect if the playwright or producer kills a girl on the stage, puts out the light and brings on some background music; I would invite your attention to my more detailed treatment of this in my paper Nāṭya-dharmī.[12]

This brings us to the production technique of Bharata's stage. The Sanskrit drama is not devoid of elements of realism;[13] Bharata again and again says that the Loka or world is the ground of reference, the Pramāṇa; there is the study of characters and the adoption of appropriate multilingualism; the make-up in Bharata is very elaborate and in connection with the correct knowledge of appropriate dressing, there is extensive study of the different parts of the country and the peoples and their manners and modes of dress, coiffure, ornaments, etc. But Bharata realised that the art of drama and representation on stage have their own limitations and that it is better to devise a technique based on this realisation rather than attempt at the impossible, viz., the reproduction of natural conditions on the stage through stage-properties and

12. *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, Vol. VII, pp. 359-375.

13. Vide my paper, Loka Dharmī or Realism on Bharata's Stage, *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, VIII, pp. 57-74.

mechanics, scenes, edifices, lighting, etc., which, in the modern age of science and engineering skill, can easily dominate the stage and reduce the play and the actor to an insignificant position. Pointing out the unity that underlies in this respect the entire eastern stage, Sanskrit, Javanese, Chinese and Japanese, Coomaraswami[14] observes: "All that is not necessary to the theatre weakens its effect." The play is after all an illusion and however much one may invest on stage-machinery, one has to play in a world of illusion. But if one makes bold to give up the extraneous aids and concentrates on his own intrinsic resources of action, he automatically lays the emphasis on the excellence of the art itself. Thus the eschewal of the elaborate stage directions adds poetry, atmosphere and power to the text in which there occur descriptions of scenery or expression of feeling which when sung or said affects the characters or spectators more effectively than the spectacle itself. In the Sanskrit drama there were no scenic trappings; stage-property was at the minimum; the situation was understood from indications in the speeches and dialogues and the song of which I shall speak later; one might recall the short stage-directions called '*Parikramya*' occurring often in the text. This direction has reference to the convention called *Kakṣyā-vibhāga*[15] according to which certain parts of the stage were understood as representing certain scenes, mountain, garden, riverside and so on, and when an actor stepped round or did the Parikramaṇa, he came to the different spot, which the careful dramatist hastened to identify for you by a passage of the dialogue or description. Similarly stage properties like horses, chariots, etc., were not brought on the stage,[16] but there were appropriate stylised actions

14. *Rupam* 7, 1921, Notes on the Javanese Theatre.

15. See my Nāṭyadharmī, *Journal of Oriental Research,* Madras, Vol. VII, pp. 364-5.

16. There is however an exception to this: Sometimes some dummies were brought or set on a side, or a character brought in his own hand an object represented symbolically by a drawing. In plays on the story of Udayana in which an elephant hunt is a vital episode, an elephant model was brought on the stage (Nāṭyadarpaṇa, p. 158); for a painted figure of chariot or its parts, carried in the hand by the driver, see Abhinavabhāratī II, pp. 151-154 (GOS.); in a Ballet performance of Cyndrella which I saw in Stuttgart, the prince going in search of the heroine carried a short stick mounted with a horse-head which he inserted in between his legs, as the legs displayed the action of riding. All such properties and dummy figures introduced come under the term *Pusta,* one of the four divisions of make-up and stage outfit called *Āhārya-abhinaya* (Bharata XXIII, 5-9, Kasi edn.). Such objects were made of light material fibre, leather, cloth, wax, etc.

set forth under Āṅgika-abhinaya and Citra-abhinaya which, if done correctly, would produce the effect in an astoundingly successful manner. Thus one can, by āṅgika-abhinaya, mount and ride a horse or chariot, move in a boat, hold or wield a weapon, or throw a stone. In the Śākuntala, for instance, one might recall the brief stage-direction 'Nāṭyena avatarati'—Duṣyanta alights from the chariot by nāṭya; similarly Śakuntalā watering plants with pots and the maids plucking flowers from non-existant plants and trees. The appropriate abhinaya of the hasta and the āṅgika of the limbs do the action in a manner the remarkable successfulness of which can be seen even today in Kathakali — where the story goes that a dog nearby at which the Cākyār did the action of hurling a stone actually ran limping in one leg and howling, in the Peking Opera where on ordinary level ground two men sail in a boat tossed on troubled waters or in the Balinese drama where fully dressed ladies depict the nakedness for bath perfectly, with bashfulness and wrigglings of limbs.

In fact, the perfection of the art of gesticulation and its mastery was such that, though from the early times Bharata's players were drawn from both sexes, it hardly mattered whether or not men's parts were taken only by men and women's by women. There were, as the Kuṭṭanīmata of Dāmodaragupta shows, whole troupes manned entirely by women who played even the men's roles in their productions.

Like the abhinaya, the poetic form of the text is also a part of the Nāṭya-dharmī; the latter was further assisted by the art of music, both vocal and instrumental. An elaborate orchestra sat behind and the strings and the drums accentuated the moods and the feelings; there were different stylised gaits for the characters, determined by their nature, age and emotional condition, and as the character dragged himself in or rushed in under the stress of emotion, suggestive sound-effects on Mṛdaṅga or the Vīṇā augmented the situation. The Mṛdaṅga always led, witness the Ceṇḍai in the Kathakali; that it was the very symbol of the play may be seen in the Mālavikāgnimitra where its sound is taken as the signal for the commencement of the dance and the Caturbhāṇī where the idiomatic exclamation for something strange is given as 'a drama without a drum'.

So far as vocal singing went, there were the songs called Dhruvās which were fitted on by stage-musicians to the play; there were five of these—the Dhruvās of entrance and exit,

which informed the audience of the identity of the character entering or going out and the details of the situation and also the condition of his entry or exit, and three other Dhruvās used while the character is in the Act, the one that indicated a change in the context, the one that burnished a situation further and the fifth which was sung when there was a tense suspension or a gap in the performance. The songs which were in Prākṛt dialects and symbolic language were composed by stage-musicians on the basis of the verses and situations in the drama and an idea of these can be had from a stage version of the highly lyrical fourth Act of Kālidāsa's Vikramorvaśīya preserved in certain manuscripts. Sometimes when only a certain melodic effect was needed as background for a scene or mood, songs were sung in which the music alone mattered or instruments like the flute were used. Bharata sets forth the relation between the seven notes and the Rasas that they could suggest, as also the Jātis or musical modes which could be harnessed for particular emotional situations of the play. A writer named Kāśyapa worked out at length the Rāga-Rasa schemes for use in drama. In fact, we know of ancient music mostly as a handmaid of drama and the name Saṅgīta applied primarily to the theatrical art aided by singing and instrumentation.[17]

This was the dance-drama style in which Kālidāsa and Harṣa were produced in ancient India. This was the Nāṭya-dharmī or idealised and stylised technique which made Sanskrit drama an integrated art of poetry, music and dance, that forms the distinct characteristic of the Indian stage; it is this kind of treatment that one sees in all the surviving indigenous provincial forms in the country; it is again a composite art of this type that one meets all over the East where Indian culture had spread in the past. Bharata called this kind of production superior and more intrinsically artistic, *Ābhyantara*, and the other, the naturalistic production such as we are familiar with today, *Bāhya*, inferior or less artistic.

In a supplementary class of stage performances, which were recognised and codified in the post-Bharata times, we see this operatic and dance-drama style more pronounced. These varieties

17. For a fuller treatment of this subject of Music on Bharata's stage see my article in *Art & Letters*, London, XXVIII, 10-18, and reproduced in original or translation in different Indian Journals.

called Upa-rūpakas, numbering about twenty, were derived from popular forms and constitute the connecting link between the classic Sanskrit stage and the provincial forms in the vernaculars. Some of them are musical themes sung and danced to and interpreted closely in gesture language and some very close to dance-compositions. They show the richness and variety and the capacity for growth inherent in the Sanskrit stage.

In the field of drama itself, the most noteworthy development is the growth of a new type which combined the features of the heroic Nāṭaka and the social Prakaraṇa, the type Nāṭikā illustrated by Kālidāsa's Mālavikāgnimitra and a host of plays that arose in its wake.

From the point of view of the literary artists, we may note some of the outstanding achievements in the field of Sanskrit drama. Kālidāsa, of course, stands supreme here, as in poetry. His masterpiece Śākuntala has evoked universal praise; herein Kālidāsa gave for all poets and playwrights the ideal of the love of the first union getting chastened in the fire of separation and getting welded again into a lasting union, in which the child plays the part of the uniting knot; the play is also unrivalled for the way the poet integrates the human heart and Nature and makes even creepers and deer dramatis personae. In his Vikrama-Ūrvaśī, the poet shows the effect of Nature on the lover who is madly raving in the separation from his beloved. In his Mālavikāgnimitra which is a shorter court play, with charming motifs of dance etc., he gave the typical graft-type called Nāṭikā which poet after poet was to imitate. Before him, Kālidāsa had masters in drama like Bhāsa, Saumilla and Kaviputra, whose works are almost lost; to Bhāsa alone among these we have some thirteen plays ascribed, of which Svapnavāsavadatta appears to be genuine; this play on the story of the great lovers Udayana and Vāsavadattā discloses a real master in delineating tender and trying situations and of the heroic sacrifice that great love is capable of. Following in the footsteps of Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti of c. 700 A.D., who voiced forth the ethereal nature of love, excelled in the depiction of pathos in his play on the Later Story of Rama; Bhavabhūti who was more effusive and even prolix in expression was capable of matching sound to sense and rousing visions of the sublime and the awe-inspiring, the terrible and the loathsome as none else in Sanskrit ever was. King Harṣavardhana produced two Nāṭikās on Kālidāsa's model; of these the Ratnāvalī was a favourite of the

actors, but a truly remarkable production of this royal dramatist is the Nāgānanda on a moving Buddhistic story in which the hero offers his own life to save a poor Nāga; the play paved the way for the recognition of the quietistic sentiment as a fit Rasa for drama. While in the above plays, the theme related to epic kings or similarly renowned royalty, the class of plays called Prakaraṇas dealt with the more common social figures and of these the most outstanding specimen is Śūdraka's Mṛcchakaṭika, the Little Clay Cart. In this play, the plot-interest and Rasa-appeal are equally matched; there is a wealth of characters, major and minor, and all drawn with individuality; with poetry and lyricism, lively action is combined and it is the only Sanskrit play containing a large amount of genuine humour and wit; along with the story of a rich courtezan's love for an amiable Brahman of the city rendered poor by his generosity, it weaves the story of a political coup and if by play one means utmost stage-worthiness, the production of Śūdraka undoubtedly stands supreme in the entire field of Sanskrit drama. Essaying in the footsteps of Śūdraka, Bhavabhūti produced his social tragi-comedy Mālatīmādhava which is very much overdone, but has a unique Act in which the poet makes the burning eerie crematorium the scene of desperate love. Among our best dramatic masterpieces is also to be counted the lost Puṣpadūṣitaka in which an innocent lady is suspected of infidelity on the basis of some circumstantial evidence and is banished in pregnancy by the father-in-law who takes the law into his hands in the absence of the lady's husband.[18] Two remarkable achievements in the field of historical drama should also be mentioned, both by Viśākhadatta, the Mudrārākṣasa and the Devī-Candragupta dealing respectively with Candragupta of the Mauryas and the Candragupta of the Guptas; the dramatist commands in his Mudrārākṣasa a direct style, an intricate plot, tense action and a tempo that never sags; here he manages a theme entirely free from love, but unique in the whole field of Sanskrit drama for the portrayal of ideal friendship which will perish rather than betray. The Devī-Candragupta, unfortunately not yet recovered, presents a theme unusual and daring in Sanskrit drama, the impersonation by the hero as a queen, the murder of the enemy, love between him and his elder brother's queen and the eventual murder of the elder brother and his taking the kingdom

18. See my '*Social Play in Sanskrit*' already referred to for a full discussion of this play.

and the queen.[19] Among other noteworthy manifestations of the Sanskrit dramatic genius are to be mentioned three other classes and specimens relating to them: the two farces — Prahasanas — the Mattavilāsa and the Bhagavadajjukīya, both by the Pallava king of Kāñcī, Mahendravikrama of the 7th century; the second mentioned farce is very originally conceived on the basis of the motif of the yogic feat of entering another's body, Parakāya-praveśa; the emissary of the god of death makes a mistake and as a consequence a saint enters the body of a courtezan and begins to talk philosophy and the courtezan's spirit is let into his body and the saint's body begins to practise coquetry. Among erotic monologues, there are the four ancient Bhāṇas ascribed to Śūdraka, Vararuci, Īśvaradatta and Śyāmilaka, which are full of humour and realistic touches. The third noteworthy class is the allegorical or philosophical play in which abstract concepts, virtues and vices and systems of thought are cast as characters; the beginning of this type is already seen in the fragments of Aśvaghoṣa unearthed at Turfan; the Āgamaḍambara of Jayanta, the poet-logician of Kashmir of the 9th century, closes with the elevating message that all faiths, if followed sincerely, form right paths to the Truth; and the Prabodhacandrodaya of Kṛṣṇamiśra (11th cent.) which portrays with much ingenuity, force and humour, the monistic philosophy.

Sanskrit drama and its derivative vernacular forms have played a very significant role in the history of Indian culture; they have been continuously effective through the centuries as a force for consolidation of spiritual, religious and moral culture among the people. With this in view, they were played in public, in festivals and in temples. While Sanskrit aesthetes held Rasa-anubhava as the primary end of drama, they also said that the secondary purpose of the art was to educate man, to make him imitate the great heroes held before him, and do as Rāma did and shun the path tread by Rāvaṇa. The heroic Nāṭaka especially held before the people the ideal of a great and sublime soul who battled with evil and triumphed. In the social Prakaraṇa again, the triumph of true love, character and chastity was depicted. In the farces and the monologues, parasites and hypocrites of society were effectively satirised and debunked. Together with the epic-recital, the drama has been, all through Indian history, bearing the burden

19. For a full discussion of this play, see my paper on it in the *Journal of the Banaras Hindu University,* Vol. II, pp. 23-54, 307. (1937-8).

of large-scale adult-education among the masses and if like the humble cart-driver, the Ceṭa, in the Mṛcchakaṭika, the average humble Indian has a true sense of values and never fails in tests of true culture apart from mere literacy, it is due in no small measure to the Indian drama. But, as pointed out above, the social use of drama, is, in the Indian theory, incidental. There is a significant legend related by Bharata in the very opening chapter of his Nāṭya Śāstra: when the theme of the victory of the Devas over the Asuras was staged, the latter created an uproar that it was all partial to the former and they would not allow it to proceed. Brahmā pacified the Daityas that the purpose of drama was not to boost or decry any one side but to present the good and bad of all, to represent the feelings and actions of all the three worlds; nor was there to be preference shown in it to any single kind of theme, and that it presented every activity, virtue, play, gain, penance, merriment, fight, love etc. While every activity would be shown and each would derive his satisfaction from what would appeal to him, the art as a whole would have a beneficial and educative effect on the public, apart from being what it primarily is,—a source of relief and entertainment.

A word is to be said about the occasion and time of enacting the plays. The prologues of the plays are explicit that plays were produced to gatherings of people during festivals in temples; from literature we know also that plays were done in palaces and from the surviving traditions we know they were performed before the village-public also. As regards the time of the play, Bharata says in his text (Ch. XXVII. Kasi edn.) that any part of the day or night could be used but one may observe some propriety between time and the theme and type of play; thus the forenoons may be suitable for themes of virtue and evenings for love-stories. The prologues to the extant dramas show that the morning time was also considered suitable (Cf. Mālatīmādhava).

Now the question may be asked why or how Sanskrit drama which was so artistically conceived and was the outstanding entertainment in the ancient times, decayed? The main reason is linguistic and literary; the growth of Middle Indo-Aryan and later, of Modern Indo-Aryan languages resulted in the diversion of creative talent to literature in these media. Side by side with this, the growth of the regional language theatres which retained the theme and technique of the Sanskrit drama, but used the common language made the Sanskrit original superfluous. The growth

of compositions more specifically designed for song and dance, for example the Gītagovinda of Jayadeva, which retained all the abhinaya and dance of the fuller drama was another circumstance that led to the desuetude of the Sanskrit drama as a regular art-form sought by people. This resulted in the further specimens of Sanskrit drama becoming more and more exhibitions of the poetic or literary gifts of a writer. More than these, it appears to me, the dance and drama traditions in India suffered a setback because of the loss of the personnel which was the medium of their preservation; on one side many of these families of dancers and actors should have migrated to the countries of S.E. Asia where these Indian traditions survive remarkably to this day; and on the other, communities of peoples specialising in music, dance and drama like the Ḍombas, as a result of inscrutable historical reason, actually migrated westwards as far away as Europe where, as Gypsies, they still show their artistic instincts and heritage. However its decay cannot be attributed to its failure to reflect society and life, for it was not superseded by any dramatic efflorescence in local languages which developed that character. In fact, in drama, the achievement of the ancient Indian genius in the Sanskrit medium is yet to be excelled in any Indian language.

Another question that may be asked relates to the extent to which Sanskrit drama is played today. The more important Sanskrit plays are no doubt rendered into the local languages and produced. In all the modern colleges, members of the Sanskrit associations, stage Sanskrit dramas yearly and on occasions of conferences also such production of Sanskrit plays is not uncommon; there are Sanskrit Academies, Sabhās and Prachār Samitis in all parts of the country who produce old plays as well as new plays which are being written today. The A.I.R. has also given a fillip to the production of Sanskrit plays.

Not only can Bhāsa, Śūdraka, Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti, Harṣa, Viśākhadatta and Mahendravikrama bear re-production on the stage today but the masterly and comprehensive treatise of Bharata can hardly be ignored by any votary of the stage today, be he a writer or an actor. As already explained, even in construction of plot and presentation of theme, Sanskrit drama has certain methods and aims, which would amply repay study. In production chiefly, if we are to evolve a distinct Indian style based on an idealised technique which would depend more on intrinsic artistic resources rather than on external mechanical aids, and would not like our stage to be a mere imitation of the western, we have to

study Bharata and Kālidāsa intimately and understand the *dharmī* and *samaya* of Nāṭya as they devised and practised them. If we do so, in one effort we will be resurrecting the three arts of drama, dance and music.

In any such reconstruction we can succeed only by a two-fold coordination of the dance-drama traditions surviving in different parts of India, and these again with those of Greater India. While extensive lyrical Abhinaya can be recovered from Kathak and Bharata-nāṭya, it is from a dramatic form still surviving in India, the Kathakali, that we can derive the utmost help. It may be noted in passing that in the whole of India, it is in Malabar, in the Kūṭiyāṭṭam, still being done there, that there is still surviving any traditional form of performing a Sanskrit play. A large part of the ancient stage technique, which has either been lost or has become attenuated in India lives in the theatres of East and South-East Asia, over all of which in the palmy days of the cultural hegemony of India over the Orient, Indian epic, art and drama spread. The whole of South-East Asia appears to have grown into a civilization raised solely on the two Indian epics and dance-dramas based on them. The system of music as harnessed for drama and of instrumental compositions designed for creation of atmosphere and accentuation of emotion have to be recovered from the *Gamelan* of the Javanese and Balinese Wayangs. From Java and Bali, we have to take also the several animal-gaits that Bharata speaks of. In the classic Chinese drama presented in gesture and song, there is not only the preservation of the elaborately codified system of Gati or gaits appropriate to different characters, but a considerable part of our āṅgika and citra abhinayas. These as well as the *Noh* of Japan, the *Khon* of Thailand, the Rāmāyaṇa dance of Laos, the Cambodian Ballet, the Burmese *Pwe* and the Kandyan dance outside our country preserve for us chapters of Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra, as also forms like the Shadow and Puppet Plays which are no longer alive to any appreciable degree in the mother-country. The most important of these recoveries from the Far East will be those exercises from young age which form the foundation of this art, where again we are at a great handicap. Today when we are free to move about and plan and reconstruct our culture and arts, one cannot think of a more urgent need than an Academy like this organising an informed and equipped team for exploring the dance-drama traditions of South East Asia which form the most popular and powerful ties which bind these countries to India. Let me conclude with a

quotation from Coomaraswami whose wisdom, I hope, none here doubts. Writing on the Javanese theatre, he said in 1921: "Few undertakings could be imagined more interesting or more illuminating than a comparative survey of the forms of the theatres surviving in India, Indonesia and the Far East. A widely extended survey of this kind would not only emphasise the cultural relationships of areas once united by the closest ties and explain the significance of isolated forms, but such is the variety of the technique, and so very high the accomplishment of the performers and so constantly is this craftsmanship applied exclusively to the epic and truly dramatic material, that such a book might well suffice to cast some light upon the darkness and banality of the European stage, where an art that is theatrical and representative has long superceded the dramatic and the abstract".[20]

20. *Rupam*, VII, July 1921, p. 5.

Dialectics of Difference

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I

Śaṅkara, the propounder of pure monism, has to make his way through the diversities of the universe only by overcoming, nay, by practically denying *Difference* altogether. His monism is based strictly on scripture aided by reasoning. Madhva and other realists make out their Dualism from scripture and reasoning alike. They come out with five sorts differences viz. (1) the difference between Īśvara and Jīva (2) the difference between one jīva and another (3) the difference between jīva and the inert (4) that between Īśvara and the inert and (5) that between one inert and another. For the monist for whom the whole world is an illusion, and jīva none other than Brahman, all these differences become illusory. But he must demonstrate it to be so. As regards scriptural evidence the Advaitin would not accept that it is in favour of Duality since Duality which is a day-to-day experience will not form the purport of the scripture as otherwise the validity of scripture (which is admitted to be only in respect of new topics) will be lost.

Various authors in the Advaita School have fought against this difference. Right from Bādarāyaṇa the author of the Brahma Sūtras to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī the Advaitins have reasoned out the illusoriness of difference.

In answer to the objection that in the Advaita view there is the contingence of non-difference between the enjoyer and the enjoyed, Bādarāyaṇa says (*Brahma Sūtras* 2.1.13 and 14) that the difference which is observed in experience is to be viewed as phenomenal like the difference observed between the wave, foam, the sea, etc. But in reality, there is no such thing as difference.

Gauḍapāda says: Advaitism is real; duality is only an appearance of this non-dual Reality.[1] All things differ only illusorily. If things of the world differ in reality, the immortal will have to become mortal.[2]

Maṇḍana Miśra in his *Brahmasiddhi* explains the circumstances under which the Advaitin has to remove the conflict between scripture and perception which are accepted as valid means of knowledge. Perception cognises difference while scriptural texts like 'there is no duality in Brahman'[3] etc., reveal the non-existence of difference. One way out of this conflict is to say that perception is sublated by scripture which is the king of *pramāṇas*. But, some say that when there is a conflict between them, perception should be accepted as stronger of the two. Scripture is weaker as it is dependent upon perception for the establishment of its very nature. Moreover scripture can be interpreted in many ways to find its meaning. There are many kinds of usage. If literal sense is not applicable we can take the scripture in a figurative sense, but perception cannot forego its object of difference. Advaitic Scripture is not only repugnant to perception but also to the Karmakāṇḍa of the Veda itself and hence it must leave its primary sense. Moreover perception operates first and Āgama or scripture which requires the sense perception of words, the knowledge of the word-sense relationship, etc., operates afterwards. According to the Mīmāṁsa rule of interpretation (*Jaimini-Sūtra,* 3-3-1,) when there is a conflict between the first and succeeding *pramāṇas* the first prevails over the others. Thus perception is stronger than Āgama.

Maṇḍana does not accept this view. He upholds the tradition that scripture is stronger than perception. He cites the Mīmāṁsa rule of interpretation (*Jaimini Sūtra* 6-5-54), wherein it is said that when two scriptural statements one following the other are conflicting, the later prevails over the earlier. This rule is applicable when the later is not dependent upon the earlier, while the rule mentioned above applies to texts wherein the earlier and the later parts are reciprocally dependent. In the present case the Āgama does not depend upon percep-

1. *Kārika,* III. 18.
2. *Kārika,* III. 19.
3. Bṛhadāraṅyaka, Upanishad IV. 4.

tion. Though it requires words etc., revealed by perception it does not require the reality of words which it annuls but their form alone which the scripture does not negate. Perception which is human may be erroneous because of human defects while scripture which is not of human origin is infallible and reliable. Thus we can assert with the help of scripture that difference is illusory and perception etc., advocating the reality of difference are all invalid.

But Maṇḍana and other authors are not content with this explanation. For the sake of those who are firm in their views regarding the supremacy of perception over scripture they insist on difference being refuted logically. While Maṇḍana and others refute difference in general, saying that it is not even an object of perception, Vimuktātman the author of *Iṣṭa Siddhi,* rejects the difference between Ātman and the inanimate objects, the seer and the seen, *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya.* Nṛsiṁhāśramin argues against difference between Īśvara and Jīva while Citusukha, and Madhusūdana argue, like Maṇḍana, against perception of difference. Hereunder the refutation of difference in the writings of some of the important representative post-Śaṅkarite Advaitic perceptors is given in summary.

II

Critique of Difference By Nṛsimhāśramin (A. D. 1500).

Nṛsimhāśramin argues that by no means of knowledge can difference be established between Jīva and Īśvara.[4] Perception which is dependent on sense-contact cannot be evidence for the difference between soul and God whom senses cannot apprehend. Nor can the mind without the help of sense-contact apprehend difference for it is not an independent means of valid knowledge. Also, difference requires a counter-correlate and since God is not perceptible, he cannot constitute the counter-correlate.

Inference has its sphere in only non-self-luminous objects like pot etc., and it cannot establish difference unconditioned by adjuncts.

4. See *Critique of Difference* by S.S.S. Sastri and Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan.

Scripture cannot have difference as its purport because difference is due to *māyā*. Difference is established by perception. Scripture is not necessary for this. As for the texts like "Two birds etc.", which seem to have difference for purport, they are intelligible even on the basis of assumptive difference. Texts which declare non-difference cannot have an assumptive non-difference for content because non-difference is not phenomenal.

Presumption or *arthāpatti*, too, is no evidence for difference since there is nothing which becomes unintelligible in the absence of real difference.

The experience of difference is authoritative up to the stage of sublation and since it is sublated by the knowledge of non-difference it cannot be absolutely real.

III

According to *Jñānaghanapāda*, (900 A.D.), author of *Tattva-śuddhi*, perception apprehends neither pot, cloth, etc.; nor their reality but bare reality which is constant in pot, etc., as their substrate. The apparent differences like pot-cognition, cloth-cognition, etc., are delusions like the silver-element in delusion while the 'this' that is the bare reality alone is perceived. Why? Difference is the prerequisite for perception of objects. When pot, etc., are perceived, they are perceived as different from objects like cloth which are the counter-correlates of difference. But it is not possible to know all the counter-correlates, which are not in sense-contact being remote in space and time. Where the counter-correlates are not perceived, being qualified by the counter-correlate also is not there. Thus, the perception of difference in objects is only a delusion. One perceives only the non-dual bare reality.[5]

Maṇḍanaś *Brahmasiddhi*

IV

Maṇḍana (800 A.D.) in the *Tarkakāṇḍa* of his *Brahmasiddhi* has tried to demonstrate that, apart from the Scriptural declarations of non-difference, even perceptual evidence does not substantiate the common-sense notion of difference. This dialectical

5. See also *Siddhāntaleśa saṁgraha*, Tr. By. S.S.S. Sastri Vol. I, p. 245.

refutation of difference has been followed up by later Advaitins like Vācaspati, Ānandabodha, Citsukha and Vimuktātman.

Stated briefly, Maṇḍana's criticism of difference[6] is as follows:—There are three alternatives with regard to perception—1. Assertion of the nature of the object. 2. Exclusion of other objects and 3. both assertion and exclusion. In the third alternative, there are again three divisions, viz. (i) simultaneity, (ii) assertion preceded by exclusion and (iii) exclusion preceded by assertion.

Of the three alternatives first mentioned, there is no knowledge of difference in the assertion of the nature of the object. Only in the knowledge of exclusion or assertion combined with exclusion, there is the perception of difference because exclusion implies difference. But perception, says Maṇḍana, has the function of assertion alone, not exclusion.

Indeed, the function of perception is not in respect of exclusion alone, nor both simultaneously, nor assertion preceded by exclusion. Because, the mutual non-existence of only an object that is already there is predicated of another object similarly established, e.g. the pot is denied on a spot in the ground—or a horse in a cow. Rejection is impossible without what is rejected and the locus of such rejection. It cannot be objected here that, according to the above rule, the Primordial Nature or *pradhāna* and the sky-lotus cannot be rejected, because there cannot be a rejection of anything that is ultimate or anything that is non-existent. There are some, however, who say that even they i.e. *pradhāna* etc., are not exceptions to the above rule. In the rejection of sky-lotus, for example, the flower that is given in experience is denied of sky that is also given in experience. Denial of Primordial Nature only means the rejection of the element of pleasure, pain, confusion, non-differentiated effects and the like in the cause of the universe.

Again, if exclusion or denial does not require a correlate and a counter-correlate, then, *pramāṇas* will have only void for their content, and not difference, since everything is rejected every-

6. For a summary of Maṇḍana's arguments, also see the article "*Can difference be perceived?*" by Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan in the *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1937.

where. So, exclusion of one object from another, so that difference could be established, needs the establishment of the correlate and the counter-correlate. And this cannot be done without assertion. Thus, rejection implying difference always presupposes an act of assertion informing the knower of the bare object.

Further, assertion and exclusion cannot be successive since they are the functions of the same perception and perception is only of that which is in contact with the senses.

If it be said that the assertion of an object itself is the exclusion of the other objects from the purview of perception, as the object is cognised as 'this' and not as any other, the reply is that mere assertion of one object itself does not mean the exclusion of other objects. When several colours are depicted in a picture, the seer, who does not recognise each colour separately, cannot apprehend their mutual difference. The perception of one colour in the picture cannot give any knowledge of this difference. Moreover, in this view there is the contingence of such exclusion of all things both perceptible and imperceptible.

Nor can it be said that difference being the nature of the object, when the object is perceived, its difference from other things also is perceived. For, on this view, difference itself will be negated, besides the contingence of the possibility of exclusion of all things perceptible and imperceptible at once. If difference were natural, it can be located in one or many. If the one difference, which is located in many, forms the nature of all those objects, there is the contingence of non-difference of all those objects. If difference were different from objects, then, difference being unnatural, there can be no natural exclusion of objects mutually.

It cannot be argued that things are naturally one but are different because of man's view of them as things are not created by man's view of them. They are there with a distinct nature according to their origin.

If it is said that difference has not one locus but many loci, and that, since difference depends upon a counter-correlate, all objects are different, each with its own difference dependent upon the counter-correlate and that this difference constitutes the nature of the object, it is replied that the objects, which are established in

themselves by their own causes, may not depend on anything else for the attainment of their essential nature. It is the man, who has clay, that requires instruments like wheel to produce a pot.

Moreover, what is the use of the counter-correlate? Is it for its (object) birth, or for its practical efficiency or its cognition? Not the first and the second because of their possibility even without a counter-correlate. Regarding the third, such a cognition is impossible and will mean the fallacy of mutual dependence. The cognition of the counter-correlate as different from the correlate itself depends on the cognition of difference.

Difference cannot be inferred from the fact of difference in practical efficiency or production of results, as this inference itself is drawn from the fact of difference. The difference in practical efficiency or difference of results is itself the question at issue. Moreover, difference in practical efficiency is possible even when the object is one and the same as in the case of fire that burns, cooks, illumines and so on. If it be said that difference is not established by practical efficiency but by the results of such practical efficiency which are observed in one object and not in another, it is replied that non-observation of the result in another itself is unacceptable to the Advaitin who accepts one only. Non-observation requires the assumption of difference which is itself to be proved. Observation of results, unobserved in another will not presuppose difference in the object, as in one and the same thing different results may be produced at different times. If it is said that difference can be established from the observation of different results simultaneously just as birth, death, growth, diminution, motion, inertia, pleasure, pain etc., it is replied that all these mutually conflicting results are possible even in one object, as in the case of burning, cooking etc., in fire.

Again what is the nature of this conflict between attributes? If it be mere difference, then, all the attributes are possible in one and the same thing as shown by the example of fire. If they are the negations of each other, they are not attributes, being negations. They cannot be mutually negating, because one attribute cannot destroy another if that has a locus different from that of the first. Thus, there can be only co-ordination.

Now, it is possible to argue for difference from the fact of the restriction of results as in the case of curd coming from milk

alone and not from the oil seed. It is also possible to argue that if there were no difference, all the things will be born simultaneously when a thing is born.

It is replied that mere difference of results cannot establish difference among objects. What is this restriction? If it is that curd is obtained only from milk and not from anything that is *different* from milk, here again the question is begged, as difference, which is to be proved, is assumed. It should be established by the results and it should not be the basis for establishing the results. If the capacity to generate curd and its absence go to establish difference, it is replied that the capacity and its absence are possible in one and the same object as in the case of a man who is capable of lifting weight but who is incapable of doing it in his old age. Or, as in the case of the vast earth where there are big things in one place and their absence in other places. Moreover, the capacity to burn and the incapacity to do so are observed in one and the same fire in respect of the same object (which once burnt, cannot be burnt again or, which once cooked cannot be cooked again).

Now: Why should milk generate a result viz. curd, different from the result of sesamum? Why not both of them produce the same result? Indeed, it is observed that many causes bring about one result just as two eyes produce one vision. Even if both of them act independently, let their results be of the same species. Or again, why not sesamum produce curd, or milk produce oil?

If it is replied that difference of results is due to the difference in the potencies (in the objects) which are beyond human imagination, then, it may not be difficult to conceive of one Brahman and of the differences in the results as being due to the unthinkable capacities of Brahman.

If it be held that one fire produces many results because of its association with numerous potencies, the *siddhāntin* asks, if one can be the locus of numerous potencies, what harm is there in accepting it as the locus of numerous effects themselves as potencies are not different from results?

It is argued by some that, even though Perception and Inference are not capable of cognising difference, difference can be cognised by the evidence of *Abhāva* or negation. The *Abhāva*

pramāṇa cognises one thing as different from another, or one place as the locus of the negation of an object etc.

The reply is: The cognition of negation as "this is not that" or "this is not here" requires the cognition of two objects, viz., correlate and the counter-correlate. Otherwise, by mere negation, nihilism will result. If the cognitions of the correlate and the counter-correlate do not grasp the difference between these two, then, because of the absence of the cognition as 'this is the correlate or the counter-correlate' distinctly, there will be no cognition of negation at all. So, we must first determine the nature of the correlate and the counter-correlate before we have cognition of negation. Thus the cognition of negation requires the knowledge of difference and knowledge of difference requires the knowledge of negation; and there is only mutual dependence.

Again: If all things are of one nature there ought to be the recognition of oneness or identity between the mustard seed and the Himalayas. The *Siddhāntin* says that there *is* recognition in as much as both are observed as *sat* or being. There is the knowledge of oneness by the first cognition itself which apprehends the object, as *sat*. Moreover, if identity is to be established only by recognition, there will not be the recognition of clay in objects like pot, jug and jar.

It may be said here: There are two cognitions like "This is *sat*", "This is a pot", where the former apprehends the generality and the latter the specific nature; and one has to accept the difference between the general and the specific natures. For example, a calf separated from her mother first runs into a herd of cows and then, with the knowledge of speciality runs to her mother. Thus, there is distinction between generality and speciality. The whole universe is similarly two-natured, special and general.

The *Siddhāntin* replies: the general and the special features are not different because of their conception as one, as in '*san ghaṭaḥ*'—"the pot is". If difference were there, they would not have been put in apposition to each other.

The Nyāya theory of accepting *samavāya* between an object and its qualities because of both difference and inseparability, is not acceptable to the *Siddhāntin*, because oneness alone is perceived and not difference. The contention of the Naiyāyika is that it is the capacity of the *samavāya* that makes two different things

appear as one and completely conceals difference. The Advaitin replies that accepting identity and the capacity of one object to appear as many is simpler than accepting many objects and a new relationship between them. If it be said that *samsarga* has capacity of concealing difference, it can equally be said that the one has the capacity to appear as many. And to the Advaitin, the illusion of difference is due not only to external defect but also to internal defects like desire, sorrow, etc. Generally, nescience is the cause of all illusion.

If the opponent holds that one object has a twofold nature, the general and the special, there being no conflict in saying that one has conflicting natures in as much as the two natures are established by *pramāṇas,* it is replied that such cognitions as 'this', which cognise conflicting natures, are not valid, like a doubt.

The *pūrvapakṣin* says: the general feature is one in all objects and the special features are different in each. And the definition of difference is mutual non-existence, that is, conflicting natures. The reverse is the definition of identity. The special features differ in as much as their forms are different. But the general feature is common as it does not differ.

The reply is: if there is conflict in respect of natures, general and special, then, they cannot be one. If there is no conflict, the contention that one is of twofold nature will have to be abandoned.

V

Vimuktātman's Iṣṭa Siddhi—Critique of Difference

i

Vimuktātman, (1200 A.D.), the author of *Iṣṭa Siddhi,* launches upon an enquiry (Chapter I, pp. 2-23) into the common notion that the difference between the inert object of knowledge *Dṛśya* and the intelligent Seer, *Dṛk,* is patently established by the *pramāṇas* like perception, inference, etc. The inert appears as 'this'. The Advaitin himself holds that the inert is not of the nature of intelligence. If the inert things are non-different from the intelligence, *Dṛk,* which is one only, even the mutual differences among the inert will not be perceived; but they are perceived. Moreover, the statement of the inference of being the effect, from divi-

sion[7] will not be there in the Advaitin's view. So, difference between *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya* must be accepted. So runs the *pūrvapakṣin's* objection. Vimuktātman answers that, though the notion of difference is so patent and common, one should analyse the basis of that notion.

ii

Critique of Difference

Difference between two inert objects may be perceived but not between *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya,* Intelligence and the inert, for the simple reason that *Dṛk* is not perceptible. The cognition of difference requires the knowledge of the substrate and the counter-correlate. The unseen can neither be the substrate, nor the counter-correlate because of the contingence of the cognition of difference simultaneously of all things from all things.

If it be held that even though Intelligence is imperceptible it is not unknown because of its nature of being self-revealed and, that, therefore, there is the possibility of the cognition of difference, it is asked: what is this difference? Is it the essence of the differents or their attribute? If the essence, there will not be the dependence upon counter-correlate for the cognition of difference; otherwise there will be an infinite regress because of the requirement of a counter-correlate for the counter-correlate itself, itself being the difference.[8] Thus, cognition of anything will be impossible. It cannot be said that what is observed is again observed with reference to the counter-correlate, for, the requirement is not for the already observed object, since that much has already been observed. Nor is there the requirement for another cognition since the knowledge of that is again possible from the old set of conditions itself. So, difference is not the nature of the different because of its cognition requiring a counter-correlate.

If it were an attribute, that, too, is not non-different from the substrate for the aforesaid reasons. So difference must be accepted as *somehow* different from the substrate and cognised by a separate cognition, like colour, taste, etc.[9]

7. *Yāvadvikāraṁ tu vibhāgo lokavat—Brahma Sūtra,* II. 3.7.
8. or even mutual dependence in addition to infinite regress.
9. colour, taste etc. though they belong to the essential nature of the substrate, yet are cognised by different sense-organs. This can be explained only by accepting them as somehow different from the substrate.

If it be said that there is infinite regress in postulating difference between difference and the different, it is asked: do you reject difference everywhere or only that between difference and the different? If everywhere, Advaitin has no objection. If between difference and different, then, we are again up against the same difficulties mentioned above regarding the question whether difference is the essence or the attribute of the substrate. So, if difference is desired, it should be desired as different from the substrate and cognised by a separate cognition.

The arguments aforesaid should be transferred in the case of mutual non-existence, *anyonyābhāva,* if it is anything other than difference. If not, the above reasonings will hold good here also *in toto.*

Dṛk or the Intelligence is self-effulgent. Its revelation is not dependent on a counter-correlate. Nor is there non-cognition of the self at any time.

Difference and mutual non-existence are not the attributes of *Dṛk.* If they are perceptible, they cannot belong to *Dṛk.* If imperceptible, they are not established. If they are self-luminous, they will not be different from *Dṛk,* and, not being dependent on counter-correlate will lose their character of non-existence.

Nor are they the essence of *Dṛk* because of the contingence of self-revelation and independence of a counter-correlate for them.

Nor are there two forms for one *Dṛk.* Nor can there be difference between the two. If difference and non-existence are non-different from *Dṛk,* there is the contingence of non-difference in what all is perceptible.

Again, in the case of their non-difference in *Dṛk,* is it in respect of difference alone or of non-existence alone? If the first, and if there is only non-difference between difference and *Dṛk,* is there difference alone or *Dṛk* alone? If difference alone, there being no *Dṛk,* nothing will appear.

If *Dṛk* alone remains, there is no difference for *Dṛk.* The same reasoning holds for the seen *Dṛśya,* also. Thus, there is no difference between *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya.*

If non-existence, *abhāva,* alone remains, as *Dṛk* and non-existence are non-different, and non-existence alone is *Dṛk,* there

will be no *Dṛk* but only void. That, too, will not appear for want of a *sākṣin*.

If *Dṛk* alone remains, then there is no mutual non-existence and consequently the mutual non-existence between *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya* will not be established.

Moreover, if difference is non-different from mutual non-existence, and if there is non-existence alone then there being no difference, mutual non-existence cannot be established. If difference alone is non-existence and nothing else, as there is no conflict for accepting mutual non-existence in a non-different object, there will be only one reality. Then, where is difference and from which?

So, difference and mutual non-existence must be accepted as different from each other and from the object. And, thus, they are not the essence of *Dṛk*, nor its attributes.

There is no substrate-attribute relationship between *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya*, even by perception because they are not cognised as such by one cognition, like a pot and its colour. For the same reason, difference and mutual non-existence from *Dṛk* are not the attributes of *Dṛśya* also. Otherwise there is the contingence of their being in one and the same object. Indeed, an object cannot be different from itself, mutually non-existent from itself and yet be itself.

Again: for want of proof also, difference and mutual non-existence do not exist. If they are self-evident like *Dṛk*, they cannot be the attributes of *Dṛśya* like *Dṛk*, because of their not being the objects of one cognition. Also if they are self-evident there is the contingence of absence of difference from *Dṛk*, from *Dṛśya* and between difference and mutual non-existence themselves.

If they are not self-evident but known by extraneous means, even then, because of their being perceptible like pot, etc., by extraneous means, they are not the attributes of *Dṛk*. If *Dṛk* were the counter-correlate of difference and mutual non-existence which character is appropriate only to perceptible objects, *Dṛk* will cease to be *Dṛk*. Therefore, difference and mutual non-existence having *Dṛk* as counter-correlate do not exist in *Dṛśya*. Further there is no proof for them as of the above character either by the senses or the mind as *Dṛk* is not

the object of any sense or mind. Nor is *Dṛk* itself a proof of their existence, since the counter-correlate *Dṛk* cannot be the object of itself. Granting even this it cannot be the counter-correlate and at the same time the proof in respect of the correlate in entirety. If by parts, no; since *Dṛk* is impartite. And, if they do have *Dṛk* as their proof, then they cannot have *Dṛk* as their counter-correlate. Those that have something as their proof cannot have that as their counter-correlate but something else—just like the mutual difference and non-existence of pot and cloth. Thus, even granting that *Dṛk* is their proof, their counter-correlate must be something different from *Dṛk*.

Rejection of Mutual Non-existence in Dṛk

The knowledge of *abhāva* arises when all the causes of the knowledge of the counter-correlate are present and the counter-correlate is not observed. But there being no cognition of *Dṛk* there can be no cognition of the absence of *Dṛk* also. It cannot be said that the non-cognition is not the cause of the knowledge of non-existence, because of the contingence of the knowledge of non-existence even when there is the cognition of counter-correlate. If as a special case there could be the knowledge of non-existence of *Dṛk* even without non-cognition, there is the contingence of the cognition of the non-existence of *Dṛk* even when it is manifest. The same conditions can produce the knowledge of the non-existence of *Dṛśya*. also there being no distinction.

It may be argued: Knowledge of *Dṛk* is *Dṛk* itself and, therefore, the knowledge of the absence of *Dṛk* must be due to the non-existence of *Dṛk* itself. But, the case with objects, *Dṛśya*, is different.

The answer is: is the very non-existence of *Dṛk* the knowledge of its non-existence? Or, is there a different, positive knowledge having that *dṛgābhāva* for its content? If there is, it must have a cause, as otherwise it will not arise. And here the usual non-cognition of what is obtained etc., cannot be the cause for the cognition of non-existence of *Dṛk*, as knowledge of *Dṛk* is its own existence and since it is always there, there cannot be non-cognition of it at any time. Further, if the negation of *Dṛk* is the non-cognition of it, then, being *pramāṇa* it cannot be its object also. Its object must be some other negation and not itself. Thus the

second alternative is not sound. The first alternative is irrelevent as negation cannot be identified with knowledge.

Again: it cannot be said that knowledge of the substrate is the cause of the cognition of the non-existence of *Dṛk*. For, what is the substrate? Not the object in which the non-existence of the *Dṛk* is seen, for, in the absence of the knowledge of the counter-correlate, what can be known as 'substrate'? There is no cause here like the remembrance of counter-correlate, etc., as *Dṛk* is not an object of cognition. An object will be the substrate of a negation only with reference to a counter-correlate. Otherwise, if the knowledge of negation is not characterised by the substrate and the counter-correlate, it will not rest with *Dṛk* and the object, but will extend to all objects at all places. And, the distinct feature of mutual negation, *anyonyābhāva*, too, will not be possible in the absence of characterisation of objects. Nihilism will be the result. So, in the absence of counter-correlate etc., the absence of *Dṛk* may not be cognised.

Moreover, *Dṛk* is not perceptible but is always manifest on account of its self-luminous character. Its negation, therefore, is not the object of any proof. In the absence of negation, mutual non-existence being impossible the difference between *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya* has no place.

iii

Critique of Non-difference

Having shown that the difference of the visible world of objects from *Dṛk*, the seer, is a common uncritical notion for which there is no basis in reasoning, Vimuktātman proceeds to show that, if the world of objects is not different from the Self, the Seer, it is not non-different from it also. Denial of difference does not imply affirmation of non-difference.

If there were complete identity of the world with the Self, difference which is the basis of empirical life and is patent, will have to be denied. If it be argued that even if there be identity in truth there is no harm in its empirical usage, we say, no; since there is no proof for identity. If without proof anything is sublated there is the contingence of the sublation of each and every sublating cognition. But in the case of difference it is not the patency that is denied by the Advaitin but only its being based on a proof. Even

when duality is sublated, its patency will not perish like the patency of the double-moon, etc. The great support of difference is that it appears in experience. Non-difference does not appear so. Nor is there its possibility even logically. If anything, the onus of the proof for the appearance of non-difference, that is so much in conflict with experience, lies with the opponent in the discussion. Patency is against non-difference. Logic also is against it because the self and the inert world of objects are as much opposed as light and darkness. Moreover, the Self is self-evident while the objects are established by extraneous means of knowledge. Thus, they cannot be the content of one and the same knowledge, which is necessary for any assertion of identity.

Again: if the object is one with the self there will be the self alone and no object. If the self is one with the object, there will be the object alone and, because there is no subject to know, object will cease to be an object; and there is no saving grace of its self-luminosity.

Further: Do the identity of *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya* and its knowledge pertain to the two things which are existent and appear? Or, in respect of one only which exists and appears? Or, both being existent, does one alone appear? Or else, is one only existent but both appear?

Not the first alternative. There cannot be any identity here because of the existence of difference and the knowledge of it even as two things are spoken of. If it is said that the other two, identity and its knowledge, exist, notwithstanding the existence of difference and its knowledge, it is asked: is the knowledge of identity in reference to the object of knowledge of difference, or something else? If the first, that, too, is only knowledge of difference because of having a common content. Otherwise, the knowledge of difference, too, will be one of identity.

If the second, even then, the knowledge of identity is not of two, but of only one since it is different from the knowledge of difference and its contents which should be two.

With regard to the second alternative in the main argument: since only one exists and appears, there is no question of identity or its knowledge in respect of two.

On the third alternative: though the second is there, it does not appear. There cannot be the knowledge of identity between

the two, one of which i.e. the world, appears and the other viz., the Self does not.

If it be said that identity between them can be asserted because the Intelligent-Self and the world of objects appear together invariably, we ask: what is this invariability of appearance? It is not invariably being cognised together because of non-perceptibility of the Self. Nor even is it the nature of appearance for both, since the object is not of the nature of cognition. Moreover, the world cannot invariably be co-present with the Self, since the Self is eternal, the world is not.

If it be said that cognitions are non-eternal because of the cognition of difference in them as pot-cognition, cloth-cognition etc., it is replied that such cognition of difference is impossible because of the self-revealedness of cognitions, and also because cognitions being momentary, the earlier cognition cannot be the content of the later. Nor is there the cognition of difference in one and the same Self because of its (cognition of difference) dependence on a second. If for one cognition other cognitions are contents, there cannot be difference between those for which difference is desired and the cognition, because of subject-object relationship as in the case of pot and the cognition of it. So, difference in cognition cannot be established. If cognitions are not accepted to be the contents of each other, difference cannot be established, as has already been said. If difference between the object-cognitions and the subject-cognition, and among the object-cognitions themselves, be desired, then, difference should be accepted between a pot and its cognition also. Thus, because the special features like blue, etc., have for their locus the object alone the difference in cognition will not be established. Cognitions, too, cannot be said to be the objects of cognition as otherwise there is the contingence of non-self-luminosity and non-intelligence like pot, etc., for, the pot, etc., being non-intelligent are not cognitions. Thus it is concluded that, because of invariable concomitance of non-objectness with the self-intelligence and because of its absence in pot, etc., they are non-intelligent.

Thus, the third alternative viz. there are two existents but one alone appears, is rejected, since there is no reason to accept identity for two, of which one appears and the other does not.

In the fourth alternative, since there is only one existent there is nothing like non-difference and the cognition of it for two. Even

assuming that two appear though there is only one, there cannot be non-difference between those that appear as different.

But, how is it that two appear when one exists? What is the one that exists? If it is the object, it cannot be known because there is no subject-Intelligence to know. If it is the Intelligence then there is no possibility of difference since Intelligence is impartite. Again, how is it said that the universe which appears does not exist?

Thus, there is no non-difference between *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya.*

iv

Critique of Difference-cum-Non-difference

There is a third course open to the opponent viz. that the world of objects is neither different nor non-different completely but different-cum-non-different from the Self. He may argue that even though there is no non-difference between *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya* as *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya,* there is identity between them and Brahman in the Reality-aspect, since Reality is one.

But it passes one's understanding how, if they are in Reality-aspect identical and if Reality is one, mutual difference could be maintained still, since, the oneness of Reality will thereby stand compromised. If there is difference, there is no non-difference and *vice versa.* If in spite of its (Reality) non-difference, there is difference between them, then, there cannot be identity for them with it, (Reality), as in the case of a pot and a cloth which are mutually different and not identical with a pillar. If it is said that the identity with Self is in an aspect different from the one in which there is difference for them, if these aspects are identical with them, then, there cannot be difference from Brahman as before. Nor can there be difference from one another. If they are different, there can be no identity between those aspects and hence no identity between *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya.* Nor is there a dual aspect for *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya.* Thus there should be either difference or non-difference between them and not difference-cum-non-difference. Again: It is self-contradictory to say that one has two aspects of *bhedābheda.* If these two aspects are different from the one, they cannot be its aspects. If they are identical there is no difference. So, if *Dṛk* is one it cannot have two aspects, viz., *dṛktva* and *dṛśyatva.*

If the aspects are said to be different-cum-non-different from the object, are they different in one aspect and non-different in another, or different-cum-non-different in the same aspect? If the first, there being two aspects in each of the aspects, there is the contingence of its having two aspects. And, if there be difference-cum-non-difference for those two aspects from the first aspect, each of them in turn will have two aspects. Thus, there is infinite regress of aspects of aspects. In the same manner, if there be difference-cum-non-difference for the substance with the aspects, for each aspect yet other two aspects are to be accepted. And if there be difference-cum-non-difference with them and yet another two aspects there is infinite regress for the aspects of substance.

Again: even between the substance and aspects difference-cum-non-difference cannot be established directly but only through aspects. And among the two aspects, for which there is difference there is no non-difference and for which there is non-difference there is no difference. Thus difference and non-difference are not attributes of any one object.

Further, if it be said that both difference and non-difference are acceptable in the attribute, no; because both of them belong to the aspects of the attribute and not to the attribute. If it is said that though they belong to the aspects, they are figuratively expressed as the attributes of the first attribute because of their identity, it is asked: in case of real non-difference, why a figurative expression at all? Indeed, they are not figuratively attributed to attributes. If it be said that the figurative usage is accepted because of the existence of difference also, then, there is no primary or real *bhedābheda* between the attribute and aspects because of the acceptance of figurative usage. If it be said that the *bheda* and *abheda* which are the attributes of aspects being figuratively attributed to the thing qualified by that aspect, form the primary sense of the term *bhedābhedā* mentioned, because of the absence of another *bhedābheda* in its primary sense; or we say that they are not figurative at all, as the attribute of a completely different object alone will have to be attributed to another figuratively; and here there is for the attribute and its aspects *bhedābheda* which has been already declared.

Then, we ask: how is *bhedābheda* between the attribute and aspects established at all; by whose grace, *bheda* and *abedha* which are existent in the aspects are used figuratively in the

object through other aspects? Not directly, because of the contingence of *bhedābheda* directly elsewhere also. Does it not involve the fallacy of mutual dependence, the establishment of *bheda* and *abheda* being dependent on that figurative usage, and the figurative usage being dependent on the establishment of *bheda* and *abheda?* The *bhedābheda* for the aspects are through other aspects. There is no proof for *bhedābheda* between aspects on one side and the object on the other. But, even if it were to be established, it will not be by aspects that are *essential* to the object, but by external aspects. Thus in the view that between the object and the aspect, there is difference in one aspect and non-difference in another aspect, *bhedābheda* can never be established. Therefore, to say that there is identity between *Dṛk* and *Dṛśya* in the Reality-aspect is also not sound.

Apart from the impossibility of *bhedābheda* being conceived in connection with the Self, it cannot be conceived even in connection with the world of objects. In the case of difference alone or non-difference alone there can be no locus-attribute relationship. And *bhedābheda* has already been rejected. Consequently, they will be attributeless and free from defects and merits. Moreover, if difference is different or different-cum-non-different from the object, there should be a difference between that difference and the object and other differences for *that* difference — in this way there will be infinite regress. And no difference will characterise the object. In case of non-difference, there will be only one entity — and that will not be difference because of its non-existence when the object itself is non-existent. Even if that one object is difference alone, let it be — even then, it is not the inert object because of its dependence on Intelligence. So, that one object is only the Intelligence-Self, and Oneness is not its attribute. By the word 'one' is intended an entity that is differenceless and attributeless. And so the appearance of the world is inexplicable.

VI

Refutation of Difference in Khaṇḍana by Śrī Harṣa (1150 A.D.)

What is difference? Is it (1) the *specific form* of the thing itself or (2) mutual negation or (3) some distinctive property (such, for instance, as separateness[10]) ?

10. Jha's translation of *Khaṇḍana*—Indian Thought—Vol. II., p. 118.

Not the first. Since the cognition of the essential form of the thing in illusion is the cognition of its difference from other things, one could never, on this supposition, mistake the shell for silver and mistake different things for being non-different.

Not the second; since it leads to the fallacy of mutual dependence. To cognise the jar as not-cloth, one should know that the jar is different from the cloth. But, then, one cannot know that the jar is different from cloth unless one knows that jar is not cloth.

If it be said that one has the cognition of the substratum of negation even without actually recognising it as the object negatived and conversely, the cognition of the thing, i.e., jar, as the object negatived is brought about by the mere remembrance of the thing and it is not necessary to remember it actually as the substratum of negation[11] and thus there is no fallacy of mutual dependence, it is replied that if the recognition as the object of negation is not considered essential in the cognition of mutual negation, then, the mutual negation "The jar is not cloth" will involve the negation of both the jar and the cloth together because, without the jar being cognised as the object of negation, or the object of which cloth is denied, there being nothing in particular to differentiate the jar from the cloth in 'The jar is not cloth', both of them will stand negated and not cloth alone.

If it be said that the jar is the substratum of negation of cloth and not the object negated while the cloth is negated and is not the substratum of negation and therefore there is not the above contingency, viz., the negation of both the jar and the cloth,[12] it is asked in reply: What is meant by the 'cognition of substratum' which is said to be the cause of the apprehension of difference? Does it mean that that which is the substratum is actually cognised *as substratum?* Or as it is in itself, i.e., as a jar without reference to being a substratum of mutual negation?

Not the first; what is it of which the jar is the substratum? There cannot be the cognition of the substratum unless there is the knowledge of mutual negation of which it is said to be the

11. Jha's Trans., p. 120.

12. The principle being "That which is remembered is the *pratiyogin* of the negation and that which is perceived as the "substratum of the negation".

substratum. The cognition of the qualified substratum implies the cognition of the qualification. Nor again can the cognition of the jar as the substratum of something else be the cause of the cognition of difference, because when two objects are, by mistake, considered non-different, even though there is the cognition of the object as the substratum of existence, etc., yet this is not enough to establish difference.[13]

If it is said that for the cognition of difference, in addition to the cognition of substratum, the remembrance of what is negated with reference to that thing, i.e., cloth with reference to jar, is also necessary, what is this 'remembrance of the negated thing'? Is it the remembrance of cloth *as the* negated object? Or, is it remembered merely as a cloth?

If the first, we ask: Is the thing remembered as the *counter-correlate of the object* negated by mutual negation? Or as the counter-correlate of anything?

Not the first, because as shown above, until it is known what mutual negation is, there can be no remembrance of anything as the negated object. When mutual negation itself is at issue, remembrance of anything as the negated object is to beg the question.

Not the second, because here the conception of mutual negation does not arise, even as in the case of an object mistaken to be non-different, though really different, and cognised later to be non-existent in a place other than its own, and thus cognised to be the counter-correlate of its own negation.

Moreover, if remembrance, and not the actual perception, is the sole condition of the cognition of difference, two objects that are actually perceived, and not remembered, cannot be cognised to be different at all. In every apprehension of difference, we have direct perception of the things that differ and not remembrance. Again in the statement *"this is that thing which did not exist there"* even though the thing is negatived by a remembered negation, there does not appear any idea of mutual negation, because the thing is taken, though by mistake, to be non-different, from that which did not exist there.

13. Otherwise there is also the contingence of the knowledge of difference from silver in the shell when it is actually cognised as silver and as the substrate of existence, in which case there is no illusion.

It cannot be maintained that in the mistaken perception of non-difference, there are three factors, (1) the failure to cognise the specific features of the object, (2) discrepancies like the mistaken cognitions, and (3) non-remembrance of the negative object. Because, taking the third first, it has been shown how remembrance cannot be a factor in the cognition of mutual negation. Again with regard to the second and third factors one can cognise "mutual negation", even when these factors are present, as when he remembers the jar seen at some previous time, and sees here and now, another jar, even if he fails to apprehend the difference between the two jars. Here there is (1) absence of discrepancy in the form of mistaken cognition and (2) the remembrance of the negatived object. Hence he will cognise the mutual negation which is impossible. Moreover with regard to the cognition of the specific features, they cannot be known until the mutual negation of a thing is ascertained. One should know the differences of an object from, and similarities with, other objects.

So, difference cannot be mutual negation.

Now, with regard to the third alternative mentioned in the beginning, viz., that difference is some distinctive property like separateness, that is clearly impossible, for, if negation (*abāva*) is held to be devoid of all properties, it cannot be 'different' from anything since it has no properties, and difference, as per the definition, is the presence of properties. Then, the negation will be non-different from the entire world and, thus, there would be negation for the world and absence of properties and the consequent absence of plurality.

It cannot be said that in this particular case, difference is not the presence of distinctive properties but the actual form of negation itself; for, (1) is this 'form' of negation which is its 'difference' — a difference from something else or (2) is it a difference without a counter-entity?

(1) To take the second first, difference is impossible without a counter-entity. Difference should be *from* something which is the counter-entity. (2) Nor is the form of negation a difference from some counter-entity. For what is that counter-entity? Is that *everything?* No, because that would mean difference of the 'form' from itself. Is it particular things like jar, pot, etc.? No; because, a thing from which another differs sets the limit to that another which is limited. And is this relation of limit and the limited different from things or not?

If the former, that will obviously involve an infinite regress. If the latter, difference will be included in the form of the things themselves. But, then, if the limit-and-the-limited relation of the difference of 'difference' with the jar, etc., were to be included in the form itself of 'difference', then, the same form could not include the relation of 'negative and negatived' that subsists between negation and negatived object, as the latter relation is entirely different from the relation of difference. For, it is possible to state difference without meaning negation as in the sentence *"cloth is other than jar"*. Difference is not the same as negation. Negation of jar, for example, pertains to the jar alone while its difference pertains to the cloth and everything besides from which the jar differs.

Again, if difference consists in the presence of distinctive properties, is it meant that the generic character '*ghaṭatva*' constitutes the difference of the jar? Or some other distinctive property?

Not the first, because this would imply that the generic character, *ghaṭatva* will have a counter-entity negatived by it. Generic character need have no counter-entity at all. Nor does it depend upon the cloth for its cognition.

Not the second; it will be wrong to hold that the 'difference' of the jar consists in some distinctive property other than 'potness'. This 'difference' cannot be considered either as present or not in itself. If it differs from the substrate by itself, without depending on another difference, there is the contingence of difference resting on itself. If it differs from the substrate requiring another difference, as it should, then there is the contingence of infinite regress. The logical realist may urge that difference is only a class or community, *Jāti,* and can constitute one of the seven categories; but, then, as different individuals could constitute a community inspite of their distinguishing properties, there will be nothing as 'distinguishing properties' at all. Moreover, when once we admit of such a community, the 'difference' of that community also should have to be included in that community; and thus between the 'community' and 'difference' each would be the container as well the contained of the other, which is absurd.

Again: if 'difference' consisted in the generic characters such as 'potness' and if the cognition of such a difference required the limiting counter-correlate like 'cloth-ness' which is also a generic

character, in as much as 'clothness', being a generic character, would also constitute 'difference', the cognition of 'clothness' will also require some counter-correlate, and that would be 'potness' — Thus, 'clothness' for its cognition, would depend upon 'potness' and *vice-versa*. There will result the defect of mutual dependence.

Udayaṇa's defence of difference in Ātmatattvaviveka

The idea of difference is given in experience. The Vedāntin himself cannot hope to refute difference, if he had no idea of it. The very fact that difference is spoken of even by the Vedāntin proves that the idea of difference has an object in the shape of the difference that is spoken of.

If by 'difference' it is meant that though 'difference' has an object, this object is sublated, it is asked: what is the object of the conception of difference? Is it form of the thing? Or mutual negation?, or diversity of character? Or is it something other than these? If the latter, as Sri Harṣa has argued only against the first three, the argument does not refute this alternative. If the former, then, with regard to the diversity of character, the said diversity of character cannot disprove the primary fact of difference because it appears to consciousness. It can deny only the subsequent diversities, as in the case of odour where infinite regress will result if an odour for odours is presumed but where the primary sense-perception of odour itself is not denied.

If 'difference' has mutual negation for its object, one need not assume, as the Advaitin does, any nescience as the cause of the idea of difference. When, of the two things, the jar and the cloth, the mutual negation between which is cognised, we perceive one as being the substratum of the negation, without at the same time, recognising the counter-correlate and also when we remember the counter-entity, without at the same time, remembering the substratum, then, we have the cognition of difference.

If difference meant the form of the thing itself, what the Vedantin would be justified in refuting is only the tautology in 'jar is different'. But by this, difference itself is not refuted. Because, such tautologous usages are made only under special circumstances but with no accompanying sense of difference. So, in refuting the tautology, difference is not refuted.

So Udayaṇa concludes that difference means all the three factors, (1) the form of the thing, (2) mutual negation and (3) diversity of character. For example, the jar is known in all the three ways (1) in the form of the jar, (2) as not cloth and (3) as possessed of character distinct from that of a cloth.

Śrī Harṣa's reply

The Vedāntin does not propose to explain anything. He merely asserts that difference that appears in usage is inexplicable. It is not right to argue, as Udayaṇa has done, that the first idea of difference results from direct experience and that only with regard to the subsequent presumptions the charge of infinite regress could be made. What appears to consciousness need not be always veridical. Secondly, there is no reason why direct perception should be considered more authoritative than inference etc. Thirdly, what applies to the subsequent series applies equally to the first difference in the series also, as they are alike in character. The first difference is as much included in the series as the second, third, etc.

Again, Udayaṇa's definition of difference as 'that in which one thing is actually cognised, though not cognised as having the same form as the other thing', is defective, as it applies to the case where one thing is mistaken for another as in the case of double-moon. Here, the moon is cognised but not as having the same form as itself. Yet this is not a case of difference, though the definition applies to it. Thus, the definition is too wide.

Further, no man perceives an object as having its form. He perceives the object as a bare fact, so that 'not cognised as of the same form' in the definition is superfluous. So, it should be said that difference consists in *mere cognition*.

Udayaṇa's definition of difference as *diversity of character* also is not acceptable. If by this is meant the incompatibility of two properties in one and the same thing, it is asked: is there or not a difference between the *means* of cognition and the *object* of cognition? If there is not, then they would be synonymous, which is absurd. If there is, the difference cannot be of their very nature since it is found that one and the same thing is found to partake of the character of both, as in the case of a balance, which is a *pramāṇa* relating to the measurement of weight and *prameya*

when it itself is a perceived object. Secondly, it cannot be of the nature of mutual negation for the same reason as above. And thirdly, it cannot be diversity of character also, because of the fact that one and the same thing can have two characters as in the case of the balance.[14]

VII

Ānandabodha's (1100 *A.D.*) *Nyāya Makaranda*

Some people accept difference between objects like blue and yellow on the basis of perception and interpret the scriptures denying difference in a figurative sense. We ask: How is there the determination of difference by perception? Does it cognise difference alone, or the object along with difference? In the second alternative, does it cognise the object after cognising difference or does it cognise the object first and then difference? Or, both simultaneously.

Not the very first, (i.e. cognition of difference alone), because the knowledge of difference without reference to the correlates is not observed anywhere. For the same reason, the first alternative[15] in the second main question is not sound. Not the second, as the knowledge which is momentary, cannot function for two moments together. Not the third, as the knowledge of difference which is the product of the cognitions of the correlate and the counter-correlate cannot originate along with their cognitions, (because of its being their product).

It cannot be said that the correlates (objects) which were cognised by an earlier cognition generate the cognition of difference, since, in that case, difference alone unqualified by correlates will be presented in that cognition.

It cannot be held that the cognition of difference cognises also the objects cognised by the previous cognitions, since the three cognitions are quite unrelated.

Some say that all objects are of the nature of difference and as such the perception cognising the objects cognises their difference also. Difference cannot be established as an object different from the correlates, because of the contingence of infinite regress. If

14. *prameyā ca tulāprāmāmānyavat Nyāyasūtra* II. 16.
15. Cognition of object after cognising difference.

difference can be differentiated from the object by itself without requiring another difference, then, let the objects also be differentiated in the same way and there is the contingence of futility for difference. Thus, difference is the essential nature of the objects.

This view is not acceptable, since there is the contingence of one object becoming many because of its nature of difference, and the nature of difference is to split objects. Identity, which is co-ordinate with oneness, is contradictory to difference. In this view, even the atom cannot be one and nihilism will be the result.

If it be contended that the blue is of the nature of difference only with regard to yellow and not to itself which is one only, this, too, is not reasonable. We ask: whether difference requires another object (1) for its origin or (2) for its existence or (3) for its apprehension or (4) for its functioning.

Not the first since each entity is generated by its own causes and there is no use for a counter-correlate.

Not the second, since if two things depend upon each other for existence, none of them could exist.

Not the third because of mutual dependence with regard to cognition.

Not the fourth since each object functions by itself and never requires other objects for its functions.

Moreover, requirement is the attribute of the sentient and not of the inert.

Again, if blue and the difference are identical, the usages like 'blue is different' 'there is difference from blue etc.', cannot be explained. Therefore, since difference is not of the nature of the object, we cannot say that it is cognised by perception.

Yet others say that difference is different from the object. Infinite regress is accepted in this case because of the non-contingence of the destruction of the origin. Infinite regress is a defect only where there is the contingence of the destruction of the origin.[16]

16. For example, in the case of the sprout and the seed, infinite regress is accepted because the origin of the seed from the sprout and *vice versa* is perceptual and thus there is no destruction of the perceptual origin on which this infinite regress is based. So the *pūrvapakṣin.*

It may be replied that even in this view, there is mutual dependence as difference of a pot from a cloth can be cognised only after cognising the difference of the cloth from the pot.

It is said that the difference and the correlates appear in one and the same knowledge.

The siddhantin replies that infinite regress is a defect even in this case. The difference which is apprehended as an attribute of an object like a staff of a man, should be apprehended previously and that apprehension of difference requires another difference and thus in the absence of the establishment of the previous differences, the original difference cannot be established.

Mutual dependence is also unavoidable since the knowledge of difference always requires a prior knowledge of the counter-correlate. Thus, perception is not capable of cognising difference. When difference cannot be perceived, inference and other valid means of knowledge are far removed, since they are based on knowledge of the invariable concomitance which has no other means than perception.

VIII

Tattvapradīpikā of Citsukha (1220 *A.D.*)

Citsukhāchārya rejects all differences.[17] The *pūrvapakṣin* says that all *pramāṇas* suggest difference. For example, perception in the form of "this is different from that" cognises difference. Inference, which establishes the *probandum* through the *probans,* establishes difference. The scriptural texts which establish difference in scriptural rites through different scriptural texts, repetition, number, merit and other means, explained in the *Pūrva Mīmāṁsa,* are also proof for difference. Similarity also which presupposes difference agrees with other *pramāṇas* in maintaining difference. Presumption also which restricts the production of oil from sesamum, curd from milk etc., stands for difference. Not to say anything about non-perception which directly cognises mutual negation of objects.

The *Siddhāntin* may ask whether perception cognises difference alone or the object-cum-difference, and in the latter case whether it cognises difference first and then the object or the

17. *Tattvapradīpika,* p. 165.

object first and then the difference or both simultaneously. But the *Pūrvapakṣin* answers that these questions might be advanced against one who accepts difference as an attribute but not one who accepts difference as the nature, *svarūpa,* of the object. Thus, when the object is cognised in relation to any other object, it requires the knowledge of the counter-correlate and *not always.*

Siddhāntin replies: difference cannot be the essential nature of objects, because of the contingence of the non-requirement of the counter-correlate. It cannot be said that as in the case of the usage of small and big, long and short, the usage of difference might require the counter-correlate, because the case of length and breadth is different since they are attributes; but since difference is the essential nature of the objects, according to the *Pūrvapakṣin,* it shall not require the counter-correlate.

Moreover, if the counter-correlateness of a cloth, for example, in respect of difference from pot, is pot itself, then cloth also will be the pot itself, resulting in non-duality.

Moreover, if difference whose nature is to divide, is of the nature of the object, its substrate can never be one because of the contingence of breaking into many. The atom, too, cannot be one for the same reason and, nihilism will be the only result.

Moreover, if difference is of the nature of the object, then when the object is seen, difference also will have to be seen, with the result that there will be no room for doubt or illusion in respect of any object.

In respect of difference as an attribute, the following arguments are advanced by way of refutation: The cognition of difference and its correlates cannot be said to be simultaneous; but the knowledge of the correlates should precede the knowledge of difference, viz., "this is different from that" and the preceding knowledge of the correlates should necessarily cognise difference, as, otherwise, if they had been one, they could not be correlates. Thus, there is infinite regress in the cognition of difference.

And what is this difference which is accepted as an attribute? Is it mutual non-existence or possession of different attributes or separation or association with different natures?

Not the first; if the mutual non-existence having the whole universe, as its counter-correlate, is an attribute, then there is the said infinite regress. If it were of the object itself, then there is

only one object and no difference. Not the second or the fourth, since by accepting another difference in the attributes, there is infinite regress. If attributes are non-different, then, the objects, too, being so, Advaita will result. Not the third, since there being no separation in separation itself, one object will result.

IX

Advaita Siddhiḥ of Madhusūdana Saraswatī (1500 A.D.)

The *pūrvapakṣin* argues: Difference is established by *pramāṇas*. It may be objected that if difference were the essential nature of the object, then there is the contingence of its knowledge requiring the knowledge of the counter-correlate. If it were an attribute, there is the contingence of infinite regress and also mutual dependence in respect of the cognitions of difference and counter-correlates. The *pūrvapakṣin* asks whether there is no apprehension of difference, or the apprehension is without a cause or the apprehension is sublated. Not the first, because of the contingence of cessation of all usages of alternatives. Nor the second; to say that an effect has no cause is self-contradictory. Not the third, as the reasoning aforesaid is too weak to sublate the apprehension of difference. Otherwise the same arguments can be advanced against identity also.

The *Siddhāntin* rejoins: We do not deny the apprehension nor its causes. But, we say that it is sublated by good reasoning and by śruti and śruti texts strengthened by such reasonings.

The reason advocating rejection of the reality of difference rejects only the reality of difference and there is no harm in accepting phenomenal difference.

If *bheda* is considered to be the attribute of the object we ask whether perception experiences difference alone or the object qualified by difference. Not the first because the experience is like 'this is different from that' and not like "difference". Not the second: here the question arises whether the difference is first cognised and then the object or the reverse or both, simultaneously. Not the first: because there is no cognition like 'difference'. Not the second and the third, since it is established fact that the knowledge of difference requires the knowledge of the counter-correlates. It may be said that the knowledge of the object alone arises first and then we get the knowledge of difference and the

object. But this is not sound as the knowledge of the object in the aspect of its being the counter-correlate is alone the cause of the knowledge of difference. And here there is the contingence of mutual dependence. Moreover, since we have to accept another difference for difference, there is infinite regress. If it be said that the usage of difference with regard to difference can be attributed to the correlates themselves and not to another difference, then the same course can be adopted with regard to objects with the result that difference will be done away with altogether.

Moreover, we ask: Is difference accepted in respect of two different objects or in respect of one? Not the first, because difference will have to be assumed before accepting this difference and thus there is self-dependence. If another difference is postulated we will be landed in mutual dependence. Not the second, because of inherent impossibility.

If it be said that difference is accepted with regard to the objects which are fit to be different, we ask: What is this fitness? If it is difference, the question has been already dealt with. If it is something else, then there is the contingence of one and the same object being different from itself.

If difference of pot from a cloth is of the nature of the pot itself, then, whenever the pot is perceived it should be perceived as different from cloth. Moreover, we ask whether this difference is of the nature of the pot alone or anything other than the cloth. In the first case there is the contingence of a chair not being different from a cloth. In the second alternative, the nature of things being different, the uniform experience as "this is different from cloth", etc., becomes impossible.

It may be asked: The Advaitin too has to answer this mutual dependence in the cognition of difference, even if he accepts that difference is phenomenal. The author of Advaita Siddhi says: There is no incongruity in Māyā as in the case of a magic performance and this mutual dependence by the opponent is acceptable for the *māyāvādin*. To the statement that all these irregularities might be due to the desire of the All-powerful Īśvara Madhusūdana answers that such irregularities are observed only in magic performances, etc., which are accepted to be unreal by both of us, and in what is accepted to be real, such irregularity is not observed,

Book Reviews

Cultural Section Souvenir, published by the Cosmopolitan Club, Madras, 1955, Pp. 62.

The Souvenir, edited by Mr. A. S. P. Iyer, contains, besides an annual survey of impressive lectures and cultural events organised by the Club during the year 1954-55, a good many articles, beginning with 'Music and Dance in India' by Dr. P. V. Rajamannar. Dr. C. R. Krishnaswamy examines the "Health of the Nation", Prof. Chakravarti Nainar presents 'Tiruvalluvar and His Message', Mr. V. C. Gopalaratnam studies the relation between 'Culture and Politics', Prof. P. Sambamurthy writes on 'Music in India', Major General Alagappan estimates the part of the Indian National Army in the Freedom Struggle of India, Mr. A. S. P. Iyer writes a short story, two poems in English, and one in Tamil, and Mr. K. Venkateswara Rao writes two poems, (one of them a translated piece), in Telugu. The Souvenir has the magnificent shore-temple of Mahabalipuram on the cover page, and ends with the Cosmopolitan's prayer and pledge to 'resolve to do his work fronting onward to the light'. The Souvenir is, on the whole, so nicely edited that a minor defect like the error in print spelling the word 'non-violence' as 'non-violance' in the article on Tiruvalluvar, consistently, is negligible.

P. K. SUNDARAM

Outlines of Public Finance with Special Reference to India. By V. G. Ramakrishna Iyer, M.A. Rochouse & Sons, Madras. Third Edition, 1956. Pp. xi + 422. Rs. 7/8.

In the Preface to the first edition of this book the author makes the just claim that it would meet the requirements of the students studying for the B.A. and B.A. Hons. Degree Examinations of Indian universities as well as those preparing for the Indian Public Service examinations. The book covers practically the entire ground of Public Finance and contains a good deal of matter relating to financial developments in India. The recent edition of this book embodies some revision on the basis of the findings of recent committees, particularly of the Indian Taxation Enquiry Commission. Chapter XII entitled "Distribution of the Burden of

Taxation in India" is a good summary of the Taxation Enquiry Commission's analysis of the problem. The author has taken care to present an account of recent developments in the theory of public finance and has laid the emphasis on the economics of public finance. Although Prof. Ramakrishna Iyer has not made any attempt to examine specifically the financial problems confronting a developing economy, he has in the course of the narrative touched upon the impact of financial policy and administration on national economy. The book has developed largely out of the lecture notes of the author and has been prepared mostly with an eye on examination requirements; yet it is bound to have wider appeal in so far as the writer has designed his work in such a way as to illustrate the principles of financial theory in the light of Indian conditions and has presented in a readable style a wealth of materials relating to current topics of importance.

D. Bright Singh

The University Teaching of Social Sciences. Sociology, Social Psychology and Anthropology: Reports prepared by Pierre De Bie, Claude Levi-Strauss, Joseph Nuttin, and Eugen Jacobson — Paris: UNESCO, 1954: Pp. 252. Price $ 1·75: 10/6; 500 fr.

This volume opens with the general report on "The Teaching of Sociology, Social Psychology and Social Anthropology" by Professor P. De Bie. In 1952, at Paris, under the Chairmanship of Professor Pierre de Bie, University of Louvain, a round-table conference on the teaching of sociology, social psychology and social anthropology was held. It was to enquire "into the teaching of sociology, social psychology and social anthropology". The way these sciences are understood or defined differs from country to country. "In Europe, anthropology is generally classified among the biological sciences and not, as in the United States, among the social sciences; ethnology was regarded at the outset as a natural science of primitive man, having no obvious links with sociology. These traditions are, however, stronger in Europe than in the United States, where classifications are often more pragmatical." (Pp. 17, 18).

It is clearly seen from this report that the observations made by the rapporteurs from different countries on the definition and scope of social anthropology, cultural anthropology and sociology

are not the same in nature. "The Indian rapporteur declares outright that the social situation in this country, with its social groups living at very different levels of evolution, does not lend itself to a hard-and-fast distinction between sociology and social anthropology, and that these branches interpenetrate"; (p. 20).

There is an account on how the three scientific disciplines came to be introduced in the various countries of the world. In India, we understand it was after the first world war that the study of Sociology was brought in. Many other factors as to the methods of teaching the relationship between teaching and research are expressed in this general report.

The article by Claude Levi-Strauss on "The Place of Anthropology in the social sciences and problems raised in teaching it", is very analytical, full of facts and suggestions.

Anthropology in relation to other social sciences studies certain general features of social life. When social life began, culture too emerged. Physical Anthropology to a great extent studies the evolution, selection and hybridization of the human species and also the anatomical and physiological changes resulting from social life and culture. It is not correct to separate Ethnography, Ethnology and Anthropology. These are only three stages in the research process.

Social Anthropology gives importance to "Society" and cultural Anthropology glorifies "Culture" from the days of E. B. Tylor. Prof. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown brought out the implied meaning of social anthropology as a study of social relations and social structure. It came to mean social life in its entirety. The concept of function later grew with Professor Malinowski; and the fact that a technique, whatever it be, has not only a use, but also fulfils a function in relation to sociological and other considerations came to be understood. Both Sociology and Anthropology study the complex forms of society.

In our country social anthropologists show great interest in the study of villages and rural problems. Prior to a study of urban problems training in social anthropology is considered essential in England and America. What we need to a right study of pure sociology is a sound knowledge of social anthropology acquired from the reliable and authentic comparative studies of social anthropologists.

An age of transition as the present one is, when we live in an atmosphere of doubts and despair, what we need is a thorough training in and understanding of the social sciences. A sound and sensible training in anthropological studies for diplomats, soldiers and administrators is certain to enable them to apply all gained theoretical knowledge of the subject to practical needs and solutions of conflicting socio-cultural problems of man.

France encouraged the study of social psychology to a very great extent.

The position of these three sciences in the Universities of German Federal Republic, Australia, Egypt, United States of America, France, Great Britain, India, Mexico, Poland, and Sweden, a summary of the methods adopted in teaching these disciplines, the essential qualifications to take or qualify for a degree in them are all given in the last chapter of this book.

It is needless to say that the impact of science on society is great. Any innovation in any sphere of life leads to a change in the socio-cultural activities of man. To understand the cause and effect of these changes it is vital to have a complete grasp of and training in the social sciences. The social sciences, though they may specialize in different chosen fields of research and knowledge are to be looked upon as an integrated whole. This volume is bound to be of use to teachers and students interested in them.

M. S. GOPALAKRISHNAN

The Hoysalas: A Medieval Indian Royal Family. By J. Duncan M. Derret (Oxford University Press), pp. xix-257. Price Rs. 12.

This book purporting to present, in the author's own words, "a bird's eye view of the work of a medieval Hindu King" (p. vii) gives a graphic account of the rise and fall of what is perhaps one of the most important of South Indian dynasties in medieval times. The author, who is Reader in Oriental Laws, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, has taken much trouble in going out of his way and making a careful research into the history of the Hoysalas taking into account all available sources, epigraphical, literary and tradition as enshrined in the Mackenzie collection. His literary sources comprise Kannada, Telugu, Tamil, Marathi, Persian and Arabic besides the writings of European

travellers. The history that has come out from a discerning study of these variegated sources is both interesting and scientific.

The author is, however, throughout at pains to establish that what is seen in the history of the Hoysala king was not a passing phase "but a feature of the civilisation in which he played a special but integral part" (p. 2). The chapter on administration (Chap. VII), in particular, is worked up on this basis and the author sees all the ideals of the South Indian polity in the administrative system of the Hoysalas. The truth, however, does not seem to be as simple as all that and one cannot but think that there were numerous varieties in the uniformity the author tries to expound.

Though the work does not bring out any new detail in the history that has been already worked out by many, it cannot be doubted that he has poured a new analysis into a subject by no means clear. The 'notes' appended at the end are very explanatory and useful, as for example on p. 222, where the author deals with Vishnuvardhana and Ramanuja. On p. 219, the explanation of the name 'Hoysala' is given, though it is not exhaustive enough. The origin of the Hoysalas also is not fully dealt with in Chap. I where the 'Beginnings' are dwelt upon. In p. 114, where Narasimha II's conquest of Magara is mentioned no attempt is made to identify Magara which has been variously identified by Dr. Hultzsh and H. K. Sastri in the years gone by. The chapter on Hoysala art is indeed a desideratum.

In spite of these omissions this book is a very welcome addition to our historical literature. It has six maps, five plates (some of which are photographs of inscriptions) and a very exhaustive bibliography.

M. AROKIASWAMI

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Principal Miller Endowment Lectures

THE DESTINY OF MAN AND INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

by

SRI P. CHENCHIAH, M.L.

CHAPTER I

THE DESTINY OF MAN AND INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

As the biped emerged into a human being, he acquired the uneasy endowments of reason and intellect. This endowment meant in succession curiosity, inquisitiveness, enquiry, research and a gift of objectifying his self. The animal takes itself and its environment as natural and inevitable and has no misgivings about them. The animal comes into existence grows and dies without feeling any mystery about these primal facts. Man alone takes birth, growth, death as challenges to be met, as quests to be undertaken. Nature and mind take interrogation and exclamation marks after them only to man. To this reaction of man to nature and mind we may trace his sense of destiny, his perpetual aspiration, his eternal unrest. Animals are satisfied with themselves. Man alone has divine discontent, a sense of wonder, a feeling of mystery and terror, and a gift of detaching himself from himself. In him a dark thread of doubt and dismay intertwines itself round the white thread of hope and aspiration. When man did not take himself for granted but questioned himself, he has started on a perilous adventure that turns history into a comedy too deep for laughter at one time and into a tragedy too deep for tears at another. Behind the panorama of events we call history we detect a puzzled mind and a palpitating troubled heart. Out of this situation arises all religions, philosophies, arts, cultures and civilizations. Mind brought to man another faculty of tremendous significance — the capacity to objectify himself. Reason, a faculty of life has the power to turn self-essentially subjective into an object and study it as such. Intellect can never grasp life in motion. It freezes movement in order to analyse it. It can only perform autopsy on the dead body of thought. It cannot vivisect. This capacity to beat the essential dualism of life into a mechanical monism disqualifies it from understanding life in its true nature. Yet without

this gift there would have been no consciousness in man of his destiny. All interpretations of history and man grow out the ability of intellect to hold life before it, to view its own inner life as a witness—standing outside itself. Thus only men are enabled to discover the direction of the flow of life—the forward movement of the life as a whole towards a destination. The understanding of the destiny of man, the interpretation of history becomes possible by this leger-demain of mind, even though this fatal gift withholds from it the inwardness of mind and the secret of the Soul.

Out of human curiosity was born the desire to look behind and see whether anything stands there. Out of wonder comes the inquisitiveness to peep into the future and to anticipate what enters from future into the present. The desire to control life leads man, to observe sequences and discover the law that govern it. The talent for objectification enables us to see ourselves. Thus curiosity and inquisitiveness brings us sciences. Wonder creates religions. The impulse to see life as a whole gives us philosophy. Behind them all exists a restlessness which intellect brings us as dubious dower, urging us ever to go forward.

The pressure and drive of intellect on emotions and instincts dares man to face issues framed in the words whence? why? and whither?—the parent of all philosophy, science and religion. This crystalization was the climax of a long process of chasing shadows that lurk in the memory and of bringing to the surface mute and silent murmurs in the depth of consciousness, of dragging into the light of the day the dreams that visits sleep in the night.

In the twilights of the forest abodes where light mated with darkness in the metaphysical sandhyas of asrams, where dark forces of instincts struggled with the lights of reason—the Indian mind formulated the hauntings of the soul in the first verse of Swethaswathara Upanishad thus:—

Kim kāraṇam brahma kutaḥ sma jātā jīvām kena ka cha sampratiṣṭaḥ adhiṣṭitā:

What is the cause? Brahman? Whence are we born? Whereby do we live? And wherein are we established?

These promptings may be repressed as irrelevant and detrimental to a full vigorous enjoyment of life. They may be derided as the taunts of sickly introspective mind. However as we throw

them out of the door they come back through the window. If we banish them from the waking hours they return to us in the musings of the night.

Life speaks darkly to us in suggestions and signs in surges and strivings on which light plays fitfully and momentarily. God speaks in a tongue not ours in creation. We have to spell Brahmalipi uncertainly and laboriously. Yet these questions reared their head not only in the dim beginnings of primitive life when imagination played the leading role, but also in the full glare of nineteenth and twentieth centuries when reason shone at the meridian.

They are not silenced at the rebuke of science or by the sarcasm of the cynic. They are part of our make up—that teases us with puzzles of life. We tried to delegate them to the background during the period of the triumphant march of material sciences when their assurances and undeniable achievements sent the theologion and the philosopher to the monastery and the cloister. Yet the highest achievements of science in unwinding the atom and unravelling relativity, have brought them back with renewed vigour and point.

All through the ages two voices have spoken and contended for audience on the destiny of man. One, the voice that denied any destiny to man and held that man like the animal, lives and dies and nothing more could be said about it than that chance brought him forth and chance will wipe him out and they that seek for meaning and purpose are hunting chimeras and seeing mirages. High philosophy can be quoted in support of this view—that of Empedocles, Omar khayam and Charvakas and modern scientists.

The other voice has been more insistant and drew the attention of the deepest thinkers of history—the voice that guided the life of Dr. Miller like a pole star. He lived in the Victorian age when sciences in the flush of their first victories promised an earthly paradise. This optimism came easy for one of Christian faith whose founder proclaimed the sons of God as the credentials of emergent evolution and the Kingdom of God, already among men, as the goal and consummation of History. I purpose in conformity with the faith of the great teacher in whose memory these lectures are instituted to enquire on what rational foundation Dr. Miller's vision of life rests, now that two wars have made

sciences less positive in their assertions and secularisation has cast it spell on the descendants of the ancient sages of India.

The fundamental problems of man's destiny and interpretation of history run in double harness. One School of Sociologists deny that man as an individual has any meaning and purpose and that if he has any significance at all it can be only as a member of society—which exists as an organism by itself apart from the individual. The other school assert the supremacy of the individual as a biological unit and regards the idea of social organism as more fanciful than scientific. Beyond all doubt man and society interpenetrate each other. Without man there can be no society and man has his existence and development always in society. Nevertheless man has the initiative and he has been the determinant of society at every crisis of history. Interpretation of history turns on the destiny of men.

Of the three problems whence, why, whither of man we are concerned in these lectures with the last whither?—what will be the future of man and human society? No topic that exercised the wit and wisdom of man has the urgency and immediacy of the problem of the meaning and purpose of life and no age has been destitute of thinkers on this theme. In India these high quests have been the mother's milk on which our culture was nourished.

Meaning of the terms used

I. *Meaning*: the elements and the ultimates have no meaning. Brahman and Pancha Bhutas have no meaning in themselves. Aksharas may be immortal but they have no meaning. Meaning belongs to judgment—to sentence, not to letters. The alphabets are the dismembered organs of a living word and are dead. Elements occur in combination in nature though we may separate them. Subject, object and a verb are minimum essentials for meaning.

II. *Purpose* involves intention, objective and contains more than meaning, though it forms a chief source of meaning. Design, intention are essential for purpose. Purpose may be constitutional—infra constitutional or ultra. The relation of parts to the whole, the inter dependence of organs in organism invest them with purpose. The purpose of heart is to pump blood and of arteries to convey blood to the body. Governments and institutions have

meaning and purpose internally in as much as they serve the whole — the body politic. Apart from internal purpose we have another type of purpose derived from the ends and means, goals and aims, ideals and aspirations. These are ultra constitutional. In the family, father and mother and children have meaning and purpose in relation to each other as members of the family. In marching towards democracy the world as a whole moves towards an end in view. Purpose may be in microcosm or macrocosm, in maintaining constitution or in realizing ideals. Movements have for their purpose, objectives beyond themselves. We are concerned in these discourses with the purpose in relation to a future end of life, of its total movement towards the realization of a plan i.e. the purpose of evolution.

III. *History.* A study of the past of the human race marks the province of history. Greek histographers Herodotus, Thucidides held that contemporary life alone was the field of history and not the past that can only be recovered by memory or recorded memory. Both these views are narrow and proceed on the assumption that future has no place in the science of history. Human action springs not only from the instigations of the past and incentives of the present but also from the attractions of ideals determining our future. Our actions—the more significant of them—depend not only on what has happened, what is happening but also on the picture of what may be conceived to be our future. If Humanity contains within itself a plan it seeks to realise, the future will certainly play a great part.

IV. *Interpretation of History* means reading human activities in history to discover whether they make any meaning, disclose any plan or purpose. In interpreting history we choose meaningful and purposeful activities out of the total of actions. We enquire the purpose of general movements, the significance of major trends. We try to discern whether history reveals a plan and find out what that plan is and to understand how much of it had been realised and how much remains to be realised. Interpretation may arise from deeper insight into the operations of forces of life or out of foresight of its destination.

V. *Destiny.* The word, has two meanings. (a) to Greeks and Hindus Destiny meant fate—a power over which we have no control, a power that rules over human affairs. In earlier stages fates are Gods, powerful, fickle and temperamental who ruled and overruled men as they liked. Later they signified tragedy—

the subordination of higher to the lower and the ultimate defeat of life by matter, character by circumstances,—the futility of the struggle for existence. Destiny was the will of Gods—despotic Gods who crush those who oppose them. Destiny spells doom and death. In the latter sense the discovery of law of nature may be said to determine its destiny—the terms of its possible existence. (b) Quite different in mood and temper, the second meaning, indicates fulfilment or realisation—the broadening ascents of life, the growing realisation of human possibilities and potentialities—in short—progress. Destiny pictures a larger, higher nobler life for man. History rolls forwards towards a new epoch—a golden age. Destiny may also be the Master plan of God for man in which nature ministers to man and man to God.

HISTORY OF SPECULATION ON THE DESTINY OF MAN

Speculations and theories on the destiny of man and mystery of existence are as old as the emergence of mind and personality. When the remotest ancestor of man, whoever it might have been—anthropoid ape or Lemur creased his brows in puzzle and opened his eyes in wonder he started a line of thought which Spenglers, Spencers, and Śaṅkaras, took up and elaborated. In certain periods of history and in certain philosophies these speculations have attained type-forms, illumined thought and gathered rich harvests.

Greece, Persia, India are associated with original speculations on man and History. These types of speculation may be classified according (1) as they take for interpretation two factors—life and supra life God and Cosmos or only one or the other of them. (2) as they believe in destiny for man and reason and purpose in history or regard creation as a product of chance fundamentally irrational. (3) as they give prominence to law or freedom (4) as the resultant outlook, is optimistic or pessimistic.

WEST—GREECE

1. *Plato and Aristotle.* Plato and Aristotle dominate the Western thought. We cannot imagine any problem of modern philosophy which they did not touch or any topic which they did not illumine. Plato's theory of the 'Universals' echoes down the corridors of history and we recognise them with different faces in Kant's 'things in themselves', Hegel's 'Idea', Whitehead's 'reality'.

The tenor of modern speculations was set by these Yuga purushas for the Western world.

Plato's predecessors developed various strains of speculation. Heraclitus thought that life was a flux in which we seek in vain for any pattern and any purpose or scheme we pretend to discover therein is first put there by ourselves. Parmenides denied change and assumed an unchanging subject which takes various predicates. Empedocles foreshadowed evolution. Socrates teased life with queries. Plato wove all these threads into a coherent web and gave for the first time in Greek thought an intelligeble answer to problems which others before him only partially succeeded in elucidating.

Plato finds meaning and purpose of life in something beyond life. The abiding in the changes, the persisting amidst variations are the universals, the forms—the architypes. Plato instituted an Olympiad of these universals. Creation copies the architypes in heaven—but by reason of the inadequate nature of materials available reproduces them imperfectly. The Universals have an ingrained tendency to incarnate themselves in nature—animals and men. They do not succeed at the first attempt. History records how attempts after attempts made by nature to capture perfection failed and how it learns from each failure. When man reproduces architypes faithfully he attains perfection. He fulfils himself. Plato rescued life from being a perpetual, meaningless flux and accident, gave life a task—the task of copying perfection. Man should strive to attain to architypal perfection for in realising perfection he justifies history. Since universals are not tengible artist models the task of reproducing them lies partly on God and to a limited extent on man. We watch the great artist shaping us to the figure of the proto type and casting us aside when we are unsatisfactory reproductions. The philosopher, Plato holds, has insight into perfect forms and guides men towards them. Hence the State ruled by philosophers moves towards desirable ends.

Aristotle a disciple of Plato—by no means a docile one—did not accept the separate existence of universals—form and substance being inseparable. The Plato's Olympiad was dismantled and universals were asked to rub shoulders with the plebian crowd. Aristotle keeps to the Platonic idea in another form. The soul which turns life into an organism, has potentialities to be worked out. Man and history are gradually realising the potentialities of

the soul. Evolution brings out better and better organisms and when these embody the fullness of the soul they realise their destiny.

Both Plato and Aristotle affirm the reality of life and use unreality in the sense of imperfection, not in the sense of Maya. The responsibility for perfection is ours as well as God's. Western Philosophy rarely negates life. They do not regard life— a lie or a mirage but a process with progressive meaning. Realisation of perfection in and through life sublimates its quality and value. The outlook remains optimistic though optimism could not be sustained without faith in the major vicissitudes of life. It upholds and energises man in his struggle for existence. Plato contributed universals and Aristotle "Entelechy" to the discussion of human destiny.

2. *Stoicism.* Plato exported universals into Heaven. Stoics brought them down as the pattern of life into nature. Stoics saw fulfilment of man in reason that upholds nature. The Jews conceived law as commands of God for individuals and for social welfare. The stoics found reason the constitutional principle inherent in man. The universals change their place and form in stoicism. Life should not be interpreted in terms of meaning and purpose but in terms of pattern and conformity. Nature was made for the happiness of man, the wise man lives according to nature. Since reason is universal all men are equal and the World Community the real community. The divine reason— consisting of justice and love gives us the moral pattern which brings us, our destiny of harmony and happiness. Stoics taught heroic and cheerful resignation as the governing principle of ethics and indifference as the supreme virtue. Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic emperor advised men to love mankind and follow God who resided in nature and man. Epictetus asked—'I must die but must I die groaning, I must be imprisoned but must I whine as well. I must suffer excile—Can anyone hinder me doing it with a smile?' "True stoic seeks and finds happiness everywhere in life, in any condition. 'Sick-yet happy; dying-yet happy, in peril yet happy, in disgrace-yet happy' was their gospel". The stoics took dispassionate view of existence. Cynicism and scepticism in themselves inadequate, found fuller and satisfactory expression in Stoicism. Destiny may be fate or ambition. To the stoics it was preminently willing resignation to the Will of God expressed in nature.

3. *Epicurianism.* Greek Epicurianism inspite of its pursuit of pleasure as purushartha was a somber creed which like some other creeds of the day adjudged life to be dark and miserable. It asked men to take the gifts of God as they come in nature and not to forego life in a longing for the unattainable. Above all it stood against bartering away body and pleasures of the body as evil, losing the joys of living present in pining after the dead past and shadowy future—exchanging certain 'here' for uncertain 'hereafter'. They interpret life as essentially enjoying the pleasures of the body and mind. The anathema of Epicurians was metaphysics and asceticism. They were not however hedonists. They taught that the attainment of happiness required a wise and well informed enjoyment of pleasures in a balanced and nonpassional way. Pleasures bring quick retribution of pain and to avoid this, pleasures have to be enjoyed moderately and with restraint. Passive pleasures are to be preferred to active ones which bring about a reaction. Epicurians are materialists but not determinists. Religion with its heaven in the future, weans us away from life—thus make us stake the real for the imaginary. "Eat little" they said "for fear of indigestion, drink little for fear of the next morning, eschew love, politics and all passionate activities; do not give hosatges to fortune by marrying and begetting children".[1] This summary of their teaching by Bertrand Russell shows them in quite a different light than those who recommend a butter-fly life of flitting from place to place in search of honey. Life is a tangle of pleasure and pain, good and evil gain meaning and purpose in our extracting the best pleasures out of it and this requires skill thought, discipline and restraint. Epicurianism neither finds a pattern in life nor offers man grandiose projects of attainment but modestly demands from him a wise and temperate enjoyment of life. Neither unduly pessimistic nor optimistic—neither advocating perfection nor desolation—Epicurianism finds wisdom in making the best of a bad business.

4. *Hegel—Germany.* The heritage of Greece was fully accepted by Europe and German Philosophers were the first to draw their inspiration from that quarter. Hegel stands in apostolic succession to Plato. What Plato was to Greece. Hegel was to Europe. He gives a new direction to Platonic Philosophy. The essentials are there but they differ in shape and function.

1. *History of Western Philosophy*—by Russell p. 268.

'The absolute' takes the place of the universals. History changes from an Artist's Studio to a theatre wherein the absolute realises itself in men and institutions. The 'idea' connotes the whole—the absolute. In space and time the absolute can only realise itself in succession, in parts not as a whole and history therefore can never give us a true and full picture of reality. Yet to the extent the idea realises itself in History, life has a meaning and purpose and man a mission and vocation—to attain the absolute. The contribution of Hegel to the interpretation of History was twofold—(1) The concept of history as the realisation of the idea. (2) The dialectics of the movements of life—the law of life. The gait of life, he would have it has a peculiarity a characteristic of its own. It swings from pole to pole and mounts up in tensions. Thesis creates antithesis and the tensions between them elevate life to a higher level in synthesis. The contradictions are only the bugbear of logicians. Opposites and oppositions mark the technique of the dynamics of life. If life like a drunkard reels from one end of the street to another, it has the drunkards' instinct for reaching home. The staircase of life—has for its steps a series of syntheses, and on them we mount higher and higher. Both Plato and Hegel find high social value in the state—one in the state ruled by philosophers and the other in absolute monarchy. We are auxilliaries to history. God makes history and destiny, Man hands up the tools and material to the great artist. Aristotle and Hegel give us the grand notion of a divine purpose unfolding itself in the universe. They are champions of human destiny in the sense of a march towards perfection. Hegel and Aristotle miss the idea of evolution but retain in a purposeful way, better than evolutionists do—the far off divine event towards which all creation moves.

5. *Spengler.* Spengler revived in twentieth century the familiar Eastern reading of history as repeating cycles. The Eastern view bases itself on revealation—Śruti and Smritis and draws on faith rather than on proof. Spengler illustrates the repetitive process in the world-history by attested documents and traditions. He makes the theory reasonable and demonstrable. There have been thinkers on the destiny of man in Greece and India who hold that life has no ultimate purpose since it moves in cycles and eternal recurrences. The cyclical theory does not deny limited purpose in life but only the ultimate purpose—a grand conclusion for humanity in perfection. Birth develops into youth and age and

to that extent it discloses an upward movement. The arcs of the circle each begin with an upward curve but at a particular stage they descend and turn upon themselves and end where they started from. This curling back, depletes life of growing higher purpose. Nations too have their birth and growth, but they also decline and die. This rhythm observable in history has place for buoyant hope and achievement but in the end it comes to naught. Life becomes a treadmill of monotonous going round and round. The cyclic theory had perhaps its origin in India. But the significance of Spengler's views lies in their coming after Victorian Epoch which developed under the inspiration of Sciences the theory of progress, of going up and up. Spenglerians attack this doctrine countering it with that of eternal recurrence.

Spengler's 'Decline of the West' has more in it than the title indicates. It contains a theory of history and a philosophy of the destiny of man. It shows that the West has passed its spring and autumn and has run into its winter. Every race, the doctrine propounds, passes through determinate phases which recur cycle after cycle. The theory first illustrated in the History of the West was next extended to other nations of the world. Appolonarian, Classical, Magian, Faustian cultures of Europe, the Indian Chinese, Arabian cultures of the East follow the same rhythm and drive home the same lesson. As one reads the original book the author's exposition of dialectics of history impresses one more than his cyclical theory. The relations of life to culture and culture to civilisation are exhibited in a brilliant way. Abstract and fundamental ideas, such as the part played by numbers in determining outlook on life are handled with such consummate skill, that it leaves the reader in amazement. Spengler throws light on the rhythm of national progress as well as on its bearing on the destiny of man. I summarise his theory shortly thus.

(1) True history is 'becoming'—The recorded history gathers 'the become' the ossified remains of the once living action. Each nation at its birth starts with peculiar endowments, significant urges which find expression in its culture and institutions—body and house. Totem, destiny, time, yearning, pulse, religion, reproduction, physiognomy and the concept of numbers are primary expressions of the becoming—the culture, Taboos, causality, space, fear, tension, politics, communication system, are the become,—the civilisation. Each nation has a historical bent, a primary impression, a sense of mission which it develops.

(2) Every culture has a genius of its own—unique and personal. Universal culture does not exist. However every nation passes through the same prescribed route, birth, youth, old age and death. These are inescapable. Germany has its youth before and Russia is just born. They have a future. The other nations of Europe have reached their end and have no future. This doctrine made him popular with the Nazis. But he reminded Germany that youth will soon pass away and it has to go the way of all flesh. This made him unpopular in Hitler's regime. Cyclical norm fixes growth as well as decline.

(3) The optimism of the Victorian age—that the world will grow better and better, ascending higher and higher nurses an illusion. All civilised nations have to die giving place to barbarians. Europe will soon be in a new barbarian age. Doom hangs over life and high ascents lead to steep declines. In their youth men and nations dare and do—in the old age they decline and disintegrate. Spenglarians are Calvinists and believe in predestination.

(4) Spengler's political theories obscured his real contributions to the interpretation of history. With Bergson he believed in creative action,—in the mystery and inscrutability of life—with Nietzsche he held that the world belongs to the hero. Nations that keep close to life risk and achieve. When once they spread life in space and time, in culture and civilisation they stray away from the path of destiny. When the 'becoming' plays the second fiddle to 'the become', pulses beat slow, energies ebb away. Then Nations take to bed and die.

We can't alter fate nor stop the windmill of life. Our duty demands that we should do great things in youth and die cheerfully in old age. Courage in youth, resignation in death becomes man. Such interpretations of life, both in the East and the West, breed pessimism—defeatist temperament. Once you enclose man in fate—you finish him. Spengler was an anti-rationalist. For him intuition was the proper organ of life—not intellect. Real man has always been the hero and not the man of letters. The 'feeling of the thing' takes us nearer to reality than knowledge.

6. *Existentialism—Germany & France*

The latest claimant for a novel philosophy of life—existentialism—regards life a nightmare—not merely dark and sorrowful

or unreal as some Eastern philosophers did. Intensely personal in treatment and without coherence among its leaders one finds it difficult to define its ideology, though a few common features are emerging. Its exponents attack each other with so much vigour and will that one fails to distinguish between friends and foes. Existentialism has both Christian—Kierkegraad and Pascal—and atheistical—Jaspers and Sartre-adherents.

The Christian existentialists are the earlier and have arisen out of recoil from Church and historic Christianity. They regard life with so much distrust and disgust that they cannot place God and Jesus in the creative order. Their conception of incarnation reveals their dilemma. Incarnation is just a tangent—that touches life without cutting into it. The transcendence of God and the vanity of existence, conceived in the terminology of the Old Testament make them file incarnation very thin. The Hindu conception of the incarnation as divinity coming in just to save and retire approaches their views. God lets incarnations as we let down baskets and ropes to those drowning in a well to bale them out. This pale ghost of incarnation bewilders the Christian as the 'appearance' doctrine of Avatars puzzles the Hindu. Advaitins and Barthians are bedfellows here in invoking the doctrine of "eva"—'as if'. Their doctrine of salvation—another paradox of their theology—does not propound an escape. The nightmare life with its dread and demonism throws man into a paroxym of frenzy and one of such torturing up-heavals land him right in the lap of God.

Non-religious existentialists portray the universe revealed by science (which they accept) as terrible and horrible (Rudra and Bibatcha)—a stark sheer tragedy—far more gruesome than the Greek. The human will caught in the coils of the boa-constrictors of man and society wages a desperate battle for life only to discover that the monster will crush him and there can be no escape from him. Jaspers says "at the root of existence are antinomies, contradictions which cannot be solved, oppositions which cannot be integrated. Liberty coupled with dependence, communication bound to solitude, these form the very stuff of existence and if the oppositions vanish existence itself vanishes into nothingness". For Heidegger and Sartre—existence is complete irrationality, plain absurdity incapable of any explanation—devoid of any hope. Every step put forward takes us backward in our irrational world—away from the goal we imagine.

Man awakens and sees with horror that he has involved himself in a context from which no escape opens before his vision. Tragically enough man cannot surrender himself to death or Nirvana. One deep instinct urges him to fight and surpass himself while another instinct assures him that these efforts can never succeed. Gradually he feels the horror of his position and dread, despair, forlornness, anguish (a favourite phrase) harass his heart. Sartre adds a few more touches. Man's environment—sticky, slimy, repellent viscious, filthy, obscene—makes the soul feel nausea. To yield brings death, to fight hastens the end. Death awaiting us at both ends makes the struggle doubly tragic. Man's hope lies in his future and he has no future. Forced to choose between either this or that his choice takes him to Nihil either way. The religious man attempts to be absorbed into the abyss and the non-religious man into order and organisation. But he cannot do either for existence recoils both from annihilation and individualisation. Man lives in a hostile world—he pases from nothingness to nothingness. All religions are fear-shelters against the irrational. In life we risk all for nothing and make propitiatory offerings to nothingness. Action measures the worth of life; intellect, systems and philosophers are mockers and betrayers.

Existentialists revel in tragedy, steep themselves in anguish, terror, disgust, despair. Romans crucified criminals. Existentialists crucify themselves. They refuse all hopes—close up all doors of escape. They decline to accept the wine of consolation and refresh themselves with draughts of gall and wormwood.

Existentialists hold up no hope to man. Destiny of man trapped in an irrational world can only be to curse and die, struggle and expire.

Existentialists revive certain traits of Indian philosophy. With Buddhists they feel the tragedy, sorrow of life but unlike them they throw away the escape of Nirvana—as unbecoming of man. They deny there are wayouts from the desert universe. Some of them talk of nothingness and Nirvana with the fondness and longing of a Buddhist, but regard it as an impossible aspiration. They do not rejoice in absorption into Brahman as the Advaitin does. Existence may be described as an upsurge, spurt a jump into nothingness—though this jump means destruction. Existence resides in the will—not in the intellect—in the choosing between two alternatives both of which demolish you. Like some sick

people who acquire a taste for quinine and Kashaya and love to exaggerate their diseases, this bleak philosophy wallows in utter misery. In this respect it differs from similar Hindu sects who invent imaginary and impossible escapes from inescapable predicaments. They are to that extent realists and derive a melancholy dissatisfaction from a mad, sad world or, to use their jargon, from the fundamental contingency of existence.

ASIA—PERSIA

Passing from Europe to Asia outside India—Persia offers two great original contributions to the study of Man and History—both of them racy of the soil—the hedonism of Omarkhayam and the apoclypse of Zarathustra.

Omarkhayam in the verses available in English propounds a materialistic fatalism—a mellowed oriental rose-water version of Epicurianism. He does this with such delicacy of thought and poetry of feeling that we fall in love in spite of ourselves, with him and his philosophy. If wine-bibbers produce poetry half as charming as the Rubaiyat, Prohibition would be a lost cause. If grape 'can with logic absolute confute two and seventy jarring sects' what chance has prohibition among wrangling legislators? The philosophy of Omarkhayam does not believe in immortality or in future. It stands for enjoying God's good gifts in this life without mortgaging to-day to to-morrow. 'Unborn to-morrow and dead yesterday—why fret about them if today be sweet'. 'Alike for those who for today prepare and those that after some tomorrow stare muezzin from the tower of darkness cries 'fools your reward is neither here nor there'. History has no meaning nor man any destiny. Life, a sealed book, cannot be opened by man. "There was a door to which I found no key, there was the veil through which I could not see—"some little talk awhile of Me and Thee—and there was then no more of Thee and Me"—"I rose and on the throne of Saturn sate and many knots unravelled by the Road but not the master-knot of human fate". Why should we labour and toil, fear and pine for an hereafter that does not exist? 'One thing is certain—that life flies. One thing is certain and rest is lies—the flower that once is blown for ever dies'. Do philosophers enlighten? 'Myself when young did eagerly frequent Doctor and Saint and heard great Argument about it and about; but evermore came out of the same door as in I went' 'Then to the rolling Heaven itself I cried asking, "What lamp had destiny

to guide her little children stumbling in the dark? "A blind understanding', Heavens replied. 'Into this universe and why not knowing nor whence, like water willy-nilly flowing and out of it as wind along the waste, I know not whither willy-nilly blowing. What without asking hither hurried whence and without asking whither hurried hence'. Here we have in a verse Omar's answer to Upanishad's quest of whence, whither and why? Hopes and aspirations avail nothing against fate. 'The worldly hope men set their hearts upon turns ashes or it prospers; and anon, like snow upon the desert's dusty face lightning for a little hour or two—was gone'. Fate rules life and nobody heeds your travail and anguish. 'The moving finger writes and having writ moves on, nor all your piety nor wit shall lure it back to cancel half a line, nor all your tears wash out a word of it'.

What then is life? A vain show of a little while. 'I came like water and like wind I go'. 'Into this battered Caravanserai whose portals are alternate night and day came Sultan after Sultan with his pomp, abode his destined hour and went his way'. 'We are no other than a moving show of visionary shapes that come and go round with this Sun illumined lantern held in mid-night by the master of the show. What shall we do then? Some for the glories of this world and some sigh for the Prophet's Paradise to come. Ah! take the cash and let the credit go'. 'Make the most of what we yet may spend, before we too into dust descend, dust to dust and under dust to lie'. Don't waste your life in vain regrets. "Come, fill the cup and in the fire of spring your winter-garment of repentance fling. The bird of time has but a little way to flutter and lo! the bird is on the wing. 'Here with a little bread beneath the bough—a flask of wine, a book of verse and thou beside me singing in the wilderness—oh wilderness were paradise enew.' 'When the angel with his darker draught draws upto thee—take that—do not shrink'.

Obviously his own philosophy did not satisfy Omar. He arraigns God for the injustice of it all. 'Oh thou who Man of baser earth did make and even with the paradise devise the snake, for all the sin the face of wretched man is black with—Man's forgiveness give—and take'. He would remake the world. 'Ah love! could you and I with fate conspire to grasp this sorry scheme of things entire, would not we shatter it to bits and then remould it nearer to the heart's desire'. The cry of the heart rings through many verses against the tragedy of death. 'Surely

not in vain my substance from the common earth was taken that he who subtly wrought me to shape should stamp me back to shapeless earth again'. The poet-astronomer, the wiseman of Persia leaves us musing with the question which in spite of all religions remains unanswered. 'Strange, is it not ? that of myriads who before us passed the door of darkness through, not one returns to tell us of the road which to discover we must travel too'. He also had the feeling all the sensitive mystics had, which the grape cannot confute. 'A hair, they say, divides the false and true, yes and a single alif were the clue could you but find it to the treasure house and to the master too whose secret presence through creation's veins running quick-silver-like elludes your pains, taking all the shapes from Mah to Mahi (fish to moon) and they change, and perish all—but He remains'. 'Creation is a drama which for the past-time of eternity He does himself contrive enact and behold'. He even echoes Modern existentialists. 'Better Oh better to cancel from the scroll of universe one luckless human soul than drop by drop enlarge the flood, that rolls hoarser with anguish as ages roll'.[2]

Solomon reputed to be the wisest of his age was a blood-brother of Khayam in his views on life. He finds unending repetition everywhere—dull, dreary and monotonous—all ending in nothing. One generation passeth away and another generation cometh, But the earth abides for ever. The sun also rises and the sun goes down and hastens to the place where it arose. The wind goeth towards the south, turns about and to the North, it whirleth about continually and the wind returneth again according to the circuits. All the rivers run into the sea. Yet the sea is not full. Unto the place from when the rivers came thither they return again. All things are full of labour. Man cannot utter it. The eye is not satisfied with seeing nor the ear filled with hearing. The thing that has been is that which shall be; that which is done is that which shall be done. There is no new thing under the sun. What about pleasures of life so much valued by Omar ? The great King drank full the cup of sexual and sensual pleasures. He drank, danced, and like American Millionaires had a collection mania. Result ? 'Vanity of vanities' saith the preacher "all is vanity. There is no remembrance of the wise more

2. Taken from Fitgerald's translation of the Rubaiyat of Omarkhayam.

than of the fool. 'How dieth the wiseman ? as the fool ! As the one dieth so dieth the other'." All go unto one place—all are the dust and all return to dust again. Ah ! the weariness and futility of life ! 'He that loveth silver shall not be satisfied with silver, nor he that loveth abundance with increase. What shall a man do then ?' 'There is nothing better for a man than that he should eat and drink and make his soul enjoy good in his labour. This also I saw that it was from the hand of God'. 'But this also is vanity and vexation of spirit'.[3] Omar preaches the futility of life and Soloman its vanity. One agrees with the other and both with Buddha though their philosophies differ.

ZOROASTRIANISM

The land of Omarkahyam gives us another original interpretation of destiny and history which under the name of Apoclypse entered Judaism and Islam. Zarathustra interprets history as a battle ground of Suras and Asuras, good and evil. Creation cleft into two—the good and the bad—and presided over by two lords Ahurmazda and Ahriman are ever in conflict. History cannot be regarded a cycle or a development. Actually life and history represent a titanic and cosmic struggle of the evil and the good forces for mastery. The destiny of man depends on his loyalty to good or evil forces. Neutrality does not serve him. He should enlist in the army of God or Satan. The battle culminates in a grand climax-the victory of Ahurmazda. The day of judgment dawns over the grand assizes of humanity when sheep and goats are separated, judged and condemned—the evil annihilated and the good rewarded. In the crowning battle of the good and bad the fortunes of the conflict are settled in favour of the good by the advent of Sraoshvant, born of a virgin. The reward of the good consists in a new earth and heaven—a new life, immortality and eternal happiness. The whole of the scheme has passed into Old Testament eschatology—the day of judgment, the coming of the Messiah, the damnation of the wicked who disobey the commands of God and the salvation of righteous who obey the Lord. History ends with judgment and a new chapter in the human destiny commences. In modern Christian theology Barthians, Niebhur derive their ideologies from this source and accommodate it to a dialectic of their own which reconciles transcendence of

3. Ecclesiastes.

God and intransigence of history by making salvation a matter of touch and go. God does not save by participation in history. The world cannot be saved but man can be saved from the world. Nietzsche takes the name of Zarathustra in vain.

Besides its dualism as the basic fact of history Zoroastrianism has one most original feature—that the ultimate issue of history depends on men and gods. Good and evil struggle but the victory depends on men enlisting on the side of the good and fighting for victory. Victory has to be won—cannot be won without facing the risk. The concept broadens the venue of history and invests the battle with tense human interest because the battle is man's as well as victory. The gains from victory for humanity stretches beyond the gifts of life. The element of contingency adds new thrills to the cosmic battle. Though God ultimately wins the fortunes sway during the battle. At the critical point God does not merely intervene but becomes an ally of humanity. The resemblance between Judaism and Zoroastrianism was noticed by scholars. But the similiarity between Christianity and Zarathustrian ideology was overlooked because the Orthodox creed obscured the Christian concepts.

INDIA

Sankya—The Original Sankhya recovered from its later amendments presents a fresh statement of the subject. It stands on a par in its novelty with Zoroastrianism and Platonism. Sankhya has been the basis of all speculations on the destiny of man in India. Its contribution to Hinduism and Hindu Philosophy has been very great. It gave to Buddhism Nirisvara view to Advaitism the psychological outlook in religion, to Madhvaism, its dualism. Above all it made guesses at evolution and laid the foundation for a materialistic evolutionism. Even in the Upanishads we see Sankhya in a form adopted to theism and pantheism. Its original contents have to be inferred by eliminating the refractions it suffered by being used by other systems for their own ends.

Sankhya was frankly dualistic—conceived two parallel categories both eternal, selfsufficient independent of each other—Purusha and Prakriti. It eschewed God and accepted plurality of souls. The denial of Brahman, the plurality of souls, the unbridgeability of the gulf between Pursha and Prakriti, the psychological and Fruedian treatment of salvation are its characteristic

marks. Like modern short stories it has no happy end—in fact no end at all.

In one respect its originality was startling—so startling that all Hindu speculations shied away from it. The answer it gave to the question how did the need for salvation arise? puts it in a class by itself and constitutes it a unique system. This was possible by making just a slide about irrefragibility of Purusha. Forgetting for a moment that Purusha is incapable of emotion it makes him fall in love with the dancer Prakriti. This touch of humanity has led to untoward consequences. Normally the ego caught in karmic toils needs salvation. In Sankhya Purusha has to recover from his momentary lapse. We do not know whether the original Sankhya attributed to Prakriti a similar lapse by falling in love with Purusha. Prakriti can afford to be indifferent to Purusha returning tit for tat. It has its own Pradhan and Mahat. If being absorbed into Brahman can be Mukti for ego, being absorbed into pradhan can also be the salvation of the ego in the prakriti series. This falling into love with each other of purusha-above all emotion and prakriti, beneath all spirituality precipitates the usual sequence of events as in the case of human love. No system except Sankhya dared to pose salvation as the need of Purusha or God. Equally none dared to imagine, that falling in love of God with the world was the cause of our bondage instead of our redemption, as in the case of Bakthi religions which declare 'that God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son that whosoever believeth in him shall not perish but have everlasting life'.

If entanglement of Purusha forms a daring originality of Sankhya so does the disentanglement which consists in remembering its previous status. Purusha gets out of its obsession by mere recollection of his previous condition—by feeling that it does not become him to fall in love with the outcaste girl—Prakriti. On the other side ego recovers by recollecting that with her low born status her love for Purusha though sweet can hardly last. They both realise their lapses and recover their own self possession. Sankhya has no salvation except Prakriti and Purusha being themselves and revolving in their own spheres, and not exchange the glances across the chasm. Probably the concept of salvation was insinuated later when the heart gained over the head but soon the head gained over the heart and the romance of divine love as the destiny of man was put an end to and the

prosaic absorption into self-consciousness replaced. All systems that make God and man fundamentally different from each other and then bring them together in the drama of salvation entangle themselves in subtle contradictions, confusions, contretemps—dexteriously covered by artful distractions from their predicament. Under similar circumstances Adwaitism, Existentialism, and Barthianism work themselves into a similar impasse. We cannot dehumanise God without paying a terrible price.

The subsequent development of Hinduism consists in accepting the basic terms of Sankhya and trying to escape from its logical consequences. Later darasanas sought to overcome its dualism by placing Purusha over Prakriti. But the incommunicability between Purusha and Prakriti remained. Advaitism met the challenge by denying the reality of Prakriti. Theistic systems accept the dualism of Sankhya and reject its incommunicability doctrine. Anyway Sankhya involved Hinduism in three lines of thought. (1) that meets the problems of life by denying life itself and (2) that saves life by denying Purusha or God (3) that brings about a compromise between Purusha and Prakriti by presenting the nexus between them as the source of fall or redemption. All these attempts regard cosmos not as a fact but as a problem, not as a helper but as a hindrance to the attainment of human destiny. Man's destiny has to be worked out not in this cosmos but beyond it in another sphere.

Another broad development starting from different premises reaches the same conclusion. The strength as well as the weakness of Hindu theory of destiny of man was curiously enough due to its early scientific attitude. India was the first to discover that the universe was bound by law and the first to extend to moral realm the physical law of causation. The acceptance of law brings its own retribution. It involves a denial of effective free-will. The law of Karma was at its origin like the caste system, flexible but it soon became an iron rod, strong, stiff and unbendable. The inescapable law of karma rules life, physical and moral and stretches beyond life into the hereafter. This doctrine need not have led to pessimism. Upanayana in Hinduism, rebirth in Christianity, discovery of law in sciences are regarded with optimism as sources of man's opulence and power, as open doors for escape from rigid control of life. What converted karma into a pessimistic doctrine was its association with rebirth. Karma may be and perhaps was a straightline conception but it was soon, bent

into a wheel—into the notion of eternal recurrence. Perhaps we have to go even further back, and locate the origin of Hindu pessimism in the primary and congenital impression which the Hindu mind received. It was an inheritance from the days when man issuing from animal life found everywhere, a danger, a threat in the all round darkness. It may be this basic impression changed law into a wheel and made existence a prison house. It could not have been formulated in the days when man feels his triumph over nature as in the twentieth century. Whatever the cause the result has been to convert life into a bondage, all salvation into a sort of redemption. The destiny of man can be realised by escaping cosmic enslavement. Man can attain his perfection not in this world but in some supra-world by escaping from its jurisdiction to a place where its writs do not run. Life plays the role of a villain who seduces the innocent, imprisons the free, entangles the unweary. Man may win and ultimately wins by his own efforts or by the grace of God but has to undergo the ordeal of life. He can look for no help from life, which does not cooperate with him but openly opposes him and checkmates him at every turn. The doctrine of karma enlarged into cosmic plan leads to a magnified cyclic view. Man cannot escape the law of karma by death. For karma hunts him like a police man and brings him back. Even redemption from life does not help for the cosmic law of rotation runs all men to earth. The Hindu cosmology projects law of karma into cosmos and makes it the soul of the universe.

Manu states the cosmic scheme thus: A year is a day and night of Gods. One year of gods equals 360 human years. Krithayuga is 4000 years of god and twilight proceeding it consists of as many hundreds years of God and the twilight following it the same number. The Krithayuga lasts 4800 God's years, Thretha 3600. Dwapara 2400, Kali 1,200. All the four yugas make one Maha Yuga. Thousand Mahayugas make one day of Brahman. The rotation of yugas has no end—though it has lulls. The cycle of Mahayuga grades downwards both physically and morally. Dharma is four-footed in Kritha, three-footed in Threta, two legged in Dwapara, and wobbles on one leg in Kali. Man lives four thousand years in Kritha, accomplishes, his desires and is free from diseases. But in each succeeding age the life span diminishes by one fourth.

It will be seen that karma binds with iron chains man here and hereafter. Beyond the individual wheel their exists the cosmic wheel which rotates without any reference to man and his actions. Man escapes from the one only to be precipitated into the other. Probably for this reason Buddhism regards not escape but annihilation as true salvation. We exist in a law bound life and cosmos which we have no power to overcome. Man either goes round and round in samsara or finds some means of getting out of it. Religion comes in to take man out of his helpless condition, while sciences declare frankly that man has not much hope and religious remedies are fanciful if not fantastic.

CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION

I have so far described the ancient and medieval theories of interpretation of History and Man as well as modern theories that reproduce them broadly. A radical departure from all the views above mentioned has taken place in the evolutionary outlook on life—which explains the manner and method of life by observation and experiment. Evolution offered a new key for the interpretation of life and it has influenced almost every department of life—theology, history, philosophy, sociology, economics, and politics and everywhere successfully challenged the ancient and accustomed modes of thought. Naturally therefore any interpretation of life and nature, any attempt to fix the place of man in cosmos, any anticipation of the shape of things to come, cannot afford to dispense with evolution. Ancient world knew of a kind of cosmic evolution but not the biological one. Sankhya among darsanas, the story kshirasagaramadana had fancy-pictures of evolution. They never recognized in it a key for understanding life. Evolution, as the principle of growth of life explaining the 'how' of the variety of forms and their order of sequence, may be said to be quite modern and attained a dominant position only after Darwin. Matter, life and intelligence—natural, animal and human kingdoms make up our Universe. Evolution tells the story of their birth, growth, how, what was, became what is and how the past of life relates itself to the present—particularly about the method and mechanism of development of organic life. Evolutoinary science Biology does not forecast—the future lies beyond its frontiers. Yet if the past and present have any relation to the future, it should help us to form intelligent anticipations of the progress of life in future

In order to see where the theory of evolution stands at present we have to compare it with the Darwinian formulation—which still stands as the classical pattern. The chief features of this exposition are : —

1. The variety of forms of matter and life with which the earth teems have arisen from an ultimate substance—matter and force or motion. That this ultimate has in it an inherent and

ingraven impulse to change and vary and these variations are the causes and conditions of evolution and its proliferation. Biologically life tends to reproduce itself but always with slight changes. These differences, when accumulated, give rise to new types—species. Descent with variation spells the Mahamantra of Biology. Of the factors that have contributed to the growth and variety of life, the preeminent one was the change of environment which produces a change in the life substance, and accounts for its variations. The supremacy of environment over life —an article of faith in the original creed of evolution—has found lodgement in other departments of life. Do you want to improve the race? 'Choose a proper environment for amoeba to grow', says Eugenics. Do you want to improve men? Remove slums, give them clean water, good food, pure air. Controlling life through environment has become the reformer's faith and politician's shibboleth.

2. The higher forms of life arise from lower by a modification of their substance. Unity of life remains the fixed dogma of evolution. The matter in one of its variations, differentiations and combinations produces life and life by a similar process changes into mind. No doubt the links between matter and life, life and mind are wanting. But one can infer what they are. Orthodox evolution sternly refuses to admit the 'new' in evolution. Every variety in nature and life, every change in form and structure are explained as the result of twists and turns of matter. All the potentialities of life are in matter and we need not go beyond the process to divine its ways and means, its intentions and objectives. If we grant impulses for variations in the stuff of matter and life and adaptations then we can explain the cosmos from atom to gallaxies from Amoeba to Man.

3. The modus-operandi of evolution and the mechanism of development was formulated in the famous words of Darwin 'struggle for existence and survival of the fittest'. Matter and life are not co-operators. Between them exists a perpetual feud—matter bent on choking off life and life determined to get the better of its adversary and survive. This duel-impulse stands even behind variations of matter and life as their instigator. The struggle takes place between the hosts of variations of matter and life and mutations of Genes and Chromosomes. We cannot predict the issue. Survival of the fittest begs the question as we deduce the elements that make for survival from the survival itself. To speak more accurately the winner in the battle survives, though

we do not know who the winner will be and why he wins. Life had to win a right to exist against colossal odds. Generally speaking, classical biology backs a materialistic and mechanistic construction of evolution and commits the interpretation of life to causal determinism.

4. Everything can be explained by law. All the events of existence are bound and governed by law and chance is only a polite name for ignorance. Law is the reality and freedom an illusion. Science has its own way of approach, its own method of attacking problems. It searches for and discovers the law: the reign of law prevails from atom to universe from germs to humanity. Freedom cannot exist if law be universal. As we advance we learn the omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence of law. Struggle for existence explains the whole realm of the living—gives a coherence and unity to our knowledge of life; supplies a method of elucidating its humours and moods.

5. Evolutionists do not believe in purpose or progress. The creation does not move forwards towards any goal—much less towards an appointed or ordained end. Biologists do not discern any plan or pattern in life and its motions. Limitations of language necessitate the use of words indicative of purpose. At the base chance rules—accidents start the cosmic process. Here we have a grand paradox. The ambition of science moves in the direction of law and prediction. Yet life has been too various, too aimless to make predictions possible. Even the more liberal evolutionists set their face against the idea that evolution moves towards a predetermined goal. Science does not predict the future of the whole, and scientists, whatever they are, do not aspire to be astrologers. Things have happened—there was no why and wherefore for the happenings. The denial of an over-all purpose promises to be the last ditch combat between religion, philosophy and science. Professor Neville George says, "In scientific aspect evolutionary process is without obvious purpose. There is no steady march of progress in evolution. The general picture is not one of advance but replacement." (Evolution in outline P. 116) Simpson in "The meaning of evolution" observes that all-over progress and particularly towards any goal or fixed point can no longer be considered as characteristic of evolution, or even as inherent in it. Progress does not exist in the history of life." (p. 178) Bertrand Russell's well-known statement may be quoted. "Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end

they are achieving—his origin and growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and beliefs are but the outcome of accidental collation of atoms".

6. Biology does not disclose any life in general. All life occurs in organisms. Life has run into blind alleys everywhere. We do not see any trunk of the tree of life—only branches. All the species have exhausted their possibilities and can only reproduce but not change. Specification—the universal tendency of life puts an end to new developments. No radical change has occurred in animals and men in the last few million years. Animals are where they have been since their creation. Man has not biologically changed from his first parents, nor mentally in out-fit. Man had a past—he has no future. He has become the Lord of the earth and there he remains.

The orthodox doctrine interprets the higher in terms of the lower—life in terms of the environment, subjective in terms of the objective, quality in terms of quantity. Life as a process has closed its circuit, and has come to a standstill. The possibilities of life are exhausted, or are being exhausted. Man, a supreme animal, shows no signs of developing into an angel. The river of life has received no rivulets from outside in the past and may not in the future.

A CRITIC OF EVOLUTION

Science has its own orthodoxy, its own creed, as religions have. There are conservatives and liberals among them. Religions used to persecute the heretics. Science looks at them askance, with disapprobation, ostracises them in a way and does not wish them Godspeed. If there are communists who cling to Marx there are scientists who stick to Darwin and consider all deviations from him as unauthorised and deplorable. Nevertheless evolutionary theories have changed. The critics have arisen from inside and outside. Three definitely marked schools—the neo-Lemarkians, neo-Darwinians, the synthetic form the inner circle. In the outer ring are Vitalists and Finalists—regarded and treated as unorthodox. All of them are scientists and none of them have any marked religious bias. We may first consider how the synthetic school which consists of Fisher, Haldane, Huxley, Wright, Muller have criticised the early theories and have given us a synthesis strictly within the terms of biological science.

1. *Life and environments*: The emphasis has shifted from variations of environment to variations of genes. The variation of external environment except radiations do not reach the genes. Even the mutations in themeslves do not control development. They are most of them detrimental and not conducive to favourable variations. They maintain repetitions or likeness between the parents and the offspring. Those only which choose environmental variations leading to stabilisable variations are operative in development. Professor Osborne puts it thus: "In any species novelty arises only when mutations occur and sustained evolution is the cumulative product of a succession of mutations expressed in a selectively preferred series of mutants (evolution in outline P. 47). The factors of evolution are environment and variations, mutations and adaptations. Of these adaptations have the role of guiding evolution.

2. *Higher and Lower*: That higher forms are modifications of the lower still remains the accepted doctrine but it has suffered great changes. The differences between matter, life and mind involves so many essential characteristics that to call them 'new' far from straining facts supplies apt descriptions. "It is merely silly," remarks G. G. Simpson, "to maintain there is no essential difference between life and non-life. Life has its own principles, functions different from matter and has distinctive attributes." (Meaning of evolution Pp. 26 & 27). When we come to man the breach becomes almost irreconcilable. That in man evolution has taken a new turn having no precedent in history is conceded by Simpson and Julian Huxley. Huxley has written a whole book about the uniqueness of man. So cautious a writer as Simpson holds: "Man is fundamentally a new sort of evolution, and he is also fundamentally a new sort of animal. The man's essential nature is defined by qualities found nowhere else—not by those he has in common with apes, fishes, trees, fire or anything other than himself. It is part of this unique status that in man a new form of evolution begins overlying and largely dominating the old organic evolution which nevertheless also continues in him. This new form of evolution works in the social structure as the old does in the breeding population structure. And it depends on learning and inheritance of knowledge as the old does on physical inheritance. Man's reaction depends far less than other organisms, on physically inherited factors, far more on learning, on perception of the immediate and new situations. (p. 179). "The

view of life as mere mechanism or automatism represents an extreme of the general field of materialism—an extreme now rather widely abandoned by materialists." (p. 28.)

Man's uniqueness consists in his moral sense—an attribute not found in pre-human stages of evolution T. Huxley threw a bomb into evolutionary circles when he drew attention to how human morality differs from the ethics of nature and how irreconcilable they are. The advent of morality directly antagonistic to nature can hardly be explained in terms of contiguous prolongation of the principles obtaining among beasts—but only on the view of new powers having entered the process of evolution in man. The attempts to derive human ethics from nature as Simpson points out, have failed. The application of the ethics of competition in the economic field has spread havoc that will take long to repair. All modern thinkers agree that in man and with man a new evolutionary departure has happened. The new departure looks like a radical breach, rather than a logical development, endangering, if fully developed, the biological basis of life.

3. The dogma of nature red in tooth and claw—the gladiatorial theory of existence so dear to Darwinism has come under fire. Huxley who opened the fire showed how nature was ethically bad before the evolution of man and how the problem of thwarting nature has vital importance. Sir Arthur Keith joins Huxley. Apologists of Darwin plead that the words were used in a metaphorical and analogical way. Critics go further and point out that struggle for existence is not a universal principle in evolution, and that along with it cooperation and mutual aid exists, to effect survival, as Kiropatkin makes out. The principle has no application to individuals in themselves in the making of their biological constitution. It operates only when reproduction rate outstrips the available food resources. The military simile illsuits the description and evolution has to pay for the use of military terminology as religion has done.

4. The determinist view of evolution came into collision with the love for freedom in human society. Rigid determinism excludes freedom of will and choice. Law certainly operates in evolution, but not in a manner as to render freewill illusory. We start evolution with a basic substance whose nature expresses itself in variety and change. Variety and differentiations concede freedom under a disguise. Moreover, random variations occur in

every evolution and have a role. "The history of life turns out to be an odd and intricate mixture of the oriented and the random, the systematic and unsystematic" (Simpson, p. 177). In this discussion about law and freedom in evolution we start with a stuff capable of being moulded into different forms and the process of moulding determined by purpose or end. As in the case of legal law, the law represents the modification of initial freedom into channels imposed by circumstances and objectives. It presupposes a life which is not moulded but capable of being moulded. The determinism of science overlooks the fact that determination can only supervene on something moving towards an end. Without the end matter, life, society would be an undetermined oozy stuff, ineffective for that very reason. Physical science which lent its determinism to biology has itself in atomic investigations discovered indeterminacy at the root of law and the wonder of it is that this indeterminacy does not amount to lawlessness inasmuch as it does not disintegrate the atom but maintains its constitution.

5. Evolutionists are yielding inch by inch, only where they could not help, on the question of purpose or progress in evolution. Both are granted in a way—but not in the way indicated by the use of these words. Conscious purpose cannot be an element till consciousness arose and that was in higher animals and men only. In view of recent development in psychology unconscious purpose has become an entertainable notion. We can hardly read a book on evolution without realising how plainly creation shows purpose stamped on it and how artificial and purely logical are the attempts to exclude purpose and aim altogether. The new school of biologists no longer exclude purpose but give it all but an overall role in evolution as the following views show:

(a) The coincidences, convergences, adaptations in evolution are so intricate, so improbable that it strains reason and logic to hold that a purpose was not intended. In his book on "Evolution in action" Julian Huxley points out how extremely improbable evolution of a horse would be if it depended on variations alone without selection. "We should clearly have to breed a thousand strains to get one with favourable mutation. A million strains (a thousand square) to get one containing two favourable mutations. A thousand to millionth power to get one containing a million, computed to be necessary for the creation of a new type of horse." Natural selection is somehow endowed with the power to choose favourable mutations dealing with such astronomical numbers.

Unless we attribute the omniscience of God to natural selection, such a feat against such odds sounds impossible.

(b) The inter-relations of parts to the whole in an organism are admittedly purposive. They are intended to maintain the organism. In man the heart to pump, the arteries to carry blood, white corpuscles to attack poinsonous germs are purposive and planned. Every text-book on biology displays the wonders of cooperative union, sense of duty, devotion to common purpose in organisms that may put human beings to shame. The social organisation of bees and ants are marvellous instances of highly specialised life of community.

(c) Simpson in a chapter on 'Oriented evolution' takes the change from Eohippus to modern horse and remarks that the change involved direction and orientation....and that in hundreds and thousands of other cases it seems clear we have orientation of some sort. The miracle of purpose and orientation does not lose its purposiveness and quality of miraculousness when a great world of system, and coordination is imported into amoeba which are shown to be extremely complicated patterns with millions of genes and chromosomes.

(d) In the chapter on 'Opportunism of evolution' Simpson draws attention to an outstanding characteristic of evolution—its opportunism, which involves exploration and exploitation of potentialities though without prescience. "Evolution shows continued trends and a neat interlocking of various sorts of organism so that they inter-act systematically and fill out the possible ways of life." p. 70.

These are the modifications of the Darwinian conception of evolution in the hands of competent scholars of evolution. Among Neo-Lamarkians and Neo-Darwinians we have synthesists who are willing to recast the original theory of evolution to meet the growing knowledge in the field. They are however opposed to Vitalists and Finalists, who hold that a better reading of the meaning of evolution can be obtained if we assume a purpose in evolution guiding it towards a definite goal. These schools receive support from evolutionary philosophers, who while taking evolution as the basis of their philosophy broaden its scope. All these are scientists and have scientific training and their interpretation of evolution should not be taken as popular and biassed. It may be instructive

to know where they join issue with evolutionists and what their evolution looks like.

The doctrine of evolution was developed in a peculiar way in departments. Each branch strictly limits the pursuit to the facts of its own special science, and these are pieced together to get an overall picture. Biology, Physics, Paleontology, Geology, Embryology, each pursues its own investigations and their contributions are built into a general system of evolution. Since nothing outside the process falls within the province of each science we get only an inside view of the house limited, as it were, by surrounding walls. The philosophic view proposes a different technique of study. It first takes an outside view of the total process of evolution—and then studies it limb by limb. It stands to reason that an allround view of the process may give better conceptions of the nature of links and component parts—a synoptic view of the direction of the movement of life than sectional study. We have to study the scroll of life not only from right to left as in English but left to right as in Arabic and top to bottom as in Chinese. Professor J. Thompson concludes his article on 'Biology and human progress' in 'The outline of modern knowledge' in these words. 'Man must be considered in the light of organic evolution, the outcome of an agelong process, and also a promise. But we must also envisage organic evolution in the light of man since it is in man that nature finds its chief significance". We may study the gains of this wider method in relation to each of the chief issues which the theory of evolution has raised".

1. Missing links—vex the evolutionists. While most of creation still exists they alone have disappeared. The search for them has not been rewarded with success. They are inexplicable gaps in an otherwise continuity. The discoveries announced with hope have petered out. Every problem connected with them presents an enigma. Monkeys reproduce, so do men. Why one link alone has failed to reproduce has not been convincingly accounted for. If however we take an outside view of evolution the puzzle ceases. The missing links are not links at all. They are punctures in the walls of the process whereby something from outside has entered the animals and transformed them. Admittedly something radical in potency and power not found in pre-man creation entered into evolution and produced him. The places where such entries are made which look like gaps from within are holes for the without to come in. Evolution can be better

explained, in terms of involution and evolution. The involution taking place at specified points in the course. The vertical descent of the 'new' into the 'old', changes its terms, injects new possibilities into it and effects new reaches in evolution. These crises are nodal points of entry, and not scars left behind in the struggle. The vertical descents are visible only from an outside view of evolution. They also become meaningful, if we read evolution from top to bottom.

2. The question of goals, plans, purpose and progress in evolution may cease to tease us so much in a broader context. The divergence of opinion between liberal and philosophical schools has narrowed down. This will be evident from the following passage in Huxley's 'Evolution in action'. "At first sight the biological sector seems to be full of purpose. Organisms are built as if purposefully designed and work as if in purposeful pursuit of a conscious aim. But the truth lies in those two words—'as if' ....As Darwin showed the purpose is only an apparent one. However this atleast implies prospective significance. Natural selection operates in relation to the future—the future survival of the individual and the species. And its products in the shape of actual animals and plants are correspondingly oriented towards the future in their structure and their mode of working and their behaviour. A few of the later products of evolution particularly higher animals show true purpose in the sense of awareness of a goal. But this purpose is confined to individuals and their actions. It does not enter into the basic machinery of evolutionary process although it helps realisation of its results. Evolution in the biological phase is still impelled from behind; but the process is now structured so as to be directed forwards" (Pp. 15 and 16). This remarkable passage which no doubt represents accurately the present position in the scientific evolution narrows the gap between the scientists and philosophers so much that one might walk over from the one to the other without taking a jump. Once we have recourse to "eva" doctrine in philosophy or in biology we may infer that the theory stands on its last legs. One reason why the running purpose is not perceived may be the sectional outlook. The over-all view makes us discern the purpose and direction for more clearly—because the range of vision widens.

Past & future: One of the moot points between Vitalists and Finalists and other biologists had been whether evolution indicates only propulsion from behind or orientation towards a goal. The

same problem appears in the controversy on the existence or otherwise of a plan in evolution. The passage above shows that scientists are descerning in evolution a preparation for the future. So much Julian Huxley concedes. If grass appears on land, if the sea water contains oxygen, if animals change their colour into that of the surroundings we may not see any purpose. If however grass becomes the necessary food for animals who come after; if gills to extract oxygen arrive subsequently with fish; if changing colour protects an animal from its enemy, it would be too much to ask us believe that a purpose in anticipation and a movement towards it does not exist. The elaborate social organisation of bees, ants, and termites—as complicated as the human where conscious purpose prevails—make it a travesty to deny deep purpose in nature. Purpose need not be conscious—we may move towards an end without knowing it. Sometimes purpose may operate from outside—sometimes from sub-conscious levels. The seed contains the plan of the tree and amoeba the plan of the animal, the embryo of the man. Each tree grows into one type of tree and each embryo into one type of animal. The universal method of nature appears to be to create germs with plans and powers inside. Re-captulation shows the plan—because it re-captulates the past history, how man has passed through fish, reptile, and primate stages. An outside and an inside view both indicate the existence of purpose though we may see it darkly. Improvement and progress is a debate very much between biologists only. Religions on the whole take a gloomy view of life. Discovery of law has the same effect. Biological improvement may be differentiations or adjustments. Nevertheless anyone who asserts that animal is nothing but matter and man nothing but a monkey with more tricks, may raise a laughter of incredulity. The 'nothing but' school has lost its popularity. The Victorian Optimism of perpetual progress may prove a dead-sea fruit. Even if the early promise of science of continual progress has proved an illusion and a cross section of life rarely demonstrates progress—a long view of evolution starting with earth—worms and reaching the lords of creation discloses a foundation for progress. We have to endow the mythic entity—natural selection with divine attributes and with Huxley believe that copyist's errors and imperfections have made for growth and progress. This may be as reasonable as to believe that if you strike the keys of a typewriter blind-folded some day or somehow you may bring out a Hamlet by coincidence or preservation of preferential letters. Evolution at every

turn reveals a tense drama—of antagonist forces trying to abolish each other. Why life should have this persistency, why it should torture itself and go through the ascetic discipline of sleeping on a bed of sharp pikes instead of throwing up the sponge can only be explained on the ground that a power beyond itself had been egging life on to battle, supplying strategy and tactics with an ultimate object or end in view. Life wages an unequal war against great odds when the obliteration of a few seeds of life makes no difference to the universe. If a gene could self-copy itself why should it be extravagant to suppose that evolution itself tries to copy a prospectively defined plan.

Higher and Lower. A deep seated feature of scientific interpretation had been the attempt to explain the higther in terms of the lower, life in terms of matter, mind in terms of life. This creates a resistance in the mind of scientists to admit the new. The philosophic school finds it more logical and rational, to admit the 'new' and discern a meaning for the earlier phase in the fullness of the later. The shifts, sophistications which scientists employ in support of the theory are somewhat extraordinary. To explain man in terms of the monkey, puts something into monkey which does not belong to it. Man treated as a super monkey loses something in dimensions and quality of life. One reading must correct the other. Thus only we can avoid a distorted picture of man on one hand and a glorified picture of the ape of the other. The procedure of leaving out the 'plus' in framing the explanation leads to surprising results. Thought, feeling, intellect, emotion, aspirations, and ideas have not only come into evolution but bring a part—the better part—of the meaning of life. The fantastic results of strict scientific explanation are strikingly put by Dixon in his Gifford lectures on "The Human Situation". "Carbon, Hydrogen, Oxygen, Nitrogen or their combinations under colloidal conditions—there we have the whole history, a complete account of mankind. In them are to be found the spirit of Plato and Shakespeare, the brain of Newton and Beethoven, the hopes and fears and affections, the saints and heroes—wars and civilisations —religions and sciences, the cathedrals and the poems and the pictures. If this be what is meant by explanation or enlightenment offered by our times the plain man may well explain 'heaven keep us in our wits'. (P. 28).

Law and Freedom. The Paradox of Orthodox Biology—law based on chance, direction arising out of randomness takes un-

kindly to freedom as a positive factor in evolution. Chance and randomness are but another name for incipient freedom. The process has law in it but it is not all law, just as man has backbone but has something else of greater importance, flesh and features. Chance without law cannot take form or shape. Law without chance petrifies, calcifies life. The philosopher regards freedom as something more than change, as the very essence not only of the constituted life but also of the promise of life. The law of relativity has atleast rendered it possible to think that indeterminacy has a part to play in physics, along with law. Freedom exists in a higher plane governed by principles that cannot be described as physical laws. A larger view of life shows that law and freedom constitute life and are its essential ingredients. 'Creative evolution' of Bergson postulates not only the new—the constant flow of the new but also a freedom which forges onwards towards a definite end. Evolution betokens this freedom at every turn.

The unexpected, the so called inexplicable, the mysterious and the miraculous cannot be yet banished by science merely because it may not like them. The business of science is to explain the facts, and not to explain them away or turn its blind eye towards them. The inconvenient facts are exactly the facts it ought to invite into its parlour instead of shutting the door against them. Values, and the moral realm in man are expressions of freedom. The inexplicable happens both in Biology and in History. The unexpected still disconcerts the scientist. The loss of the British Empire in India, the success of Satyagraha, the victory of the unarmed, the birth and growth of Communism in the face of Europe's united opposition are all unexpected if not inexplicable. Life comfutes the astronomer and astrologer alike. Wave of the wand by the Scientists does not dissolve them and we hear their suppressed chuckles as they mock the scientist's gestures. Miracles still happen, and they do not mind the frowns of historians and scientists. Conspiracy of silence does not exterminate them. I should like to relate an incident taken from the 'Readers Digest' September 1950 and its value lies in that it gives the testimony of a well known medical man and does not end in conversion as such stories do.

Alexis Carrel the author of 'Man the unknown' was not religious enough to believe in miracles. He was a Doctor so full of zeal for medical science that a miracle would have the effect of

an earth-quake on his mental structure. He was on the train to Lourde carrying the sick. He got an engagement as a travelling Doctor just to examine and find out what truth there was in the miracles and how much of priest—craft. He was asked to examine a young girl, Marie Ferrand—and his diagnosis was that she suffered from advanced tubercular Peretinitis. He was positive that she could not reach Lourde alive. When she was taken to the Grotto he felt it was cruelty to a dying woman. Marie was slowly deteriorating and two other doctors agreed with Alexis Carrel that her death was a matter of hours, and nothing could save her. Let me tell the rest of the story in the Doctor's words.

"Lerrac (the reverse spelling of Carrel) glanced again at Marie Ferrand. Suddenly he started. It seemed to him that there has been a change—that harsh shadows on her face have disappeared, and her skin was somehow less ashen. Surely he thought this was Hallucination. "How do you feel?" he asked. She answered in a low voice "I am still weak but I feel I am cured". Larrac stood there in silence profoundly troubled, unable to analyse what he beheld. This event exactly opposite to what he expected must surely be nothing but a dream. Her cure was a miracle, a resurrection of the dead".

The story does not end with the doctor converted to religion. He was still a sceptic, though a troubled one. It was incontestable that a miracle had happened, beyond that he did not want to admit—the hand of God. There was a cure that much he could guarantee. Yet deep with in himself, he felt it was not all".

There are more things in heaven and earth than philosophy and sciences dream of. The crumbling of Western culture has opened the eyes of the Western sceptics. Bergson, Morgan Alexander, Driesch, Aurobindo represent the school of biologists and philosophers, who take the broad idea of evolution, widen it and make it a key of life. The facts are given by scientist-biologists and the interpretation of these facts are determined by a vision of the larger context of life.

Bergson. Bergson leads this group. He regards evolution as the mechanism of life, not life itself. All that we see occurring as life flows on is the behaviour of life and not the inner soul of life. This soul called elan-vital presides, guides, directs, evolution, towards an end not pre-determined but determined by man. The

whole past leans on the present and pilots it into the future. Creative evolution does not merely juggle with matter and life, clothing them in different dresses but produces the 'novel' and 'the new'. Matter and life have both their parts and functions to play in evolution. But one cannot be derived from the other. Though we see the future darkly in the process it does exist and shape the present as much as the past. Freedom characterises life. Freedom means something more than negation of law. Law itself has its origin in the determination of freedom. Freedom realises itself through law, and does not cease to be the master for that reason.

Lloyd Morgan in "Emergent evolution" think that the division into matter and mind does not correctly state the truth. Matter and mind are both physical and psychic. In vital events we have a new kind of relatedness that does not occur in the physico-chemical events. In mental events a further kind of relatedness appears which does not obtain in merely vital events. Morgan would supplement scientific explanation by the concept of progressive unfolding in time of that activity enfolded subspecie aeternitatis.

S. Alexander. The creation moves on. It has a nisus towards the deity, that stirs up our longings, aspirations, and hopes. Man with consciousness marches towards the higher status. The next step represents the deity to the present.

A. N. Whitehead. Feels that mechanistic tendency of science and its materialism are due to its concentration on abstractions, merely logical entities. Actual events are always concrete systems, or organisms in which the whole influences the parts "in the inescapable flux there is something that abides: In the overwhelming permanence there is an element that escapes into flux". The governing principles of life are 'the togetherness of life' and 'the principle of concretion. Neither God nor the world reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty'.

H. Driesch. Expounds a dynamic teleology in opposition to mechanistic theory of life. The Aristotelian idea of entelechy—means a plan pervading a living organism revealing its power in the development of organism and all its biological reactions. God

is the ultimate entelechy of the universe which consists of organisms. The world, we may infer, has some ultimate purpose.[1]

Sri Aurobindo. On the creative advance into novelty Sri Aurobindo without claims to expert knowledge of any of the biological sciences but with profound insight into the ways of life has thrown some light. He sees in life a double rhythm—involution and evolution. Evolution though it appears as a stream in two dimensions has really three. Before every stage we have involution of mighty potentialities as in atom and amoeba. When these potentialities are worked out new potencies descend vertically supra-mind into mind. The new potentialities descend on and enter into the horizontal flow of evolution-life into matter, mind into life, embody themselves in the old and form their meaning and explanation. Life converts a portion of matter into flesh, mind changes a portion of life into intellect, supra-mind transmutes mind into intuition. These are hinges of evolution and evolution reveals its face as in a glass just at these junctures. Evolutionary process is a seed process. The atom, the amoeba carry in themselves deep reserves of power, and also plans of their unfoldment. The plans laid one after another interlock and fit in. Involution at the beginning, evolution in the middle, prolongation in the end, are three movements in the creative process. The 'new' when it descends does not merely link up with the old. It flows back and re-orientates the whole series. After the advent of life, matter has been transfigured and transformed and thereafter all matter has a mind and all mind matter and so on. Involution, évolution, descent, transfiguration, prolongation, incarnation are the key terms of the philosophy of Aurobindo. "The ineffable Being proceeds out of its status into various poises of itself but ever on the inalienable basis of the primal status which is always present as the all comprehensive continent of all the poises of the being. Consciousness-force moves forth into graded formulations of itself into different forms of energy, into its various rhythms of action. Thus we reach the conception of self-aware primal energy reaching downwards into matter's inconscience and rising upwards into spirit's super-consciousness (Sri Aurobindo's Divine Life—V. Chandrasekhar, p. 6).

1. See *Out-line of Modern Knowledge*—Recent and contemporary Philosophy Secs. VIII & IX.

It will be seen that philosophers, Vitalists and Finalists on one hand and liberal evolutionists on the other do not differ in the terms to be employed in the reading of evolution. They are matter, law, chance, the old in a new form on one side; life, mind, purpose, novelty and the goal on the other. The early Darwinists ruled out the second series. The liberals find them in operation in life and man only and not in the earlier stages. They do not favour reading from the higher to the lower, and do not countenance an over-all purpose and direction in creation. Facts are sacrosanct but not interpretations. The scroll of life gives meaning when read by many schools of scholars and not only by one. It involves joint labours in a common cause. In the realm of thought we should not recognise dictators. Science should not say 'Roma Locuta, Causa Finita'—'Rome has spoken, the case is closed'. The difference between the schools does not matter for the interpretation of man and history advocated in these lectures. Whether man was planned or not he has arrived somehow. He plans. All the evolutionist philosophers are agreed on (1) a plan and purpose in evolution (2) a descent and ascent of forces in creative evolution (3) the entry of the new or the novel at critical junctures. (4) a moving onwards and forwards towards perfection.

Let there be no hesitation or vacillation in acknowledging thankfully the great contribution evolution has made towards the interpretation of the destiny of man. It has given us the key to the understanding of the gait and poses of life, a key which pre-scientific era did not possess. It has reversed the mediaeval criteria of truth as the unchangeable unqualified, unapproachable something dwelling in isolated majesty beyond all contacts with life. It has brought reality into cosmos as its very soul It has restored to reality motion, change, growth, transformation and transfiguration. It has provided a reason for Brahman seeking his own realisation in creation. From Plato to Bergson, this gift of science was acknowledged and used. Its unprecedented success in the limited sphere of sciences in grasping that which has so far elluded the prophet and philosopher attests to its authenticity. Only we broaden it, develop it as an interpretation of the whole movement of life. We dare not reject evolution without losing our face, and in all probability our audience.

CHAPTER III

THE DESTINY OF MAN

The question of questions is whether with man creation has reached its summit or whether a new height has yet to be scaled? Has the urge for evolution come to an end with the development of mind? Has the book of life been closed or a chapter yet remains to be written? If evolution sweeps forward would it do so leaving man behind and creating a new creature in his stead? Does the finale of the drama take place on earth or in a post-mortem region beyond the frontiers of life? Has the Soul, as Sri Aurobindo says, a mission to manifest here in the conditions of becoming, the higher powers and intensities of being-consciousness-delight or does the soul reach its fullness elsewhere in heaven? With regard to the future the Finalists hold that evolution aimed at man and having produced him it has come to an end, its task fulfilled. Most organisms on earth have been so specialised that they cannot move forward—they can only reproduce. The liberal school on the other hand finds man incomplete needing completion. Let us hear the opinion of Simpson. "Man is probably quite capable of wiping himself out, or if he has not quite achieved the possibility yet he is making rapid progress in that direction. If man does not exercise this or if in any case his extinction is long delayed, it is reasonably certain that he will evolve further, and will change more or less radically......On the biological side few inhabitors of a human body can possibly think that it is perfect, and that some change in it would not be highly desirable (Meaning of Evolution P. 168). Christianity and liberal evolutionists—a rare combination—agree in this that creation has not come to a full stop, and that it has a last lap to run.

This prospect provokes still more interesting questions. Where do we stand in relation to the prospect? Does it stand far off in the immeasurable distances of the future or are we approaching the prospect atleast as Moses did and see the promised land within visible distance, or has it come among us in the conditions of our being and becoming? Using the Christian phraseology, does the Kingdom of God stand far off as prophets foretold or does it lie near at hand as John the Baptist announced or has it come in as Jesus proclaimed? Are the children of God, the biological

new men, going to be born sometime, about to be born soon, or are born? What are the features and nature of the new biological era? Can we describe the pattern of new life, give a portrait of the new man? How does the new man come into existence? By birth or by transfiguration? These questions have taken an urgency since hydrogen bombs have threatened to end the world. The primary object of these lectures is to answer these questions:

There are reasons for holding that we are approaching a world crisis weighted with destiny:—

1. The mind—the highest in evolution by its very constitution is so imperfect that it calls for replacement. The attack on reason—a modern compaign—has made a good case against it. It has not the certitude of instinct nor the direct sight of intuition. It cannot handle life. It stands pointing to something beyond itself. Yoga aspires after chitta vritti nirodha, destruction of mind, on the way to Samadhi.

2. The unwinding of matter and its dissolution calls for a new intervention, if creation should not end in an inglorious debacle. It may be the depths of the mind are not yet plumbed. If matter ceases, atleast in biological phenomena, mind cannot survive body, as far as reliable evidence goes. Their co-existence is the condition of their existence.

3. The explanation of life by biologists exhibits it as the result of chance at its birth, reaching in man only the status of purposiveness. If purpose, hope, aspiration for further progress, be ill-founded creation becomes a mad vertigo dance—aimless, objectless. The need to save the rationality of existence demands an advance.

4. Men who have drunk deep of life, enjoyed her lavish gifts, were endowed with insight and foresight declare it to be lacking fundamentally. Buddha described all existence sorrowful, Solomon vanity, Indian Seers—a lie. Life exhausted, lies fallow. Others see in it a silent death struggle between light and darkness, life and death, plenty and penury. Why should, life and light win? it may be asked. Everything in man backs up life and light. The battle has been raging. The war between suras and asuras has to end one way or other. It can't go on endlessly. Death or immortality should triumph.

5. Men who have special attitude for the feel of life, tell us that creation awaits consummation. The jewish prophets culmi-

nating in John the Baptist, the Eastern seers ending with the writer of Bavishath Purana have seen the vision of things to come, the next move in evolution. Their vision may be true or false. If false the words of Dixon are appropriate. "To create immortal longings in the ephemeral beings of an hour, to implant in him passions never to be gratified, knowledge never to be attained, for understanding never to be fulfilled, to give "him imagination—a fatal dowry—appears either as a malicious irony or a promise of fulfilment" (Human Situation, p. 56).

Science does not purport to divine the future. Yet its story of the past gives us some clue as to what the next chapter in creation may be like, and how it would be inaugurated in our midst. Scientists, orthodox as well as unorthodox, agree that man stands at the pinacle of evolution, and that he alone has the endowment to carry evolution further. In spite of scientific fiction which delights in picturing super-ants or super-animals gaining mastery of life, we may be sure that the future instrument of evolution will be man and the new creation will be by transfiguration of man and not by separate creation. If the future conforms to the past the 'new' may come into man in the form of a seed with an ingrained plan and inbred powers, or by the descent of power on man that remoulds him—those who are dead by resurrection, those who are living by transfiguration, those who are yet to be born by birth process. Evolution reveals experiments towards perfection. The creation of uncouth freaks and carricatures in the animal world shows that the experiment is still going on. The existence of animals in different sizes—the mosquito, pig, tapir, elephant mostodon reveals an artist behind creation. Our hope that nature may yet draw a picture of perfection rests on the inferrence that the artist behind evolution, cannot be satisfied with less than perfection. Evolution had been throughout, incarnation. While Avathar refers to the power that descends, incarnation indicates the history of a new power after it enters evolution. Evolution does not know anything of the dis-embodied. It may be that we have to seek for the picture of life to come in those who have been recognised not only as Avathars but also as incarnations, and particularly in those who do not come and go but come to abide—those who have realised new life in the conditions of human existence. The future may be guessed, imagined or inferred. Conjectural pictures and Utopian visions do not materialise and often misguide us rather than guide. We have to keep our windows open but should not expect the future to come by the window

we constantly look at. Wishfull thinking makes us see things not as they are but as we want them to be.

Where then shall we seek for the trustworthy picture of things to come ? Nature gives us no guarantee that it would fulfil our desires. Indeed it takes a malicious delight in frustrating our cherished hopes. The clue should be sought among men only—among realities. Of men there has been in history some who challenge attention, command loyalty, drive masses before them. They are called heroes. Some are good and some are bad. But all of them are attention compelling. They symbolise things that are and not things that may come hereafter. Above these heroes stand avathars and incarnations descending from beyond. We call them so because we feel they transcend men and measures. Some avathars are redeemers. They come for a purpose and go. They do not stay with us. But there are some who bring heaven to earth to change earth into heaven permanently. They do not embody forces of our age. They bring powers of a glorious age of the future. They change the human order—uplift it higher. They are dreams that gain reality—future passing into the present, ideals realised in time and space. To such we have to go for an answer to our quest. They bring forth the children of God. In them we see the actual beginning of a new order. Of such I know only Jesus of Nazareth. In our day two prophets in the Indian tradition proclaimed his message—Sri Arabindo of Pondicherry and Sri Venkasamy Rao of Kumbakonam.

I do not propose to deal with the theological Christ—Christ in Christian dogma and doctrine—the Second Person in the Trinity. I should like to study him not as the son of God—in his relation to God but as the son of man in his bearing on human destiny—as one who interprets history for us. His disciples considered him Thathagatha—he that is to come, one who carries human destiny to new heights. He asked them at Caesarea Phillipi what do men say I—the son of Man am? They replied 'some say you are a prophet—some the prophet". He then asked them, you know me, you have been with me what do you say? Peter on behalf of the disciples said 'Thou art the son of God—the Messiah'—which meant different things to different people but to all one who transcends human destiny (Mat. 16: 13-16). In what does this new advance of man in Jesus consist? This will be found not so much in his teaching but in his personality—in what he was rather than in what he said and did.

Jesus began his ministry by announcing as his fore-runner John the Baptist did that the kingdom of God is at hand. And when he realised the significance of his own being he changed it into 'the kingdom of God is among you—meaning that in him the supra life has entered into the conditions of the world and began to operate on man and nature.

The phrase 'kingdom of god' was not used by Jesus in a monarchical sense for to him God was not a king but a father. It meant an order like the natural, animal and human orders. It represented a crisis in history when new powers are injected into the process, and life lifted into an upgrade status—a mutative turn imparted to it of unspeakable value to human destiny.

Jesus saw in himself the advent of the new type into the history. It stepped into history in his own person. The kingdom of God begins with the son of God for its foundation. Significantly while others called him son of God, Jesus called himself son of Man—to emphasise that in him history continues. This kingdom of God exists on earth, fulfils the prayer he taught to his disciples—'thy kingdom come on earth'. Jesus belongs to the paramparya of Prometheus —of men who raided heaven to bring divinity to man. He stands as the champion of humanity against its detractors, be they Gods or men. If we ask what did the disciples find in Jesus to rate him over prophets, their descriptive records in the Gospels supply the answer.

First, the prodigality of healing power—characteristic of Jesus and Holy spirit. It signified a new vitality and an abundance of life expressing itself in healing. Disease and its parent death stood rebuked before Jesus. When John the Baptist sent messengers to enquire of Jesus whether he was the Messiah he simply drew attention to the fact that the blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up and to the poor the gospel is preached Lk. 7:22. Jesus wiped away the tears and healed the scars of humanity. This was his credentials for being a redeemer.

Second, in the moral realm the new ethics of Jesus appeared so unattainable to man that even the Christian Church called his teachings interim ethics. In Jesus the moral structure of man has taken a new form. The self, the dominant and formative factor in normal ethics was practically eliminated and its place taken by the spirit of love. The Sermon on the Mount was the nature of Jesus put into words. It was part of his nature and not a

categorical imperative. The prayer on the cross for the forgivenness of those who crucified him was natural to Jesus. The Roman centurian, superintending the crucification, was so much struck with it that he spontaneously exclaimed 'truly this was the son of God'.

Third, Jesus was an earnest of the new order and brings into the biological stream a new cosmic power-personality the Holy spirit. Just as animal order begins with life, the human order with mind, the new order of life commences with the Holy Spirit. It descends on man and transforms him from the very roots—body, mind and soul. The triumphant march of Christianity to Rome, its conquest of the world empire was the work of the might of the spirit. The biological aspect is disclosed in the verse, 'the power of the highest shall overshadow thee and therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the son of God'. (Lk. 1-35.) Biologically virgin birth declares a new departure in the mechanism of reproduction. Every vital change in biology has been attested by a new method of reproduction.

Fourth, Jesus had a new body—a spiritual body and a new control over nature. He stilled storms. The gradual increase of power of life over matter has been the refrain of evolution. Its confirmation in Jesus culminates a broad biological trend. The spirit, to operate in the conditions of the earth, requires a new physical and moral body. Cosmic powers of the spirit cannot be harnessed without destruction unless it creates for itself a new constitution that can combine its conflicting constituents into a harmony. Carnal body deteriorates unless a higher life controls it. Spirit triumphs over life just as mind conquered life. Thus only can the new law be substituted for struggle for existence and survival of the fittest and nature red in tooth and claw humanised.

Fifth, the Resurrection of Jesus was not a miracle but a necessity of the new order. The conquest of death and the introduction of everlasting life was the dream not only of religion but also of the scientists. Medical science hopes to postpone death and prolong life. This desire springs from the depths of creation and points to an inevitable completion and crowning of the evolutionary process. Christianity would have been a still born child if Jesus did not rise from the grave. It was this vision of new life that made the disciples invincible.

Sixth, Jesus had God-consciousness, the assurance of being one, with God as a part of his constitution. It was his birth mark. In spite of the marvels of Bhakti, we sense God in gleams—like a streak of lightning—fugitive and transcient. Jīvan Mukti has ever been a spiritual aspiration. The process of life involves unity as in flesh where the unity of matter and life was achieved. Every ascent of life broadens the consciousness of fundamental unity, the wholeness and integrity of life. Jesus had the inalienable feeling of oneness as the endowment of the spirit to man.

St. Paul, a world intellect of the order of Plato and Sankara gives an ideological exposition of his interpretation of Jesus. In Romans 8th Chapter and first Cor. 15th Chapter he sketches the coming stage of evolution. Romans, 8th Chap.,—"for the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God (19). Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God (21). For we know the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body (22). For whom he did foreknow he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of the Son, that he might be the first born among many brethren" (29). Ist Cor. 15th: "And so it is written the first man Adam was made a living soul and the last Adam was made a quickening spirit (45). The first man is of the earth, earthy and the second man is the Lord from heaven (47). As we have borne the image of the earthy we shall also bear the image of the heavenly (49). We shall not all sleep but we shall all be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye....for this corruptible must put on the incorruptible and this mortal must put on immortality" (51, 52).

St. John, who absorbed the illuminations of the Greek, also interprets Jesus as the embodiment of the everlasting life in the constitution of a renewed human body, the prototype of a new species of humanity. He speaks of the kingdom of God, of the entry a man into it by birth in spirit. "Except a man be born of water and of the spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. John. 3 : 5.

The description of Jesus as new Adam, the prolongation of man into children of God, the advent of the spirit into the constitution of man changing him from top to bottom, the coming of

the new in the travail of the earth, the birth and transfiguration as the new process, stamp on Christianity the biological and evolutionary format. Some aspects of the new evolution may be stressed. It takes place in and through man as a continuation of the existing phase of humanity elevating him into a higher order by the entry and operation of a new cosmic power—into his personality. The Old Adam was body and soul—the New Adam spirit, soul and body. The insistence on a new body in the Pauline Epistles is noteworthy. Philosophy has missed the significance of the body in creation. The body including mind is the measure of man. It determines the scope, the value and sweep of life. It creates the world, not merely apprehends it. New Physics tells us that what appears as the outside world consists in reality of whirls and swirls of electrons, patrons and neutrons. The objects as we see are not there. They are not merely objective or subjective, but a creation of both. The pattern of the body determines the creative medium. With the present body we cannot see beyond the spectra nor hear beyond the octave. Our sight gives us only a part of what appears even if things are what they apear to be. To a new and full apprehension of the objective world, a new faculty, a new organ of perception a new body are necessary. With the new body, the new man creates a new heaven and a new earth, constantly referred to in the New Testament in this connection. The new life arrives as it has done in the past in the bija (seed) form. The atom and the seed make up Andanda Brahmanda Koti. The spirit widened the sweep. It is suggested that mutations occur not in the full developed body, but in the larvae stage. So also the new life may come to man while being formed in the womb of women. This is for those born in the new order. For those already born transfiguration and for those who are dead and are worthy to enter new life resurrection may be the methods to be employed. Thus the new order comprehends the whole humanity. Transfiguration deals with polarisation in a new way. The polarities of light and darkness, righteousness and sin are not incompatible and we are not restricted to a choice between them. It is so with our present equipment. With the spirit we gain the transforming power, the power to change darkness into light, sin into virtue, so that morality ceases to be a choice between and becomes a natural expression of life in the new order. Love will transform selfishness. It will not be a life of confrontation of either or challenge but a transmutation and assimilation by the power of love. In these

respects Christian ideology falls in with the liberal and philosophic interpretation of evolution.

Sri Aurobindo starts with the imperfection of mind in its make up. The mind, the highest achieved in terrestrial evolution, is a mid way faculty between instinct and intuition. Intellect divides and analyses while life unites and integrates. The great passion for life confronts nature, with its threat of death. Life would stultify itself if it does not evolve a faculty above mind, or a weapon to fight its enemy, death. Life could not have come into existence only to expire after a brief and futile struggle. The deep instinct for immortality implies a new stretch of evolution. Just as mind arose in the conflict of life with matter so also the conflict of mind with life will bring forth a new power, a higher life with better faculties.

The original impression of life in the toils of Karma—the implacable enemy, invincible and unconquerable, that yields man no quarter, which dominated religion and philosophy in India was a congenital impression derived in the primitive era when man in arboreal stage had to fight for existence against the odds of nature. Later it gained strength from the tedium-vitae of those men who enjoyed the best that life could give and found it insipid. This led us to religions which offer to man a means of escape. The heroic mind of Buddha could face the prospect of negation and annihilation as redemption. Others less heroic went in quest of redeemers and allies from beyond life. This nebulous world crystalised into the realm of Gods or into a God—Satchidananda. The rishis contemplating in a timeless world locate Satchidananda beyond creation before its birth while others equated it to Heaven. Religion became either an absorption into the Primus or a treck into a world lying beyond the portals of death. Religious men had no hope of succour from life by any improvement within samsara. Hence one note of Hinduism has been retreat from life—a note found in almost all religions in one form or other. Other favourable conceptions of life are not wanting and soon the counter current started which sought redemption not from life but in and through life by inducing into it potencies and powers that would co-operate with life and thus turn the foe into a friend. This note struck in Isa Upanishad, and culminated in incarnation—the terminus of 'Idam' route as against 'Neti' Ideology. Behind stood the Matrix and the background into which man could be absorbed. Before stood the incarnation Brahman realising himself through

an inadequate process gradually gaining adequacy. Hinduism had these two heart-beats—systole and diastole—one away from life the other forward through life movements. Sri Aurobindo is the first great exponent in India of a full ideology of incarnation just as St. Paul and St. John were the first great expounders of the concept in Christianity. In his theology incarnation means God realising himself fully in man, Creator passing into the apex of creation—man and becoming his inner Atman. This predicts and predicates the emergence of a new type of man, who meets nature on its own terms and from his sovereignty imposes on it terms which convert it into a helpmate in a joint adventure. Geeta contains the first exposition of an Avatar as a redeemer rescuing man from being enslaved by Adharma. The avatar descends as a fighter and wins victory for man over his enemy. Sri Aurobindo brings out the fuller implications of Avatar, fuller than the partial exposition in Geeta. His line of thought demands a new evolution in nature, a new understanding of Brahman in relation to cosmos. Rejecting the doctrine of Maya in its advaitic severity, he gives life a status and mission in the drama and salvation. Sri Aurobindo takes up the enlightenments of sciences, the revelations in other religions to re-interpret the past spiritual experience and re-orientate a comprehensive and satisfactory philosophy of incarnation.

While realising the narrow and inadequate front of materialistic theory of evolution, Sri Aurobindo holds that broadened and amplified it affords a key to the riddle of life. Evolution gives us two potent ideas—a plastic universe and a forward moving life and opens a vista of hope for man. The ancient static view was unable to see in change anything more than evanescence. Dynamic evolution assigns it a significant role. The victories of science which religion can no longer afford to treat with disdain change the gloomy views of nature and Samsara does not appear to be as implacable and as bitter as represented by religion. Life and intellect are not impotent. After a few rounds with fate, they come to their own. Today we have the reins of nature in our hands. and we need not feel as pessimistic about life as Sri Buddha did. We can drive the charriot of Samsara to some good purpose. The centre of pessimism shifts from nature to morality, and we see light in the ascent of mind into spirit.

Granting we are moving towards something can we gain some knowledge as to whither we are moving. Sri Aurobindo's leadership has been very helpful just here. The next move in evolution

will mark the advent into life of supramental life—the parallel to Christian Holy Spirit. Of this supernatural life Sri Aurobindo does not speak as a visionary, a prophet or a poet. He does not see it as a picture far away. He has felt its pressure and thrill. He has touched and handled it. It was not a product of wishful thinking but a mighty reality. Nearly twenty centuries after Jesus and St. Paul India produced the best interpreter of his incarnation from within Hinduism. He preaches that supramental life is at hand and has even entered life impinging upon us, seeking embodiment in us and working towards creation of a new race of superman, the Christian sons of God, the incarnated God-men. Jesus was the normalised human formulation of God, the spirit of God or divinity. Nietzsche's superman was a glorified gladiator, Aurobindo's—a new man after the image of God, the last term of evolution. The new man has sovereignty and freedom. He conquers death, rules over nature—a Swarat and a Samrat clothed in a new body.

In India, whenever a new idea or power emerges in the religious world an attempt to realise it by a technique simultaneously begins. These techniques called Yogas are of two kinds—Yogas of Mastery, Yogas of reception. Yogas of mastery draw out latent potentialities. The other yoga—a borderland yoga—deals not with what has entered man but with what is entering or seeks entrance into man. Here man's efforts count for little. Like birth it happens, and the child born has nothing to do with its own birth. The situation demands reception, and not sadhana. The supramental life presses on the doors of life and we have only to unlatch the door. The yoga seems to be difficult because it is so simple. We see with the eye but our efforts to see the eye never succeeds. Aurobindo's Yoga consists of one word 'open'. It can be expressed in the words of the text "Lo ! I stand at the door and knock. If any man hear my voice and open the door I will come into him and will sup with him and he with me (Rev. 3, 20).

Nolini Kanta Gupta, a disciple of Sri Aurobindo, expounds his philosophy in the words of St. Paul in his 'The coming race'. The world travails in the throes of a new creation and the pangs of the new creation have made the earth restless. The new man, the divine race, already exists among us—only a thin veil covers it. The new humanity is rising out of present species. The beings of the new order will hold sway over the earth and be the head and

front of the new evolution, in the approaching cycle. They will be what man is and also what man is not. They will be the Master first of themselves, next of the world. They will attain to what had been man's first desire, his earliest dream for which he coveted Gods—Amrutatva—everlasting life. The new life will come when we are ready to be its receptacles, its instruments, its embodiments. Intuition; knowledge by identity, will be the new faculty. There will be a new structure of soul and substance. The old man, by integral Yoga will be transsubstantiated into the new man. The inflatus of something vast and transcendent, something that escapes our familiar scheme of cognition and that is insistent with translucent reality of its own will invade and envelope our individuality transmuting it into a personality which can hardly be called human. This transmutation involves a purer illumination, a surer power and a wider compass and also a fundamental change in the very mode of being and living.

Master C. V. V.—C. Venkasami Rao of Kumbakonam, little known to public as he avoided publicity, broadcasted the same message. He combined in himself by birth and marriage, the three strains of Advaita, Visishtadvaita and Dvaita. An Andhra-born and brought up in Tamil land, he had a vision that transcended communal limitations. He gathered about seven hundred and fifty disciples, mostly from educated professional classes. He wrote no book, developed no set ideology. He too has left us as Sri Aurobindo did for all seeming, but not before implanting in his mediums an unquenchable hope. He devoted himself to the technical problems involved in engineering the new power and inducting it in our new personality. Brahma-Bija injected into man and through him into cosmos gives birth to a new life and man. He named his yoga Brikhta Rahita Tharaka yoga—Yoga of a life without a residue of Karma or deficiency. His initiates await the trumpet call that summons life to its new destiny.

History presents two riddles—the phenomena of conquests and the phenomena of cultures. Why do some nations conquer and why are other nations conquered ? Why do cultures grow, decline and die ? The problem has never been sufficiently solved. The view of destiny of man and the meaning of history above propounded may throw some light. Conquests have a peculiar characteristic. The conquerors have always been of a lower culture than the conquered. The Greeks gave their culture to Rome who had none when they conquered Greece. Rome was

invaded and ultimately went under Goths. History calls them barbarians. Barbarians have conquered because they are nearer the current of life and the civilised have been defeated, because they have strayed away from the path of life. Biology proceeds from life to life and the new man will be a man with new life, not so much a man with new intellect.

Spengler and Toynbee have specialised in the growth and decline of civilisations. Spengler construing Society as a biological unit thinks that like men they have birth, growth and death. This explanation is artificial, for some people are never born into a nation; some like the primitives never grow, and some nations never die. Toynbee gives different causes for the decline such as soft environment and division of personality. But this explanation too is not satisfactory. Britain which lost the Indian Empire was as vigorous and virile when she lost the Empire as when she found it. India reached her adolescence in Upanishadic times and there is no evidence that she lost her intellectual or spiritual powers when she ceased to influence nations.

Perhaps, we put the question wrongly. Nations do not grow and die. They play their part and retire. They get their training and are asked to wait till they receive the summons when the curtain arises over the Kingdom of God. All those nations who had their training and who have mastered their script will be brought on the stage to enter the new age on its inauguration. This explains the phenomena of activity and retirement of nations better.

The puzzle of reincarnation may be unravelled, under this theory. We have no proof except occasional glimpses of the survival of a man after death or of reincarnation. Reincarnation rests too much on dogma and theory and too little on experience. Probably the ordinary man does not survive death. It is the extraordinary men that revisits life in Reincarnation. Boddhi-Satvas who have attained salvation come back into life out of compassion. Hindus believe in reincarnation and the Jews, that the dead will be resurrected before judgment. Jesus preached that the Kingdom of God will be on earth. It may be not all the dead but only those who are prepared and fit, reenter life, to be present when the Kingdom of God dawns on earth and enter into it. That much of meaning and truth remains in the belief of reincarnation and the resurrection of the dead.

It may be asked why, then, if the new evolutionary process began in Jesus, it has not yet resulted in a species of children of God and if the Holy spirit has found permanent abodes in Jesus it has not done so with others to bring out a new order. We are facing the great problem of life and death with an inadequate apparatus of mind incapable of comprehending life. God sends atoms, amoebas, life, mind, Holy spirit, Jesus but does not send with them text-books explaining their constitution and conditions of re-production. If the second Adam has come, we have to make it our business to get from him a new cosmic power and appropriate it. We have to discover the Yoga of reproduction, ourselves.

Christianity, when it converted Rome, was itself converted by Rome. The place of new life, and the sermon on the mount was taken up by creed and dogma and the church patterned after the political body of the state. The Christian became a soldier, the Church an army and heroic virtue replaced Christian ethic. Death was glorified and resurrection postponed, *sine die.* Church was built on other foundations than life and instead of being an organism became an organisation. Christianity spread on a lower gamut, stooped to conquer. This deployment of the Church drew its attention away from the new life and inspiration, to new knowledge and enlightenment. India was disciplined to appreciate personality, personal relations and aspirations to be divine, though in the end it lost its vitality and remained entombed in customs. Who knows in the providence of God, the conjunction of a traditionalised Hinduism and politicized Christianity was intended to awaken both to seek and find the Holy spirit—the Brahma of new creation. In the economy of God we find a time schedule called fullness of time —time to be reached in the meeting and understanding of Hinduism and Christianity in India. In the religious background of India, Christianity may shed its uncouth armour adopted from the West and stand in its genuine body. May it not be the explanation why two prophets in India, Sri Aurobindo and Sri C. V. V., have proclaimed a true interpretation of the Holy spirit and have tried to awaken us from our sleep. Jesus, St. Paul, Aurobindo, C. V. V. meet together in India. If our racial and traditional limitations do not hinder us, we may with the guidance of Eastern and Christian seers see in Jesus the new man and in the integral yoga the meaning and purpose of the Holy spirit. Ideologies are converging towards the new man and new power. Old prophesies are invested with new clarity.

In the light of their combined inspirations we may see the profile of new man and endeavour to devise an integral yoga that will give us the technique of the perpetuation of the Holy spirit in evolution. The children of God are the next step in evolution and kingdom of God the next stage in cosmos. The spirit will transmute body and mind and offer us an organ of intuition, a translucent spiritual body-tejomaya sarira. Man will no longer be a debtor to nature, paying his debt in death. Invested with immorality the last enemy to be conquered will be conquered. Son of Man will have everlasting life. Disease and death, sorrow and suffering, self and selfishness, conflict and calamity will no more claim him. The monadic isolation will cease. New man will be a trinity or a society in himself possessing an internal pathway of spirit communication with others. The Kingdom of God will enter into men and the words of Jesus 'the kingdom of God is within you' will be fulfilled.

Does this sound utopian, too good to be true, a dream that will vanish when we wake up? Even then should the dreamers of the East abandon the hope that he who implanted the dreams in us would one day make them true. Even other wise should we not rather die dreaming great things for humanity, than being satisfied with being worms in the slime?

There are two phenomena of nature which are parables of our receptivity of the new life. The Lemmings in Norway when oppressed by famine are led by an instinct of the past to migrate into the sea where once a fertile land existed and drown themselves. The instinct of the past proves their grave. The eels in Europe living in rivers, distant from each other, and from the sea are impelled by an instinct for life to wriggle into the Atlantic Ocean during the breeding season. Both impulses are present in religion—the one to go back and cease to be in absorption—Sayujya and the other to go forward to fulfilment in incarnation. God has removed himself from the origin and beckons us from the end, thus to fulfil himself in creation. The new prophets of India inspire us to heed the call of life and move forward ascending new heights. God has three poses Bhutha, Varthamana and Bhavishath, past present and future. Let us not turn around and run to the origin from where God has removed himself. Let us listen to the call of the present and future and march onwards. Let us copy the eels and not the lemmings. Jesus often used to conclude his discourses with the words, 'he that has ears let his hear'. The

danger for the sophiscated men as most of us are, lies in stuffing our ears with the cotton wool of tradition, rites and ceremonies so that we may not hear the voice of the present and future. We invent electric chairs that always turn to the past. The primitives may hear the rumblings of the future better than the civilised. The victims of civilisation, the poor, the meek, sinners and publicans, the persecuted and the children are the first to enter the kingdom of God, for they are nearer to the central stream of life. They that sit in the valley will see the spiritual sunrise sooner than they that have their habitations on the mountain tops.

Weaving together the intimations, gleams, premonitions whispers, that point their fingers towards the age to come in the life of Jesus and in the teachings of St. Paul, Sri Aurobindo and Sri C. V. V., I may in conclusion express the destiny of man and the prospects of history thus. Man has not finished his journey yet. He is not the crown and climax of evolution. Perfection has not yet come to him. A new vista opens before him in which God-implanted aspirations will not mock him. He will see yet his dreams fulfilled. The longing for perfection, the desire for immortality, the craving for self sufficiency, the pining after divinity, are not mirages, that taunt the thirsty traveller in life but finger posts directing him towards his destination. He will enter the kingdom of God and possess it. He will contain in earthly vessels the fulness of God-head for that seems to be the meaning of history and destiny of man. The child of death will enter into the heritage of immortality; Love will triumph and the self will be sublimated. The spirit of God shall descend on the children of men and transform them into sons of God. In evolution doom and destiny jostle together, the missing link is a razor path. The propositions of God are not affirmative but conditional —not that the kingdom of God will come but that it will come if we yield and surrender to the spirit and if we are ready to receive. To send the kingdom is in God's grace—to prepare ourselves for it is our task and duty. We aspire to be glorified animals. God wants us to be God—men, His children, the first born of a new creation—men like Gods. When we can say with all our hearts 'amen' to God's proposals we get our marching orders. The dawn has shown its golden tints in the Eastern sky. They that prick their ears and skin their eyes, hear and see its glory. He that hath ears let him hear.

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

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